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To my parents
DINNER PARTY
In a cacophony of competition,
Brilliance waltzes arrogance
Around a table of words.
Wine glasses, brightened by darkness,
Shine reflections of candles
Across unnoticed necklaces,
While a quiet man's mind,
Freed from the necessities of talk,
Quietly undresses a quiet woman
r.o. MARCH (1985)
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ABSTRACT
This study provides a theoretical and
profitability for stockholders of buying
strategic mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
empiric al analy sis of
and selling firms in
The theoretical model
examines the relationship between product-market effects
(corporate strategy) and financial market effects (corporate
finance) in strategic M&As; general and specific synergies,
takeover premiums and overbidding are important variables in the
model. The firm's strategic core is specified, and it is argued that
the core variable is important when setting firm boundaries.
Moreover, M&As are theoretically compared to alternative methods
of economic organization: direct entry, strategic alliances and
markets. The empirical part of the study is more limited in scope
than the theoretical model. Based on a large sample of U.S.
takeovers during the period 1970-1987, the empirical analysis
investigates the link between type of synergy (general/specific),
competition in the takeover markets and abnormal returns for
stockholders of bidding and target firms (as measured by using a
market model). Results from the time series analysis largely
confirm theoretical expectations; strategic core bidders, related,
not core bidders and unrelated bidders realize positive, zero and
negative returns respectively. Cross-sectional regression analysis
suggests similar effects after controlling for effects of competition
in the market for corporate control, method of payment and time
period. According to virtually all M&A studies, stockholders of
target firms realize large positive gains. Targets in unrelated
M&As realize higher abnormal returns than targets in core M&As
in the time series analysis. However, no differences among
strategic groups are revealed for targets in the cross-sectional
analysis.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
1. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PURPOSE
The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyze when mergers
and acquisitions 1 are profitable for stockholders of buying and
selling companies. Virtually all empirical studies show that
stockholders in selling firms realize a significant positive
abnormal return in the period around the announcement of a
merger or a tender offer. However, the evidence regarding
abnormal returns for stockholders in buying companies is mixed.
This result means that in some cases the total gains from a merger
(or tender offer) may be negative even though there is no doubt
. that the shareholders of the selling companies are better off. My
starting point is therefore that mergers and acquisitions should be
done selectively. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to contribute
to the understanding of M&A profitability.
A basic assumption in this thesis is an objective of maximizing
stockholder value.2 In such a setting, mergers and acquisitions
(hereafter M&As) can create shareholder value by increasing the
company's risk adjusted returns. This effect can arise if (l) income
is increased, (2) costs are reduced and/or (3) the systematic risk is
reduced. Managing value (Copeland, Koller & Murrin 1990) is the
name of the game! And that is what this study is about.
1Mergers and acquisitions represent one element of the concept of
corporate restructuring and control. Other important elements of
restructuring and control are joint ventures, proxy fights,
greenmail, voting rights, standstill agreements, takeover defenses,
exchange offers, share repurchases, going private transactions,
leveraged buyouts, voluntary liquidations, spinoffs (splitoffs and
splitups), divestitures and equity carveouts (see for example Smith
(1986), Copeland & Weston (1988) and Weston, Chung & Hoag (1990)
for overviews).
2Of course, non-maximizing behavior will often take place. Even
though this is a very interesting issue, it will not be discussed
extensively in this study. However, this kind of behavior will be
an implicit element in decisions concerning strategic types of
mergers and acquisitions.
2Following Jemison (1988), I divide the gains from M&As into two
main groups: value capture and value creation. Value capture is
seen as a one-time event resulting from the transaction itself; for
example asset stripping or tax benefits. Value capture is
predictable in scope and timing and is relatively easy to measure.
On the other hand, value creation is associated with long term
phenomena like synergies, market power, transaction costs
(Williamson 1985),etc. The effects of these phenomena are more
uncertain and problematic to predict. I will focus on value
creation gains. Put differently, the emphasis will be on how M&As
can create sustainable competitive advantage such that
stockholders in both buying and selling companies realize a
positive abnormal return) The concept of strategy will therefore
be important here.4 But, as noted by Porter (1985:25), one should
remember that "acquisition and vertical integration are not
strategies but means of achieving them."
The basic question is whether the firm should make the product
itself, buy spot in the market or rely on some kind of alliances
(make-buy-contract philosophy). Where should the firm set its
boundaries? Using Porter's (1985) value chain concept.P the
problem is illustrated by using the value system in which the firm
is embedded:
3Before a takeover decision, one must, of course, also take into
consideration the value capture effects.
4Porter (1980) defines competitive strategies as "positioning to
maximize the value of the capabilities that distinguish it (the firm)
from its competitors" (p. 47). See Pennings (1985) and Mintzberg
(1988) for further discussion of the strategy concept.
5A value chain is a systematic way of examining all the activities a
firm performs. See Porter (1985:chap. 2) for detailed discussion.
3VALUE CHAIN SYSTEM
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The fundamental idea is to choose a mode of economic organization
that creates the most shareholder value through sustained
competitive advantage.
M&As can be regarded as capital investments where the takeover
price is the investment outlay. It is therefore essential for the
buying company that the present value of the change in total
future cash flow as a result of takeover is greater than the
takeover price. Even if the total net gain from a merger is
positive. the shareholders in the buying company are not
necessarily better off. The distribution of gains between buying
and selling companies is therefore important. It does not help the
stockholders of the bidding firm much that the total gains from
merger is positive if the takeover premium outweigh this gain.6
The interaction between financial markets (takeover price =
investment outlay) and takeover gains (corporate strategy) should
therefore by analyzed when trying to find the most profitable
M&A strategies. Accordingly. my way of approaching the problem
6 By exammmg 681 takeovers in the 1963-1985 period. Nathan &
O'Keefe (1989) find that premiums in the 1974-1985 period are
approximately double those for 1963-1973. The mean cash tender
takeover premium rose from 41 % to 75 %. the mean cash merger
premium rose from 29 % to 70 % and the mean stock premium rose
from 32 % to 67 %.
4can be illustrated like this:
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The effects of corporate strategy and financial markets will be
evaluated simultaneously. In addition, different perspectives in
the strategy area (especially industrial organization economics,
strategic management and transaction cost theory) will be
discussed.
There are many motives and explanations for mergers and
acquisitions.7 (1) Synergy is often stated as an objective in M&As.
The concept of synergy has many definitions - many of which lack
concrete content (cf., "the 2 + 2 = 5" -effect). However, Wells (1984)
and Porter (1985) make the synergy concept clear by dividing
business units into a set of activities (value chain) and by
analyzing how these activities are performed and coordinated.
Every firm is a collection of activities that are performed to design,
produce, market, deliver and support its products. Porter (1985)
divides the value activities into two broad types: primary and
support activities. Primary activities include inbound logistics,
operations, outbound logistics, marketing & sales and service.
Support activities include firm infrastructure, human resource
management, technology development and procurement. Synergy
effects can be realized through economies of scale and scope8 in
the performance of those activities. (2) Increased market
7For a recent survey of merger motives, see Trautwein (1990)
8These concepts will be defined later.
5p owe r and thus higher sales prices/ lower input prices can also
be a motive (Stigler 1950). This hypothesis is empirically tested
and rejected by Eckbo (1983,1985), Stillman (1983), Eckbo & Wier
(1985) and James & Wier (1987). (3) Diversification may
sometimes create value, for example, in a company with only a few
undiversified owners. Williamson (1985) argues that M&As can be
used (4) to minimize the sum of production and transaction
costs in exchange relations characterized by uncertainty, high
frequency and idiosyncratic investments. In a similar vein, Klein,
Crawford & Alchian (1978) claim that "vertical integration is
examined as means of economizing on the costs of avoiding risks of
appropriation of quasi rents in specialized assets by opportunistic
individuals". Furthermore, M&As can be used to protect rent
created from (5) inn o vat i o n s. Integration is here a means to
avoid owners of specialized resources or imitators appropriating
the rent stream from innovation, cf. Teece (1985(1984), 1986,1987).
M&As can be an important way to (6) enter a market (Yip 1982)
and will also affect a firm's exit options (Harrigan 1985b). (7) The
redistribution theory of corporate acquisitions implies that
shareholder gains from M&As represent a transfer from holders of
senior securities. Empirical evidence provides little support for
this theory (see Asquith & Kim 1982, Dennis & McConnell 1986,
Eger 1983 and Marais, Schipper & Smith 1989). Another type of
redistribution is the one among stockholders and other types of
stakeholders than bondholders. As argued by Shleifer & Summers
(1988) and Franks & Mayer (1990), takeovers may abrogate
"implicit contracts" of companies with their workers, suppliers,
the government and the surrounding community - in the form of
layoffs, lower wages, termination of pension plans, renegotiated
supply contracts and lost tax revenues. (8) Tax motives sometimes
exist in M&As (e.g., Auerbach & Reishus 1988 a and band Hayn
1989). (9) The corporate raiding hypothesis implies that a
raider seeks controlover the targets assets in order to divert them
to his own benefit at the expense of other shareholders. This
hypothesis is rejected by Bradley (1980). Often bidders believe that
the market (10) undervalues the company such that the bidder
6can offer substantial premiums for target firms while still paying
far below the intrinsic value of the corporation. The empirical
evidence tends to reject such a hypothesis (see Bradley, Desai &
Kim 1983 and Pound 1988). (11) Displacement of inefficient
management is often a major motivation in M&As. Takeover is
one way to displace management. However, it might be cheaper to
displace inefficient management by proxy fights, replacement of
operating managers by the board of directors or simply
replacement of directors by stockholder vote (Roll 1987).
Sometimes M&As reflect (12) a conflict of interest between
the management and the stockholders in the buying
company (see Journal of Financial Economics vol. 20, No. 1 and 2,
1988 (special issue), and You.Caves, Smith & Henry 1986). Large
takeovers often give prestige to managers in spite of the fact that
they detriment stockholder value. Following this line of argument,
Jensen (1986,1988,1989 a and b) establish a (12.1) "free cash flow
theory" for mergers and acquisitions. According to Jensen, this
theory can explain much of the merger and acquisition activity
that takes place today. Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that
required to fund all of a firms projects that have positive net
present values when discounted at the relevant costs of capital.
Such free cash flow must be paid out to shareholders in order to
maximize value for shareholders. However, such payment of cash
to shareholders reduces the resources controlled by managers.
This can reduce the managers' power and potentially subject them
to the monitoring by capital markets that occurs when firms must
obtain new capital. Managers often have incentives to expand
their firms beyond the size that maximizes shareholder wealth.
Growth increases managers' power by licencing the resources
under their control. Moreover, changes in management
compensation are often positively related to growth. Empirical
support for "the free cash flow hypothesis" can be found in Lang,
Stulz & Walkling (1990). They find that bidder returns are
significantly negatively related to cash flows for bidders with low
Tobin q but not for high q bidders. A final explanation of M&As is
Roll's (1986,1987) (13) "hubris hypothesis". The implication of
7this hypothesis is that bidders tend to overestimate the true value
of the seIling company and therefore pay too much such that. no
positive abnormal return is realized. The difference between
hypothesis (12)/(12.1) and (13) is that (13). accepts that "bidding
firm managers intend to profit by taking over other firms,
possibly because they believe that synergy is present, that the
target has inefficient management, etc." (Roll 1987:86). However,
the problem is that the buyer exaggerates his ability to estimate
the true value of the target and therefore tends to pay too much for
the company.9
"Value creation" is especially associated with the 4 first motives of
M&As (synergy, market power, diversification and transaction
costs). This thesis will therefore focus on these elements (in
addition to understanding the role of financial markets in the
distribution of gains between the bidder and seller). Furthermore,
my focus will be on the "formulation" aspects of M&As. Process
constraints in implementing the takeover will, even though most
important, not be discussed extensively here.! O As an exposition, I
illustrate the whole M&A process, as I perceive it, on the next page.
2. DEFINITIONS
The market for corporate control (Manne 1965) is the market for
the right to control the management of corporate resources. In a
takeover, an outside party seeks to obtain control of a firm
(minimum 50 %). There are several types of takeovers, including
mergers, hostile and friendly tender offers and proxy contests. In
a tender offer a bidder makes an offer directly to shareholders to
9This is related to the concept of "the winner's curse" used in
auction theory. Put simply, this means that whoever makes the
winning bid for a valuable object is likely to be a bidder with a
positive valuation error.
10For discussion of these topics confer Jemison & Sitkin (1986),
Jemison (1987,1988) and Marks (1990) with further references.
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8buy some or all of the stocks of the target firm.II A "friendly"
tender offer refers to offers that are supported by target
management. Vice versa, "hostile" offers are opposed by target
management. Moreover, tender offers can be classified into "any-
or-all", "two-tier" or "partial" (see Comment & Jarrell 1987): (a)
any-or-all offers specify no maximum and accept all shares
tendered, or none if the conditions of the offers are not met; (b)
two - tie r offers specify a maximum number of shares to be
accepted and are accompanied by at least the announced intention
to obtain the remaining shares in a follow up merger if the
conditions of the offers are met; (c) partialoffers specify a
maximum number of shares to be accepted but are not
accompanied by any disclosed intention to acquire the remaining
shares in the near future. In a mer g e r the bidder negotiates an
agreement with target management on the terms of the offer for
the ·target and then submits the proposed agreement to vote of the
shareholders.I2 In a proxy contest, a dissident group attempts
through a vote of shareholders to obtain control of the board of
directors.
For our purposes, it is necessary to establish an M&A classification
scheme that can be useful when discussing profitable merger
strategies.
categories:
At this point, M&As are divided into 5 distinct
(1) Horizontal merger - merger between companies that are
110ilson (1986:581) puts it this way: "The essence of a tender offer
is that the proposal for business combination is made directly to
the shareholders without the necessity of prior approval by the
board of directors of the target company. Moreover, because the
offer is advanced to the shareholders in their individual capacities,
no action by shareholders as a group is necessary either. At this
formal level, corporate law treats the technique as if a separate,
unrelated offer has been made to purchase the stock of each target
stockholder without acknowledging that the effect of aggregating
these individual purchases is the transfer of control of the target
company, Le. corporate acquisitions".
12 Since support from both management teams is required,
"mergers" are considered "friendly".
9operating in approximately the same product-market.! 3
(2) Vertical integration - integration with companies upstream
or downstream in the value chain.
(3) Related merger - merger between related companies (same
product .or market. and/or technology and/or competence).
(4) Unrelated merger - merger between unrelated companies
(companies without any major commonalities when it comes to
product. market. technology or competence).
3. RESEARCH APPROACH
In this thesis I develop a model for M&As. Based on this model and
an M&A classification system. hypotheses on M&A profitability are
developed and tested by using an event study methodology. Event
studies measure the effects of unanticipated events (such as
takeovers) on stock prices. after correcting for overall market
influence on security returns. Any finding of abnormal returns
shows how the stock market views the impact of the event on the
firm's common stockholders.
4. REVIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides
the necessary theoretical background and gives a review of
previous studies. First. the concept of synergy is discussed.
Different kinds of synergies are analyzed in relation to Porter's
value chain analysis and are related to M&A type (horizontal.
vertical. related. unrelated). Important empirical results and
price/quantity effects are also discussed. This analysis is followed
by a discussion of the market power hypothesis of M&As. The
power concept is analyzed with respect to the company's
13 It is not necessary that the companies are using the same
technology and/or competence in order to be classified as a
horizontal merger - same product-market is sufficient.
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environment, industry structure and merger types. The next
section explores financial and corporate diversification problems.
Based on Williamson's suggestions about transaction costs, new
institutional economics is also discussed. A following analysis of
costs of integration and mergers vs. strategic alliances focuses on
relative advantages of different forms of economic organization.
Furthermore, existing empirical results from the market for
corporate control are presented. The end of chapter 2 deals with
information in financial markets, auctions and the bidders ability
to realize positive abnormal returns from M&As.
Chapter 3 focuses on theory and hypotheses development. The
theoretical model examines the relationship between product-
market effects (corporate strategy) and financial market effects
(corporate finance) in strategic M&As; general and specific
synergies, takeover premiums and overbidding are important
variables in the model (these variables are defined later in this
study). The firm's strategic core is specified, and it is argued that
the core variable is important when setting firm boundaries.
Moreover, M&As are theoretically compared to alternative forms of
economic organization: direct entry, strategic alliances and
markets. The empirical part is more limited in scope than the
theoretical model. A main focus when developing hypotheses is to
emphasize the relationship between strategic core, takeover
premiums and abnormal returns. The degree of asset specificity
(and implicitly different types of synergies) are taken into
account when classifying transactions such that one gets some
insights into the degree of diversification of the transaction.
Chapter 4 presents the data, sample selection and methodology
while Chapter 5 gives the empirical findings and discussion of
results. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides suggestions
for future research.
1 1
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
PREVIOUS STUDIES
1. SYNERGY
1.1. The concept
Synergy is often a major motivation in mergers and acquisitions.
In business literature synergy is frequently described as the "2 + 2
= 5"-effect to denote the fact that the firm seeks a product-market
posture with a combined performance that is greater than the sum
of its parts) Wells (1984) and Porter (1985) give synergy concrete
content and provide a very good systematization and discussion of
synergy possibilities and effects. The reader should refer to these
two studies for specific examples.
Following most of the literature. I divide the synergy concept into
economies of scale and scope:
Economies of scale are present when efficiencies arise from the
expanded production of a specific product. Put differently.
economies of scale occur when increase in production volume of a
specific product reduces average costs (Yao 1989). Early studies in
1Supplement 1 gives an overview over definitions of the synergy
concept in several recent studies.
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the industrial organization literature focused much on the notion
of scale economies. Stigler (1958), Pickering (1974), Hanoch
(1975), Scherer (1974,1980), Scherer.Beckenstein.Kaufer, Murphy
& Bougeon-Massen (1975), McGee (1975) and Hay & Morris (1979)
all provide industry studies and concrete examples. One type of
economies of scale is reduced set up costs. Sometimes it takes
several days to set up a metal- stamping press to produce a
particular automobile fender, roof or door panel. A high-volume
factory which can assign each press full time to a single part will
incur this set up cost infrequently.
attributable to specialization both
Cost savings may also be
with respect to labor and
physical capital. In the automobile industry for instance, a large
automobile engine plant can save millions of dollars annually by
investing in automated cylinder boring, value seating, and work-
piece transfer machines, while the low volume producer must opt
for slower, more labor-intensive general-purpose machine tools
(Scherer 1980).
While scale is a static concept, there may be dynamic benefits of
scale through what has been described as the experience or
learning effect.2 The high volume that helps a firm to exploit
scale benefits also allows it to accumulate learning which leads to a
progressive cost reduction as the firm moves down its learning
curve. Put differently, scale economies may be realized if cost
declines are realized through an increase in the production rate
(movement along a given long-run average cost curve). The
learning effect reduces costs over time because of cumulative
production volume (movement of the long run cost curve).
Economies of scope are present if the cost of the joint
production of two or more products is less than the cost of
producing them separately (Ghosal 1987, Singh & Montgomery
1987), that is an increase in the number of products offered
2 See Amit (1986) for a discussion of experience curves and cost
leadership strategy.
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decreases average cost.3 Suppose, for example, that the variability
of output of one product leaves an expensive machine idle for some
time. Economies of scope can be captured if that machine is used to
produce another product during its low-usage periods. It is
important to note that scope economies can occur outside of the
production area. Distribution systems and intangible assets like
brand names can be a source of scope economies if they are used
for more than one product: Another source of scope economies is
sharing of specialized know-how (Teece 1982). Due to market
imperfections this know-how may be unavailable at the same cost
to other firms in the market place. In general, economies of scope
can be realized through complementary products and shared
technology, knowledge and external relations.
As noted by Porter (1985), synergy effects in mergers and
acquisitions can enhance the company's competitive advantage by
lowering its costs and/or by increasing differentiation (and
therefore income). 4 This is important because value is what
buyers are willing to pay for; superior value stems from offering
lower prices than competitors for equivalent benefits or providing
unique benefits that more than offset a higher price. According to
Lubatkin & O'Neill (1987) synergies may also reduce the firm's
systematic risk. Therefore synergies can have both important cost,
revenue and risk effects. All of these effects should be considered
thoroughly when analyzing future effects of a merger.
Since realizing synergies involves costs of sharing (e.g., Porter
1985:chap. 9 and Ghoshal 1987), it is important that the benefits
from sharing outweigh the costs. It is also important that the
3The term scope economies is both a newer concept and not as
clearly defined concept as scale economies. This has led to some
confusion in the literature. For instance, Teece (1980) seems to
define economies of scope in a way that also includes scale
economies.
4Synergies can affect differentiation in two separate ways: either
by increasing the uniqueness of the activity or by reducing the
cost of being unique.
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synergy potential may have a significant impact on the firms'
competitive advantage. Merger proponents should therefore
concentrate on strategic synergies, that is focusing on activities in
the value chain that have a large potential for synergy effects5
and where the activity constitutes a large percentage of operating
costs or assets.
1.2. Synergies and value chain analysis
Porter (1985:33) defines the value chain as a "systematic way of
examining all the activities a firm performs and how they
interact".6 By coordinating the activities in separate value chains,
economies of scale and scope can be realized. Empirically (see later
discussion), the synergy hypothesis is one of the hypotheses that is
not rejected in M&As. A detailed examination of benefits and costs
through value chains analysis is therefore often a key factor for
M&A success.
By using the value chain analysis one can disaggregate the
synergy effects in different value-creating activities of the firm.
This is important, not only to identify the relevant activities, but
also because the efficient scale may differ depending on type of
activity. A disaggregated view (in contrast to a unitary view of
scale) permits the firm to configure different elements of its value
chain to attain optimum scale economies in each. A business unit
can potentially share any value activity with another business
unit in the firm including primary and supporting activities.
Based on Porter (1985:chap.9), supplement 2 sums up synergies
connected to different value activities.
5Activities that have large scale,scope and learning sensitivities.
6 For detailed discussion of the value chain concept, see Porter
(1985,1986,1987b).
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In M&As the focus is on shared activities between strategically
distinct value chains.? Synergy effects from shared activities can
lead to a sustainable competitive advantage.
that the advantage is to some degree
important point is whether synergy effects
It is required, though,
sustainable. Another
can be realized more
cheaply by using some kind of strategic alliances instead of full
integration. All these issues will be discussed later in this study.
Much of the synergy literature focuses on shared activities
between two distinct value chains. In my view, shared external
relations (networks and strategic alliances, see section 6 below)
have not been emphasized enough. When searching for synergies,
one should analyze interrelationships both between the value
chain activities performed by the merging firms and the
environments in which the firms are embedded:
7A related, but different kind of problem is linkages wit hin the
value chain. Such linkages exist because
system of interdependent activities.
interdependencies are both important and
they will not be discussed further here.
the value chain is a
Even though such
interesting to study,
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Having access to strong strategic alliances often cre.ates
competitive advantage (e.g., Jarillo 1988, Reve 1990). Giving a
merger partner access to these alliances might create significant
synergy effects. Analogous to Teece's (1980,1982) discussion of
know-how, I will argue that the marginal cost of giving access to
these alliances for a merger partner is often likely to be much less
than the average costs of sustaining the alliances. The value of
these alliances can often be transferred to a merger partner
without impairing the inherent value of the alliance. Synergies
created by shared external relations therefore deserve careful
attention in a merger setting. One must, however, be aware of
problems that can easily arise when sharing external relations.
Relationships with customers, suppliers, competitors and
regulatory agents can easily be disrupted during the process
which in tum may cause damage to the value of business (negative
synergies).
In my view, a good way of classifying the concept of synergy is to
divide into 4 main ways of realizing economies of scale and scope:
(1) shared activities, (2) shared knowledge/skills, (3) shared
external relations and (4) shared image/reputation:
,..
"
SYNERGIES
Firm A > 1. Shared activities2. Shared knowledgelskills3. shared external
relations
4. Shared imagel
goodwill
< Firm B
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Shared activities refer to economies of scale and scope in primary
activities (inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics,
marketing and sales and service) and in support activities (firm
infrastructure, human resource management, technology
management and procurement). Transfer of knowledge/skills may
create substantial synergy effects by increasing efficiency or
quality in different activities that are performed. Shared external
relations may create synergy effects in the interrelationships with
suppliers, buyers, competitors and regulatory agents. Finally,
synergy can be realized through transfer of reputation and brand
name. Reputation (see Weigelt & Camerer 1988 and Nayyar 1990) is
a key factor in competition and is especially important for goods
and services for which quality cannot be physically ascertained
before purchase and when after sales service is important.
Finally, as already indicated, different classes of synergies seem to
have quite different potentials for economies of scale and scope
and different costs associated with implementation. In general,
one should expect that when synergies are based on tan gib l e
assets, the excess capacity available for scale and scope economies
are exhausted relatively fast. By contrast, some intangible
resources, such as brand names and reputation can sometimes be
repeatedly used with little cost in the effectiveness of original
operations.
1.3. Synergies and M&A type
The potential for significant net positive synergy effects seems to
be different for various types of M&As. Presumably, horizontal
and related M&As have the biggest opportunity for realizing
significant synergy effects followed by vertical and unrelated
mergers.
In horizontal/related M&As there are several mechanisms
available for the combination of the two firms to be more valuable
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than the sum of their premerger values (Chatterjee 1986,Singh &
Montgomery 1987, Lubatkin 1987). In such cases there will often be
opportunities to reduce costs or enhance differentiation in
virtually any activity in the value chain (Porter 1985). However,
the notions of "fit" or "commonalities" are often viewed too broadly
leading to an overvaluation of the synergy effects.
Synergy effects in vertical integration are, in most cases,
expected to be smaller than in horizontal/related mergers.
Nevertheless, vertical linkages8 may sometimes lead to enhanced
competitive advantage if they are exploited. Competitive advantage
can be a result of lower costs or enhanced differentiation by
coordinating and jointly optimizing supplier and channel linkages
(see Porter 1985 pp. 50-52, 55, 76-78, 103, 125 for concrete examples
and further discussion). As noted by Waterson (1984), it is quite
often the case that vertical activities are subject to scale economies:
"For example, both the glass and the gearboxes which go into a
motor car probably come from processes involving substantial
scale economies, but while engines are commonly produced by the
car assembler, glass is usually not" (p.95). According to Scherer
(1980), many firms have integrated too much upstream. He
therefore argues for some kind of "vertical disintegration" If a
given production process requires a scale of production larger
than the smaller firms in an industry can achieve, this process
tends to be separated off from the downstream companies. In such
cases there will often first be a vertical disintegration followed by
horizontal mergers upstream in order to achieve a more efficient
scale at that stage.
The gains available in unrelated acquisitions are expected, ceteris
paribus, to be lower than those for related acquisitions (Singh &
Montgomery 1987, Lubatkin 1987). . Gains in unrelated acquisitions,
if any, result from infrastructure interrelationships (Porter 1985).
8Vertical linkages are linkages between a firm's value chain and
the value chains of suppliers and channels.
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These synergies can stem from shared financing, cash utilization,
accounting, legal department, government relations, hiring .and
training. Such effects may result in reduced financing costs (due
~-.,-'...._
to lowered bankruptcy risk or internal financing arrangements),
increased administrative efficiencies, or superior utilization of
human capital not specific to products or businesses (Singh &
Montgomery 1987). Lewellen (1971) argues that lender risk is
often reduced in M&As while Galai, & Masulis (1976) ~
pricing theOl:~ to show that this reduced lender risk will result in a
change in the relative position between creditors and
shareholders: debt value increases and equity value decreases.Y In
an extension of Galai & Masulis' model, Shastri (1982) discusses
various theoretical scenarios where the net effect on equity value
is uncertain. Such scenarios are created by allowing the merging
companies to have different cash flow variance, different leverage
and different debt maturity.
Williamson (1975), Teece (1982) and Jones & Hill (1988) postulate
that multidivisional firms can establish internal capital markets
with resource allocation properties superior to those obtained by
the external capital market. The reason for this effect is investors'
inferior access to inside information and weak control instruments
exercised by the financial intermediaries and the stock market.
Often it is costly to obtain and transmit information about
investment opportunities, making it difficult to utilize the capital
markets efficiently. In addition, control disadvantages give scope
for managers to behave opportunistically, maximizing their own
utility functions rather than those of shareholders. Unrelated
M&As can. therefore create economies of internal capital markets
by internal audits (enhanced control) and achieve a better
allocation of resources.
9 Theoretically this effect can be neutralized by increasing the
leverage.
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In an important paper, Myers & Majluf (1984) put forward another
rationale for conglomerate mergers. They present a model where
given asymmetry in information between managers and
shareholders, a firm with insufficient financial slack may not
undertake all valuable investment opportunities. Myers & Majluf
suggest that value may be created in a merger when firms rich in
financial slack acquire slack poor firms. The value created
through such a merger stems from the additional positive NPV
investment taken by the merged firm that the slack-poor firm
might pass up.
Porter (1985 :348/349) claims that infrastructure interrelationships
have a rather small effect on competitive advantage. In some cases
though, infrastructure synergies and economies of internal capital
markets might have significant effects. It is, however, difficult to
interpret the empirical evidence in this area.
1.4. Sustainability, industry structure and empirical
results
Synergy effects do not lead to above average performance unless
they are sustainable. Positive effects can be nullified by rapid
imitation from competitors or new entrants. Even worse, if
imitation of a move from competitors has the effect of wrecking
industry structure, then every one is worse off (Porter 1985:8). It
is therefore important to analyze the total dynamic effects of M&As
on the industry structure. Will the threat of newentrants
increase? Will the rivalry among existing competitors be more
intense? What about the threat of substitute products? Caves &
Porter (1977), Spence (1977), Dixit (1980), Porter (1979,1980) and
Tirole (1988) discuss these problems in detail.
In order for synergy effects to create sustainable competitive
advantage, it is required that a firm possesses some barriers that
make imitation difficult. Such barriers to imitation may stem from
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some kind of uniqueness, like reputation or goodwill (Demsetz
1973) or team production/knowledge (Alchian & Demsetz 1972) .. As
Demsetz points out, it is often difficult to understand the reasons
for difference in performance between firms or to know to which
inputs to attribute the performance of the successful firm.
Lippman & Rumelt's (1982) theory of uncertain imitability
explains the origin and persistence of interfirm differences in
efficiency.10 In short, uncertain imitability will exist when the
creation of new production functions is inherently uncertain and
when either causal ambiguity or property rights in unique
resources impede imitation and factor mobility. According to
Lippman & Rumelt "it may never be possible to produce a finite
unambiguous list of the factors of production responsible for the
success of firms. ..... Factors of production cannot be mobile unless
they are known" (pA20). In addition to ambiguity, factor
immobility can be explained by uniqueness combined with
enforceable rights to the exclusive use of the unique resource (for
example patents or ownership of a special resource). Reed &
DeFillipi (1990) discuss how causal ambiguity can create
barriers to imitation. They argue that competitive advantage based
on competencies that have causally ambiguous characteristics will
be difficult for competitors to imitate. Tacitness, complexity and
specificity tend to produce such ambiguity. Tacitness is implicit
and non-codifiable accumulation of skills that results from
learning by doing. Complexity results from having a large
Specificity refers tonumber of interdependent skills and assets.
the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses
without sacrifice of productive value. Moreover, in an interesting
article, Yao (1988) argues that failures of the competitive market
are necessary conditions for expected positive abnormal returns.
Yao refers to market failures as "impediments to economic
1DOne of the interesting results from Lippman & Rumelt's model is
the generation of equilibria in which there are stable interfirm
differences in profitability, an above-normal industry rate of
return and a lack of entry even when firms are atomistic price
takers.
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activity" .
failures are
transaction
Specifically, three fundamental causes of market
identified: production
costs and imperfect
economies and sunk costs,
information. l l Sunk costs
and transaction costs are highly correlated with specificity.
Imperfect information implies that actors in the market place have
differential information about prices and quality.12 The causes of
market failure (causal ambiguity, sunk costs, transaction costs and
imperfect information) give a more systematic way to assess the
significance
application.
or importance of a barrier in any particular
All types of entry barriers should be evaluated with
respect to these four causes of market failure to identify profitable
markets and appropriate strategies for those markets. For further
discussion of connections among impediments and entry barriers,
see Yao (1988:65 ff.).
Since the imitation in many situations is only imperfect, producer
rents will not be fully eliminated. Peltzman (1977:232) provides a
graphical analysis of the dynamics in that respect. For an extreme
view in the opposite direction, see Baumol's (1982) discussion of
contestable markets.l 3
Sustainability of cost advantage varies for different cost drivers
and from one industry to another. According to Porter (1985:112)
some cost drivers tend to be more sustainable than others: scale,
interrelationships, linkages, proprietary products or process
Il Even if the market failure concept seldom is explicitly discussed
in the entry barriers literature, the notion is necessarily implicit
in the discussion.
12 See Nayyar (1990) for an interesting discussion on information
asymmetries.
13 Baumol defines a "contestable market" as a market where entry
is absolutely free and exit is absolutely costless. Free entry is here
meant to imply that the entrant suffers no competmve
disadvantage in terms of facing higher costs or less ability to
differentiate. The theory of contestability holds that, in
circumstances where entry and exit are instantaneous and devoid
of sunk costs, the equilibrium price would approach (or equal in
the polar case) the competitive price, regardless of the number of
actual competitors.
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technology. Similarly, sustainability of differentiation depends
on two things: its continued perceived value by buyers and. the
lack of imitation by competitors. Differentiation will be more
sustainable when (Porter 1985:159) (1) the firm's sources of
uniqueness involve barriers,14 (2) the firm has a cost advantage in
differentiation, (3) the sources of differentiation are multiple and
(4) a firm creates switching costs at the same time as it
differentiates. A firm should, ceteris paribus, most aggressively
pursue those synergies that its competitors will find the most
difficult to match. Basically, competitors face two types of options
in matching the competitive advantage of a synergy: either
duplicating the synergy or offsetting through other means such as
gaining market share in the affected business area 15 or exploiting
other types of synergies. However, it is important to note that
many of these effects can be realized by relying on market
transactions or on strategic alliances instead of fully integrating.
As noted by Teece (1982), synergies explain joint production, but
they do not explain why joint production must be organized within
a single firm. This issue will be elaborated below in section 4 and 6.
~pirical studies of synergy effects mostly stem f~om three fields:
industrial organization, financial economics and strategic
management. Early empirical studies in industrial organization
use different approaches: survival tests (Stigler 1958), profitability
as a function of size, the engineering approach and statistical cost
analysis (Scherer 1980).16 Demsetz's (1973) results indicate that
increased concentration leads to more efficient production
(consistent with synergy hypothesis) and lower (instead of
higher) prices. Maloney & McCormick (1988) conclude that there is
14For example proprietary learning, linkages, interrelationships
and first mover advantages.
15Prescott, Kohli & Venkatramen (1986) find that gaining market
share seems to be most profitable in "mature, declining and the
fragmented with auxiliary services environments".
16These tests will not be discussed further here.
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a link between multiproduct diversification, economies of scale and
mergers.
In financial economics there have been many studies on abnormal
returns for shareholders based on stock prices. This event studies_._ ...-.----"' ..,._;_ ..._.:.,._.~_..._ .........__ ......-- ..~.__.........,.".,..--_., .•,.......... _.,.:'"
seem to be the best method to analyze the profitability of "events"
like M&As.17 Jensen & Ruback (1983), Eckbo (1987,1988),
Jarrell,Brickley & Netter (1988), Copeland & Weston (1988:chap. 20),
Jarrell (1988), Roll (1986,1987,1988) and Magenheim & Mueller
(1988) all give good surveys of recent empirical results from
financial economics. Also 4 studies from st[ateiic man~~ment u~e-
(Chatterjee 1986, Lubatkin 1987, Singh & Montgomery 1987 and
Shelton 1985,1988).18 Many of the studies tend to conclude that
~_""_""""'''"'_'''''''''''''''","''''''''_'~_ ''''''''-'L· ....''·"·",.,...,-~~,-,......_~.",'''''".i
M&As create value (that is, create positive abnormal returns).
': ',' _'-'-'''''_-:''',,- '-'»:")-"'-"-'-""""""""-'-
However, almost all of these studies fail to analyze whether these
abnormal returns stem from synergies (productive efficiency) or
collusion (market power). Important exceptions are Eckbo
'"''' __''' "'"".__' ,_' ....,,_,_,~_.'._,Y.'" -,"
(1983,1985), Eckbo & Wier (1985) and Stillman (1983). By using a
special test method they are able to test the collusion hypothesis.
All these studies reject the collusion hypothesis, but since the total
gains from M&As do not seem to be negative, they are not able to
reject the synergy hypothesis.
In summary, synergy effects created by economies of scale and
scope can increase competitive advantage by lowering costs or
enhancing differentiation. Such synergy effects can be obtained
by coordinating various activities in the value chain, and the
synergy potential seems to differ between various M&A types. The
synergy hypothesis is one of the few hypothesis in M&As that is
not empirically rejected.
17The event study methodology is discussed later in this study.
18All these studies will be discussed in section 7: empirical results.
25
2. M&As AND INCREASED POWER
One hypothesis is that M&As increase a firm's power in relation to
actors in the environment. The purpose of this section is to
analyze M&As, power and industry structure.
2.1. The power concept
Emerson (1962) defines power as the inverse relation of
dependence: "The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly
proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B
and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A
outside the A-B relation" (p.32). Drawing on Pfeffer & Salancik
(1978:46 ff.) A's power over B will be determined by 3 factors: (1)
resource importance, (2) controlover resource allocation and use
and (3) concentration of resource control. Emerson's power
concept is fuzzy and difficult to delimit. His power concept is much
broader than "market power" or "collusion" from the area of
economics. Collusion is anticompetitive and creates monopoly rent
if individual rivals within an industry are able to coordinate their
production rates. In extreme, the combined profits of the entire set
of firms in an industry are maximized when they act together as a
monopolist (Stigler 1964). The focus for section 2 (M&As and
increased power) will be on "market power". However, I will try to
put the power concept into perspective by discussing the relation
between "power", "market power" and "industry structure". As we
will see later on, important elements of the broader power concept
is captured by the notion of synergy as defined in section 1 above.
2.2. Power, synergy and industry structure
Organizations are open systems that make transactions with actors
in their environments. The organization's choice of domain
(products, markets, technology and competence) defines its task
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environment (suppliers,
agents), cf., Reve (1986).
for p owe r relations
customers,competitors
The industry structure
between the firm and
and regulatory
forms the basis
actors in the
environment. Following Porter (1980,1985), an organization's
power over actors with whom it makes transactions is determined
by (1) bargaining power of suppliers, (2) bargaining power of
buyers, (3) intensity of rivalry among incumbent firms, (4) threat
of substitutes and (5) threat of new entrants. The power concept is
therefore very closely linked to my discussion about entry barriers
and market failures (see section 1.4 above). A firm can through
M&As increase its power both by changing the industry structure
and its own position in the market.
.5011usion is extensively discussed in the economics literature. For
our purpose, the interesting issue is how M&As can enhance the
degree of collusion. Following Stigler (1950,1964), increased
collusion will lead to better coordination of the production rates of
the individual rivals within an industry. Effective collusion
creates monopoly or monopsy rents and is dependent on the "cartel
members" not cheating by increasing output.
While market power (collusion) focuses on how rivals can increase
rent by coordinating production rates, the broader concept of
power defined above includes all power relations as determined by
industry structure and the firm's position in the industry
structure. If synergy effects lead to lower cost or enhanced
differentiation that are sustainable, the power vis-a-vis suppliers,
buyers, competitors and/or potential entrants may increase.! 9
Therefore the concept of power is implicit in the discussion of
synergies above. Accordingly, one should be aware of the
19As noted by Cham berlin (1933) there will always be both
monopolistic and competitive elements present in the field of
differentiated products. Synergy effects that enhance
differentiation will therefore affect the monopolistic elements and
therefore power.
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distinction between the broader concept of "power" and the more
restrictive notion of "collusion" or "market power".
2.3. Market power and merger types
The traditional market power argument focuses on the
coordination of the production rates of individual rivals within an
industry. One hypothesis is that M&As can enhance market power
by reducing the number of independent producers in the industry.
Mergers that increase market power include mergers for
monopoly, mergers that create a dominant firm and mergers that
facilitate anti-competitive price-collusive behavior with large
rivals (Jarrell 1988). For microanalytic discussions of market
power, merger types and market structure, see Stigler (1950,1964),
Williamson (1968), Spence (1978), Perry & Porter (1985) and Blair &
Kaserman (1985).
Presumably, potential changes in market power from M&As will
differ between various merger types. Horizontal mergers can
increase profits by enabling the industry to price at
noncompetitive levels. However, there are many problems related
to collusion: problems of entry, problems of cheating, problems of
unequal costs and problems of partial conspiracies (see Stigler
1964, Blair & Kaserman 1985). On the other hand, structural
condi tions, 2° product homogeneity, demand inelasticity and
fewness of sellers may be conducive to collusion (Blair & Kaserman
1985). It is unlikely that price fixing will be successful when there
are many firms in the industry. Small numbers of firms are much
more conducive to collusion than large numbers. When the
number of firms is small enough. the actors are more likely to
recognize their mutual interdependence. In other words, each
2°For example, government buyers are often required by law to
ask for sealed bids and have formal bid openings. This, of course,
makes collusion easier because a cheater cannot hide his price cut
or his identity.
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firm in the industry is aware of the other firms' presence, and
each is concerned about the price and output decision of those
firms. M&As may, in certain cases, facilitate collusion by reducing
the number of competitors by one.
Even if M&As facilitate collusion and entry is to some degree
controlled, there are other effects that may nullify gains from
collusion. As noted by Stigler (1950), it will become increasingly
more expensive to acquire independent firms when "merging for
monopoly". The reason for this is that firms which do not
participate in a merger may benefit more than the participants.
When a merger occurs, the new firm will typically reduce its
production below the combined output of its constituent firms. As a
result, industry price will increase.2 1 Nonparticipants will then
expand output and profit from the higher industry price. Thus,
merger participants do not capture all the profits that result from
their merger.
Apriori, there are fewer reasons to expect that vertical mergers
will lead to increased collusion (Eckbo 1983). The reason for this is
that vertical mergers do not necessarily change industry
structure.22 In fact, in some cases vertical integration will lead to
lower prices. It can be shown that under the case of successive
monopoly, vertical integration increases total profits while
reducing output price and increasing the quantity of the final
product sold; Both producers and consumers are made better of
through vertical integration in such a setting (cf., Blair &
Kaserman 1985 :chap. 11). The concept of vertical market
foreclosure is closely related to market power. As discussed in
Comanor (1967) and Williamson (1985:98 ff.), the basic idea behind
the foreclosure doctrine is that an input supplier, by merging with
one of its customer firms effectively removes that firm's purchases
21 This assumes that the cost reductions associated with merger are
not too large
22More specifically, there will seldom be any direct changes of
concentration in the product-markets.
29
from the open market. 23 By doing so, vertical integration reduces
the size of the market that is available to other nonintegrated firms
in the industry.
D i v e r s i fy ing mergers may also have market power effects
(Singh & Montgomery 1987), even though most of the theories in
these cases are somewhat more dubious.24 There are four
principal theories of diversifying mergers that may imply price
increases: (1) the theory of potential competition (limit pricing),
(2) cross-subsidization (predatory pricing), (3) multipoint
competition and (4) reciprocity. The most interesting theory is
probably the theory of multipoint competitors. Market power can
be increased when a firm actually or potentially competes with
diversified rivals in more than one business unit (Porter 1985,
Wemerfelt & Karmani 1985). The basic idea underlying the theory
of multipoint competitors is that a firm that shares more than one
market with a rival firm may refrain from aggressive price
competition in one or more of these markets in an implicit
exchange for restraint on the part of the other markets that they
share. This kind of behavior closely resembles tacit collusion.
Moreover, this can to some extent be related to Pfeffer (1972) and
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) who argue that diversification is a
strategy for avoiding interdependence.
E m p i r ic a 11y , there is hardly any evidence supporting that M&As
lead to enhanced collusion. Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977) do
not find any support for the market concentration doctrine.2 5
23 Correspondingly, an input customer can by merging with one of
its suppliers remove that firm's sales from the open market.
24Blair & Kaserman (1985:chap. 17 & 18) surveys the antitrust
issues in diversifying mergers.
25These studies use accounting measures and fail to discriminate
between the collusion hypothesis and other hypothesis. There are
for example no correction for cross-industry differences in risk or
average costs of production. Furthermore. they regress
profitability against the level of industry concentration instead of
measuring today's market value of an increase in industry
concentration.
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Using capital market data and a special test method, Eckbo
(1983,1985), Eckbo & Wier (1985), Stillman (1983) and James & Wier
(1987) all reject the market concentration doctrine. 26These
studies are, however, not able to reject the synergy hypothesis.
Synergy effects may therefore be a viable explanation for
abnormal returns in M&As.
2.4. Mergers, power and risk
If M&As in some cases increase market power, systematic risk may
be reduced (cf., Lubatkin & O'Neill 1987). Subrahmanyam &
Thomedakis (1980) and Moyer & Chatfield (1983) find evidence
supporting that as market power increases, systematic risk
decreases.
3. DIVERSIFICATION MOTIVES
3.1. Financial diversification
A popular saying in business is that one should not "put all one's
eggs in one basket". This saying is based on the fundamental
premise of portfolio theory: whenever the cash flows of individual
business units are not perfectly correlated, the total risk is reduced
by diversification. However, Levy & Sarnat (1970) show that in a
perfect capital market there is no economic gain from pure
conglomerate mergers.27 Investors can diversify more cheaply
themselves. Actually, based on Levy & Sarnat's assumptions,
investors may be hurt by a firm's diversification policy because
they can no longer invest in the proportions they want in the
individual businesses, but are restricted to the proportion of
26This applies to any type of merger.
27 A pure conglomerate merger is a merger without any changes in
the underlying cash flows.
3 1
investment made by the consolidated firm. In order to create value
for stockholders in a perfect capital market, diversifying mer.gers
must reduce the variability of returns or increase returns to
investors to a greater extent than what is available through simple
portfolio diversification (Salter & Weinhold 1979:chap.5).
If one introduces some "frictions" into the financial markets, there
may be financial motives for conglomerate mergers.Å 8 First, in a
"closely held corporation" (Fama & Jensen 1985,Gilson 1986)
diversification must take place at the company level if the
owner(s) want(s) a rearrangement of portfolios. Second, m ark e t
imperfections like bankruptcy costs and conflict between debt
and equity may have some effects. Lewellen (1971) argues that
merger reduces the probability of bankruptcy of the combined
unit and thereby increases debt-capacity.29 As noted by Higgins &
Schall (1975), the reduction in the probability of bankruptcy is
insufficient for an increase in stockholders' wealth. An additional
requirement is the existence of taxes3 O and/or bankruptcy costs.
Even if there are tax advantages and reduction in bankruptcy costs
from pure conglomerate mergers, an increase in stockholder value
is not necessarily expected. This can be explained by the "co-
insurance" effect (Higgins & Schall 1975) which indicates that the
bondholders receive more protection since the stockholders of
each firm have to back the claims of the bondholders of both
companies.Å! Galai & Masulis (1976) use option pricing theory to
show that reducing the risk to bondholders represents a
redistribution of value from shareholders to bondholders (given
that there are no synergy effects, etc.). However, empirical studies
28 In most cases these effects are expected to be small and can
hardly alone justify the high takeover premiums in M&As.
29 It is not necessarily true that a pure conglomerate merger with
less than perfectly correlated cash flows reduces the probability of
bankruptcy. For instance, if a merger takes place between a small
firm with stable cash flow and a large firm with volatile cash flow,
expected bankruptcy costs may increase.
30US taxes favor, to some extent, high leverage.
31 This is the same as saying that their limited liability is weakened.
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indicate that leverage often increases following a merger and
thereby tends to nullify this redistribution effect (see Michel &
Shaked 1985). Shastri (1982) extends Galai & Masulis (1976) study
by allowing the merging firms to have different variances,
different debt ratios and different debt maturities. In his model the
effects of conglomerate merger on stockholder value can be both
positive and negative.
In sum, in order to obtain a potential increase in stockholder value
as a result of a pure conglomerate merger one must assume that
there are bankruptcy costs/corporate taxes and that the combined
firm increases the amount of debt after the merger.
Empirical
indications
studies of conglomerate
on the effects of
mergers
financial
may give some
d iversific ation.
Nevertheless, such studies also capture other effects that do not
represent "pure" diversification effects. The empirical results are
affected by costs of integration (eg. Porter 1985, Williamson 1985),
multipoint competitors - effects (Wernerfelt & Karmani 1985),
synergies in firm infrastructure (Porter 1985) and gains from
internal capital markets (Williamson 1975,Teece 1982).
Furthermore, the definition of unrelated merger is often vague
or differ among various studies (Williams, Paez & Sanders 1988).
The evidence provides little support for the redistribution theory.
Conglomerate firms seem to increase leverage after a merger; a
potential decline in business risk resulting from the diversified
nature of the post- merger operating income stream is usually
offset by a simultaneous increase in financial risk. Asquith & Kim
(1982) and Dennis & McConnell (1986) find that bondholders
neither gain nor lose in M&As, while Eger (1983) finds that
bondholders realize significant gains in pure exchange mergers.3 2
Lehn & Poulsen (1987) study 108 leveraged buyouts from 1980 to
32While Asquith & Kim's and Dennis & McConnell's studies were
concerned with all types of mergers, the results of Eger's study
cannot be considered applicable to mergers in general.
33
1984. They find no evidence that the shareholder value created by
the leverage buyouts comes at the expense of preferred
shareholders or bondholders.
Bankruptcy avoidance is a plausible motive for mergers. However,
it is difficult to evaluate how great importance one should attach to
this motive. Warner (1977) provides evidence suggesting that the
direct costs of bankruptcy are small,33 Since Warner does not
measure indirect bankruptcy costs, his study underestimates
reduction in total expected bankruptcy costs.34 On the other hand,
Altman (1984) finds that total bankruptcy costs (direct + indirect)
may be sufficiently large to give credibility to a motivation for
conglomerate mergers) 5
Recent studies in the strategic management area provide some
evidence related to stockholder value in conglomerate mergers.
Lubatkin & O'Neill (1987) find that unrelated mergers increase
leverage while changes in risk are small (not significant).
Chatterjee (1986), Lubatkin (1987) and Singh & Montgomery (1987)
all find that shareholders in acquired companies realize
significant positive abnormal returns in unrelated mergers.
Lubatkin (1987) also finds that acquiring firms realize significant
positive abnormal returns in unrelated mergers, while Chatterjee
(1986) and Singh & Montgomery (1987) find no significant
abnormal returns for shareholders in acquiring firms. For
further discussion of empirical results, see section 7 below.
33 The evidence indicates that direct cost are trivial, averaging
about 1 % of market value of the firm seven years prior to
bankruptcy.
340irect bankruptcy costs include legal, accounting, filing and
other administrative costs, while indirect bankruptcy costs are
costs like losses in asset value due to forced sales, opportunity costs
of funds tied up during bankruptcy, lost sales and profits, higher
cut of credit or possibly the inability of the enterprise to obtain
credit or issue securities to finance new opportunities (Warner
1917, Altman 1984).
35 Indirect bankruptcy costs are opportunity costs and are
therefore difficult to estimate. Apparently, more research needs to
be done on this topic.
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3.2. Corporate diversification
Corporate diversification is a broader concept than financial
diversification.36 Corporate diversification focuses on ~
sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 1985) by· reducing risk
- -- -or increasing returns more than investors can do themselves -.;y-·a
portfolio diversification in stocks (Salter & Weinhold 1979). The
effects from corporate diversification will be different from
traditional financial portfolio effects discussed in modern
financial theory. The reason for this is that the firms' underlying
risk-return profile is affected in a merger because of tangible,
intangible and competitor interrelationships (Lubatkin & O'Neill
1987), reduced transaction costs (Williamson 1985), costs of
integration (Hill & Hoskisson 1987) and takeover premiums
(Nathan & O'Keefe 1989).
Corporate diversification may be divided into related and unrelated
diversification. The motives behind related diversification can be
several: reduced transaction costs, synergies, market power,
multipoint competitors effects, financial diversification effects and
easier entry. Un rei ate d diversification seems to create fewer
possibilities for significant economies: infrastructure synergies,
financial synergies and economies from internal capital
markets/asymmetric information. Altogether, diversification
based on interrelationships has the highest possibility to enhance
the firms competitive advantage (Porter 1985,1987a). Synergies
between value chains create opportunities for cost leadership
and/or enhanced differentiation.
Theoretically, corporate diversification seems to be right when
there is a potential for (1) synergy effects (Porter 1985,1987a), (2)
3 6 For a short overview of corporate restructuring and
diversification, see Bowman & Singh (1990).
\_/
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transaction costs prevent an efficient market in relevant factors
(Teece 1980.1982).37 and (3) there are limits on obtaining increased
factor utilization by expanding the output of any single end-
product (Rumelt 1982). Without synergies there can be no gain in
expanded use. If there are no transaction costs. the firm could use
market transactions. Finally. if a firm can exhaust all synergies in
the core factors with any single product. there is no need for
diversification.3 8
Competitive advantage in any market is best achieved when a firm
combines distinct business units that are linked by certain core
skills. Such constrained diversification often indicates specific
factors which normally yield competitive advantage (Montgomery
& Wernerfelt 1988). Although unrelated diversification may
provide financial synergies. it is less able to provide tangible and
intangible efficiencies (Porter 1985). collusive gains (Chatterjee
1986) and multipoint advantages (Wernerfelt & Karmani 1985).
The relationship between diversification strategy and profitability
has been subject to several recent empirical studies. I have
summed up the most important studies in table 1 below.3 9
Rumelt finds in his classical 1974-study that related diversification
is associated with a higher profitability than unrelated
diversification. and that more narrowly focused related-
constrained diversification is more profitable than loose related-
linked diversification. This result fits nicely with the theory
presented above. Rumelt's findings have been confirmed by many
subsequent studies. see table 1. However. some studies point out
that the differences in profitability between strategic categories
37Transaction cost theory will be discussed in section 4 below.
38 Efficient expansion of single products can be limited by product
markets that are differentiated, oligopolistic or otherwise
constrained.
39 The studies are listed chronologically. Supplement 3 reviews
some classification schemes used in some major M&A and
diversification studies.
TABLE 1 - DIVERSIFICATION STUDIES
STUDY TIME
PERIOO
SAMPLE MEASURE
OF
PROFIT-
ABILITY
MEASURE ADJUSTMENT
OF FOR 1100-
RISK STRY/FIRM
VARIABLES?
us STUDIES:
Mel isher & 1966-71 45 congl. Accounting
Rush(1973) 45 noncong. Market Beta No
Runelt (1974) 1949-69 500 indus- Accounting Variab- No
trial compo il itY in
returns
Mason & Gouclz-
waard (1976) 1962,1967 22 congl. Accounting None No
22 port- (ROA)
folios of Market
specialized (accum.
firms stockh.wealth)
METHm
OF
ANALYSIS
F-test
F-test
t-test
Welch t-
test
Christensen 1972-77 128 Fortune Accounting St.dev. Industry t-test
& Montgomery 500 compo ROIC structure F-test
(1981 ) (subs8q)le variables
from Runelt)
Bettis (1981) 1973-77 Firm var.:
Advertising,
R&o,plant
inv.,size
80 Fortune Accounting
500 compo
(subsample
from Rune lt)
St.dev.
ROA
Scheffe
method
of multo
comparisons
Analysis of
variance
Two regres-
sion models
EMPIRICAL
RESUlTS
No significant differences between the congl. and the non-
congl. goups in either accounting or market ~sed measures.
High performers: Dominant-constrained, related constrained
Medium performers:Related-linked,single, acquisitive congl.
Low performers:Dominant-vertical, Unrelated passive
Returns higher for portfolios of specialized firms than for
the conglomerates.
High performance: Dominant-constrained, dominant linked and
related constrained.
Low performance: Vertically integrated
Market structure variables major influence. High performance
of related constrained firms due to location in profitable,
growing and concentrated markets. Unrelated firms were
located in stagnant, unprofitable, unconcentrated markets.
Related-constrained firms more profitable than unrelated.
Performance differences result from impacts of advertising,
R&D, risk and capital intensity.
STUDY TUE
PERIOO
Bettis &
Hall (1982) 1973-n
Rl.IlIelt
(1982)
1955-74
TABLE 1 - DIVERSIFICATION STUDIES, CONTINUED
SAMPLE MEASURE ADJUSTIENT
OF FOR INDU-
RISK STRY?FIRM
VARIABLES?
MEASURE
OF
PROFIT-
ABILITY
":TIIOO
OF
ANALYSIS
Same as
Bettis
(1981)
Accounting St.dev.
ROA
•• 11 ••Hypothesis
tested both
with and
without
pharmaceutical
firms in sa~le
273 Fortune Accounting None
500 c~.
(extension of
Rl.IlIelt's74'
sa~le)
Control for
industry
membership
t-test
Analysis
of var.
Michel & 1975,1981 51 c~. Market Beta and No
Shaked (1984) from Fortune st.dev.
250
Palepu (1985) 1973-79 30 food Accounting None No
product
c~.
Bettis & 1973-n
Mahajan (1985)
t-test
F-test
EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
Higher profitability of related firms due to the precence of
4 pharmaceutical c~anies in the related group. Superior
returns to related diversification may be due largely to
industry effects.
Before adjustment for industry structure:
Above average:Related-constrained
Below average: Dominant-vertical,unrelated business
After adjustment for industry structure:
Above average: Single business, dominant-constrained
Below average: Unrelated firms
The high ROC of the RC group was primarily an industry effect
Unrelated diversifiers earned higher returns on sales than
related diversifiers.
t-test Firms with related diversification show significantly
Median test better profit growth than firms with predominantly unrelated
Mann-
Whitney
U-test
diversification. Low diversifiers were more profitable than
high diversifiers.
Same as in Accounting St.dev. Industry indic., Cluster Related diversified firms (especially related-constrained)
Bettis 1981 ROA individual firm's analysis outperform unrelated diversified firms
sustainable
growth indic.,
innovation,product
differentiation
TABLE 1 - DIVERSIFICATION STUDIES, CONTINUED
STlI)Y TIME
PER lO)
SAMPLE MEASURE
OF
PROFIT-
ABILITY
MEASURE ADJUSTMENT
OF FOR INDU-
RISK STRY/FIRM
VARIABLES?
METHOD
OF
ANALYSIS
EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
Montgomery
(1985)
1972-77 Same as in Account ing None
Christensen
8: Montgomery
(1981 )
Market growth t-test
firm size,
market power,
market share,
ind. profitab.,
ind. concent.
Highly diversified firms have lower average profitability
than less diversified firms. After correcting for industry
profitability and market share, the divers1fication variable
was not significant.
Varadarajan & 1980·84
Ramanujam
(1987)
216 firms Accounting None No two·way Related diversified firms significantly better performance
analysis of than unrelated firms
variance
Chi ·square
stat.
Dubofsky & 1975,1981 Same as in Market Beta and No Duncan's Market measure: Low-relatedness group significantly
Varadarajan Michel & Accounting Std.dev. multiple outperform those in the high-relatedness group.
(1987) Shaked( 1984) range test Accounting measures: no significant differences
Porter 1950-86 33 large US Number of None No Successful diversifiers made a disproportionately low
(1987a) companies units percentage of unrelated acquisitions, unrelated being
retained by defined as having no clear opportunity to transfer ski lls
the company or share important activities
Hoskisson 1942-83 62 firms Accounting Variance Industry eH., F-test Related diversifiers outperformed both vertically inte-
(1987) in ROA movement to grated and unrelated diversified firms
M-form,size,
growth rate,
change in GNP,
company trends
Montgomery & 1960-77 246 firms Tobin's q q implic. Concentr., t-test Find that the wider a firm diversifies, the lower average
Wernerfelt uses beta market share rents
(1988)
snny TIME
PERIOO
Wernerfelt
Montgomery
(1988)
1960-n
Amit & 19n-84
livnat (1988a)
Amit & 19n-84
livnat (1988b)
TABLE 1 - DIVERSIFICATION SnnIES. CotITlNlÆD
SAMPLE MEASURE
OF
PROFIT-
ABILITY
MEASURE ADJUSTMENT METD
OF
ANALYSIS
OF
RISK
FOR INDU-
STRY/FIRM
VARIABLES?
Same as in Tobin's q
Montgomery
& Wernerfelt
(1988)
q impli- Industry eff., F-test
~it~ly market shore
uses beta
400 large Accounting Variab. Leverage, Cluster
firms Tobin's q in stock R&D intensity, analysis
Market! return advertising
book- Beta
equity
.... 11 ..... Accounting Std.dev. No
of ROA
Correlation Pure financial diversification is associated with (a) lower
analysis operating risk, (b) increased levels of leverage and
t-test (c) lower profitability than related diversified firms
Capon,et.al. 1978-80 112 firms Accounting None With and without t-test
(1988) pharmaceutical
firms in sample
Chang & 19n-81 64 firms ..... 11 ... - Variance Industry risk! F-test
Thomas (1989) of ROA return
Firms size
Lubatkin & 1940-70
Rogers(1989)
Analysis Firms that diversified in a constrained manner realized
of variance significantly lower levels of systematic risk and signi-
Scheffe ficantly higher levels of shareholders returns than firms
multo employing other strategies
range test
Chi-square
144 firms Market Beta No
ElFIRICAl
RESULTS
Industry effects account for the majority of the
explained var;ance. Narrowly diversified firms do
better than widely diversified firms.
Related diversification:high return-high risk
Unrelated diversification:low return-low risk
Firms which concentrate in one market area (consumer or
industrial), at given levels of diversification, achieve
superior performance. Different types of markets require
different sets of skills for success.
Differences in performance between diversified firms can
be attributed to differences in market profitability and
firm size (rather than differences in diversification
strategy).
TABLE 1 - DIVERSIFICATION STUDIES.CONTINUED
STUDY TIME
PERIOO
SAMPLE MEASlIlE
OF
PROFIT-
ABILITY
MEASlIlE ADJUSTMENT METHm
OF
AJlALYSIS
OF
RISK
FOR IJI)U-
STRY/FIRM
VARIABLES?
Sinmonds 1915-84 73 firms Accounting None None Mam-Whit.
(1990) U-test.
I("uskal-
Wall is an.
of variance
UK STUDIES:
Grant. 1972-84 304 large Accounting None Industry groups F-tests
Janmine & British firms size
Thomas (1988) manufacturing leverage
c~nies
Grant & 1972-84 ._ •• 11. __ - Accounting leverage Industry F-test
Janmine (1988) membership. t-test
firm size
capital intens.
leverage
CANADA:
Seror & 1980-83 133 manuf. Accounting Beta Ind. conc •• t-test
Devimey firms Market entry barriers.
(1990) market share.size
growth,foreign own.
MULTINATIONAL FIRMS:
Kim. Hwang 1982-85
& Rogers
(1989)
62 multi- Accounting Std.dev. No
nationals
EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
For both related and unrelated diversification. firms relying
on internal development were higher performers than firms
relying on M&As. However, differe~r,es wp.re not s;gnificant.
Product diversification did not increase profitability. There
was limited evidence that profitability promoted diversi-
fication. Industry membership was far more important than
firm effects in determining interfirm differences in
accounting rate of return.
Diversification strategy has no significant effect.
Diversified firms outperformed specialized firms. Industry
effects major influence.
Extent of technologically related diversification is
significantly and positively related to firm profitability.
Some industry and firm specific effects.
Orthogonal Related diversifiers outperform unrelated diversifiers in the
planned case of low global market diversification
c~rison
t-test
Geringer, 1977-81
Beamish &
daCosta(1989)
100 largest Accounting None
MNEs from
the US and
Europe
No F-test High performance: dominant-constrained, related constrained
Medium performance: active conglomerates, related-linked and
si~gle business
low performing:unrelated passive, dominant-vertical
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that Rumelt observes can be attributed to other influences. Put
differently, a key question when interpreting the different
profitability among various diversification strategies, is whether
these differences stem from the chosen diversification strategy or
if they are a result of other factors correlated with the
diversification strategy. Some studies find that industry structure
variables (e.g., market share, concentration, market growth, firm
size) and/or firm variables (e.g., advertising, R&D, plant
investments, size) explain most of performance differences
between various diversification categories (see Christensen &
Montgomery 1981, Bettis 1981, Bettis & Hall 1982, Montgomery 1985,
Wernerfelt & Montgomery 1988, Grant,Jammine & Thomas 1988,
Grant & Jammine 1988 and Chang & Thomas 1989). For example,
Christensen & Montgomery (1981) report that unrelated firms have
lower market shares, tend to be positioned in less profitable and
less concentrated markets and are significantly smaller than other
firms in the sample. Related constrained firms, on the other hand,
tend to be in more profitable, faster growing and more highly
concentrated markets than other firms. Interestingly, in updating
his earlier study, Rumelt (1982) confirms that, even after
adjustment for interindustry differentials, related constrained
diversifiers earned the highest returns on assets.
Most studies seem to confirm the hypothesis that competitive
advantage in any market is best achieved when a firm combines
distinct business units that are linked by certain c ore factors
(Bettis 1981, Rumelt 1982, Palepu 1985, Montgomery 1985, Hopkins
1987, Montgomery & Wernerfelt 1988, Wernerfelt & Montgomery
1988, Amit & Livnat 1988b, Capon, Hulbert, Farley & Martin 1988,
Lubatkin & Rogers 1989, Geringer, Beamish & daCosta 1989). On the
other hand, in their study of diversification strategies in British
firms, Grant & Jammine (1988) and Grant,Jammine and Thomas
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(1988) find that diversified firms on average have higher
profitability than more specialized firms.4 O
Findings concerning relationships between diversity and
profitability appear to be highly susceptible to choices of
profitability measures and time period. Diversified firms seem to
increase their profitability over t ime (Grant & Jammine 1988,
Grant,Jammine & Thomas 1988). This supports the predictions that
management technology (portfolio analysis, PIMS analysis,
organizational innovations) and learning have increased the
effectiveness and efficiency with which diversified corporations
are managed. Furthermore, most of the diversification-
profitability studies use accounting measures. Such measures are
associated with problems. Specifically, accounting rates of returns
F'
are distorted by a failure to consider differences in systematic risk,
temporary disequilibrium effects, tax laws, arbitrary accounting
conventions and by not including human capital in the asset base.
For further elaboration, see Fisher & McGowan (1983) and Benston
(1985).
The diversification studies give an indication of the profitability of
different diversification strategies. Even if a particular
diversification strategy seems to be profitable, it does not imply
that a merger is profitable. The net gains from diversification-~~_#~_.._--
must be larger than the takeover premium. Since these studies do
not consider the effects of bidding in financial markets, they
cannot be used directly in
The relationship between diversification strategy and risk seems
to be complex.
investors take
From financial theory
the systematic risk for
we know that passive
given. In corporate
40Interestingly, Williams, Paez & Sanders (1988) document that
conglomerate firms have increased their degree of business
relatedness in the period 1975-84. This is most likely an indication
of restructuring away from unprofitable conglomeratization that
took place in the 60s and 70s.
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diversification the underlying cash flow and risk profile for the
combining firms will be altered in a way that cannot be obtained
by ordinary portfolio diversification. Studies show that systematic
risk is positively correlated to cycIicaIity, operating leverage
and financial leverage (see Brealey & Myers 1984) and
negatively correlated with market power (Moyer & Chatfield
1983). Furthermore, systematic risk is affected by synergies
(Porter 1985, Lubatkin & O'Neill 1987). Firms that achieve
competitive advantage through exploiting synergies can
sometimes expect their level of systematic risk to be lowered.f 1
Lubatkin & O'Neill give an example on this point:
"It is reasonable to presume that IBM, by virtue of its
interrelationships has distinctive options to combat
economic decline. They may include raising buyers'
switching costs through offering a complete line,
discounting the prices of complementary products,
increasing promotion and introducing a new
technological breakthrough. To the extent that such
options help insulate IBM's returns from overall
economic risk, IBM's systematic risk should be lower
than its competitors (p.670).
In general, strategic M&As may reduce systematic risk because
related mergers are more synergistic, are more able to exploit
market imperfections and can buffer market movements
(Chatterjee & Lubatkin 1990).
Empirical studies indicate that conglomerate firms and
conglomerate-type merger activity tend to result in higher
systematic risk (Melicher & Rush 1973, Joehnk & Nielsen 1974,
Montgomery & Singh 1984, Barton 1988 and Lubatkin & Rogers
1989). This may be caused by conglomerate firms having higher
financial leverage (Melischer & Rush 1974, Montgomery & Singh
1984,Barton 1988) or lower market power (Montgomery & Singh
41 That is, a reduction in systematic risk that more than offset a
potential reduction in expected returns.
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1984,Barton 1988). Lubatkin & O'Neill (1987) find that related
mergers are associated with significant decline in systernatic
ris k 42 and total risk. No other merger strategy reveals a
significant decline in systematic risk in their study. Furthermore,
Chatterjee & Lubatkin (1990) find that mergers among firms that
share the same core technology are able to reduce the systematic
variability in the returns to their securities.
4. TRANSACTION COST THEORY AND M&As
4.1. The foundations of Te theory
Transaction costs theory43 focuses on how a firm should organize
its boundary activities with other firms and attempts to explain
why institutional structures other than markets are often
necessary for efficient governance of economic activity. The
theory regards the transaction44 as a basic unit of analysis and
holds that organization of economic activity is largely to be
understood by considering certain attributes of the transaction.
The central paradigm is whether a given transaction should be
undertaken via spot market transactions, strategic alliances or
within a hierarchy (make-buy- contract). Transaction costs
theory builds on Coase's (1986(1937» fundamental insight that
firms exist because it is costly to use the price system to coordinate
economic activity:
42The decline in systematic risk appeared for related acquisitions
despite an increase in leverage.
43Coase (1986(1937», Williamson (1975,1985) and Teece (1980,1982)
are some of the most important contributions to this area. For a
mathematical approach to transaction costs economics, see
Grossman & Hart (1986). Caves (1982),Galbraith & Kay (1986), Teece
(1981,1986b), Hill & Kim (1988) and Gatignon & Anderson (1988)
apply transaction cost principles to multinational enterprise,
while Teece (1986,1987,1989), Kay (1984), Lundgren (1990) and
Pisano (1990) use the theoretical perspective to analyze
innovations and firm boundaries.
44 A transaction can be defined as an exchange of goods or services
from one party to another (Jones & Hill 1988).
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"A firm will tend to expand until the costs of
organizing an extra transaction within the firm
become equal the costs of carrying out the same
transaction by means of exchange as the open
market or the costs of organizing in another firm"
(Coase 1986:87).
Transaction cost theory considers firms as governance structures
in contrast to neoclassical microeconomic theory which considers
firms as production functions.f 5 The key argument is that
transactions imply transaction costs in addition to production costs.
Transaction costs are "costs of running the economic system"
(Arrow 1969:48) or as Williamson (1985:19) puts it: "the economic
equivalent of friction in physical systems". Williamson divide
transaction costs into ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Ex ante
transaction costs are "costs of drafting. negotiating and
safeguarding an agreement". while ex post transaction costs
include "(1) the maladaption costs incurred when transactions
drift out of alignment...... (2) the hag g Iin g costs incurred if
bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments. (3) the
set up and running costs associated with the governance
structures (often not the courts) to which disputes are referred.
and (4) the bon din g costs of effecting secure commitments"
(Williamson 1985:21).46 It is important to note that transaction
costs are likely to result in a loss of efficiency and not just a wealth
distribution effect that to some extent could be handled by
investors through financial diversification. For example. one part
requires contract execution because it is profitable for him even
though the "total value" of the contract is negative owing to
45 In view of this. Coase's original hypothesis says that institutions
serve the purpose of facilitating exchange and can best be
understood as optimal accommodations to contractual constraints
rather than production constraints.
46 As we will see later on. ex post transaction costs are very
important in transaction cost theory. Maladaption costs seem to be
especially important. see Williamson (l988b).
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change in exogenous factors. Such independent maximization of
profits leads to lower combined profits than joint optimization
(Gomes-Casseres 1985).47
Transaction costs depend on type of transactions and thereby
create a need for different governance structures. The basic
argument in transaction cost theory is to minimize the sum of
production- and transaction costs (Williamson 1985 :61) by aligning
transactions with governance structures in a discriminating way
(Williamson 1988a:73).
Transaction cost theory builds on certain behavioral assumptions
,(bounded rationality and opportunism) and certain dimensions of
the transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency).
Bounded rationality implies that individuals have psychological
limitations (cognitive and perceptual limitations). As pointed out
by Williamson (1988a), bounded rationality does not imply
irrationality on behalf of the actors; the human agents are
assumed to be "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so" (Simon
1961:24). Opportunism is self seeking interest with guile. More
specifically, opportunism refers to incomplete or distorted
disclosure of information in order to mislead, distort, disguise and
otherwise confuse (Williamson 1985:47). These two behavioral
assumptions have (together with transactional dimensions)
important implications for economic organization. As Williamson
(1990) puts it. given bounded rationality, all complex contracts are
unavoidably incomplete. Given opportunism, contract-as-promise
unsupported by credible commitments is hopelessly naive.
Asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency are important
dimensions of the transaction. Asset specificity refers to the
degree to' which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses
without sacrifice of productive value. Specialized assets cannot be
47 Klein,Crawford & Alchian (1978) touch a discussion about this in
their printing press example.
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redeployed without sacrifice of productive value if contracts
should be interrupted or prematurely terminated. There are four
main types of asset specificity (Williamson 1985, Joskow 1988): (1)
site specificity (buyer and seller are located in a "cheek-by-
jowl" relation to each other in order to economize on inventory
and transportation expenses), (2) physical asset specificity
(investments in equipment and machinery that are specific to the
transaction), (3) human asset specificity (relationship-specific
human capital that is often created through a learning-by-doing
process) and (4) dedicated assets (general investments by a
supplier that would not otherwise be made for the prospect of
seIling a significant amount of the product to a particular
customer). Transaction cost theory assumes that uncertainty is
present in a nontrivial degree. Uncertainty refers to the condition
of being unable to predict relevant contingencies. This implies
that contracts are incomplete. Incompleteness of contracts exists
because some contingencies are unforeseeable, or because there
are too many of them to specify in writing, so that cost
minimization requires the original contract to define only the
broad lines of the relationship.f 8 Increased uncertainty makes it
important to devise a machinery to "work things out" when assets
are specific. The reason for this is that contractual
expected to be larger and the need for sequential
increases when uncertainty increases (Williamson 1985).
fr e que n c y (how often a transaction occurs) coupled with
gaps are
adaption
High
high
uncertainty and asset specificity create a need for specialized
governance structures.
48 It is impossible or prohibitively costly to write, execute, and
enforce complete, fully contingent contracts. Accordingly, the
relationships between transacting parties cannot be fully
described by a court-enforceable formal document that the parties
have signed. The contracts are incomplete because uncertainty
implies the existence of a large number of possible contingencies.
It may be very costly to know and specify in advance responses to
all of these possibilities. Therefore, breach of contracts may often
be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of a third party enforcer - if
one happens to exist.
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By combining behavioral assumptions (bounded
rationality,opportunism) and dimensions of the transactions (asset
specificity, uncertainty and frequency), one can describe the
fundamental transformation (e.g., Williamson
1985,1988a,Joskow 1988): Even though there is a large number
bidding at the outset ("ex ante competitive bidding"), the situation
will be transformed into a condition of bilateral monopoly after
entering into an agreement ("ex post bilateral monopoly"). Ex post
bilateral monopoly indicates a situation where a supplier may not
find alternative contracts and a buyer may not be able to contract
with a new supplier on time.49 This is, however, dependent on the
asset in question being transaction specific. Where no specialized
investments are incurred, ex post competition will be fully
efficacious.
If we assume bounded rationality, opportunism and that
uncertainty is present in sufficient degree to pose an adaptive,
sequential decision requirement (Williamson 1985 :72), we can
focus on asset specificity and frequency. The major premise of
transaction cost theory is then that the behavioral assumptions
and the dimensions of transaction are determinants of efficient
governance structures (Source: Williamson 1985):
ASSET SPECIFICITY
Low Medium High
> ~ Market Trilateral TrilateralO oZ ....J governance governance governancew
::law .l: Market Bilateral Unifieda:: C)LL governance governance governanceJ:
49Under bilateral monopoly, each party wants to appropriate the
common surplus ex post, thus jeopardizing the efficient realization
of trade ex post and the efficient amount of specific investments ex
ante (Tirole 1988).
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There is no need for specialized governance structures in
nonspecific transactions.50 For occasional transactions of medium
and high asset specificity trilateral governance seems to be an
efficient solution. In this case market governance is not efficient
because of specificity and problems related to the fundamental
transformation. Bilateral governance/unified governance will be
too expensive in such cases because of "set up costs" (Williamson
1985:75). Bilateral governance seems to be the best solution when
asset specificity is medium and frequency is high. Hierarchy is
not chosen since the specificity is not high enough; scale
economies can be realized through interfirm trading and outside
procurement maintains high power incentives and limits
bureaucratic distortions (see Williamson 1985 :chap. 6). U n i fi e d
governance (hierarchy) is predicted when asset specificity and
frequency is high. High specificity often implies that there are no
obvious scale economies to be realized through interfirm trading.
Furthermore. integration reduces transaction costs compared to
market or bilateral governance. Therefore. transaction costs
theory predicts that M&As will take place when the transaction has
high frequency and is characterized by high asset specificity.
Such highly specific assets bear large losses in value if switched to
other uses. To avoid opportunism when specific assets are required
to achieve competitive advantage. integration may be a profitable
tactic. Put differently. a low level of ownership is preferable until
proven otherwise (Anderson & Gatignon 1986). When competition
is strong. market outcomes tend to be efficient. Competitive
pressures drive parties to perform effectively at low cost and to
deal with each other in fairness. honesty and good faith. Otherwise
they will be replaced.
In sum. asset specificity seems to be one of the most important
rationales for the firm to exist. Later in this study. when
50Ex post competition will be fully efficient in this case.
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developing a theory for M&As. we will see that asset specificity
plays an important role in classifying profitable merger strategies.
Even though the theoretical arguments provided by the
transaction cost perspective seem to be persuasive. they have been
fruitfully challenged in an interesting article by Hill (1990).
According to Hill, it is important to recognize that the "invisible
hand of the market" in many cases will remove opportunistic
actors even when the focal exchange relationship is characterized
by substantial transaction specific investments and high
switching costs. This can be explained by reputation effects that
influence future exchange relationships. Every firm is
surrounded by a system of markets; opportunistic actors by a firm
in any of these markets has ramifications for its ability in other
markets since the invisible hand (through reputation) tends to
delete actors whose behaviors are habitually opportunistic. The
transaction cost rationale for integration has therefore in many
contexts been overstated.
4.2. Transaction cost theory and M&A type
Asset specificity is a critical factor when choosing institutional
form. The need for governance structures increases when asset
specificity increases. Based on this, transaction costs theory can
explain different types of M&As.
Economizing on transaction costs seems to be one of the most
important factors when evaluating vertical i n te gra t i o n
(Williamson 1975,1985,1988a, Klein,Crawford & Alchian 1978,
Riordan & Williamson 1985, Joskow 1988). When asset specificity is
low, market contracting between successive production stages will
generally be the most efficient institutional form. The reason for
this is that (1) outside suppliers are often able to realize economies
of scale and scope by aggregating demand and thereby be more
efficient than if the focal firm were to produce at that stage
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itself,51 and (2) that the market promotes high powered incentives
and restrains bureaucratic distortions more effectively !han
internal organization (see Williamson 1985:Chap. 6). On the other
hand, internal organization is favored where asset specificity is
high. When asset specificity is high, it is difficult to accomplish
adaptive, sequential adjustments to disturbances. In such
internal organization is less likely to imply scale or
disadvantages. Furthermore, in internal organization one
cases,
scope
has
access to distinctive governance instruments that may reduce
transaction costs. The fundamental point is therefore that internal
organization enjoys a progressive governance advantage over
market organizations as the condition of asset specificity deepens
(Riordan & Williamson 1985). Integration will in such cases
economize on transaction costs (Williamson 1985) or, in the same
vein, economize on the costs of avoiding risks of appropriation of
quasi rents of specialized assets (Klein, Crawford & Alchian
1978).52
I have summarized the major empirical studies on ve r t ic a l
integration and transaction costs theory in table 2 below. 53 The
studies generally provide strong empirical support for the
importance of transaction costs considerations in firm boundary
settings (Monteverde & Teece 1982, Masten 1984, Anderson &
Schmittlein 1984, Joskow 1985, Hennart 1988, John & Weitz 1988,
Masten, Meehan & Snyder (1989) and Pisano 1990). Walker &
Weber (1984) and Demsetz (1988) do not find results consistent with
the TC perspective. However, their measures of asset specificity
seem especially vague, and in the case of Walker & Weber (1984)
the components have high simplicity. Empirical results in this
area focus on the relationship between economic organization
5 1See Williamson 1985:92 footnote 8 for a qualification on this point
52 Quasi rents are the difference between an asset's value in its
first- best use and its value in its next-highest value.
53 Empirical evidence on long term contracts and TC theory will not
be discussed here. See Joskow (1988) for a nice summary of these
studies.
TABLE 2 - VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND TRANSACTION COST ECOtOnCS
STlDY SAMPLE MEASURE OF
ASSET SPECIFICITY
METHOO OF
ANALYSIS
Monteverde & 133 automotive Engineering Probit analysis
Teece (1982) components used effort Maxillllll1ikel ihood
by GM or Ford method
Masten (1984) 34 observations Design specificity ....... __ 11 .............
from aerospace (questionnaire)
industry Site specificity
Anderson & 145 sales managers Hl.III8nasset .................u ....__.......
Schmit tlein for 16 electronic specificity
(1984) component manuf. (questionnaire).
Walker & 60 decisions made Assessed indirectly Unweighted least
Weber (1984) in a component through the effects squares procedure
division of a large of supplier compe·
US automobile manuf. tition and volume and
techn. uncertainty
Joskow (1985) US coal mining
companies
Mine·mouth plant Percentage of vertical
(site specificity), integration in mine·mouth
Physical asset spec. plant to all vertical
Dedicated assets integration
Anderson &
Coughlan (1987)
94 product
introductions in
foreign markets by
US semiconductor
companies
Hl.III8nasset
specifici ty
(questionnaire)
logistic regression
Maxillllll1ikelihood
model
EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
Find that "specific" components will have a higher probabil itY of
being vertically integrated.
Variations in the importance of asset specificity affect the choice
between vertical integration and market procurement. The specificity
variables have expected signs and are very significant.
Vertical integration is more likely
1) as asset specificity becomes more important
2) when it is difficult to evaluate the performance of sales personnel
3) when firms are larger
Results show that comparative production costs are the strongest
predictor of make·or·buy decisions and that both volume uncertainty
and supplier market competition have small but significant effects.
Vertical integration is more likely when asset specificity
increases
Products requiring development of specialized skills and working
relationships in order to be distributed tend to be handled by
company channels rather than independent organizations
S1\IH
Demsetz (1988)
chap. 10
Hennart (1988)
John & Weitz
(1988)
TABLE 2 - VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND TRANSACTION COSTS ECON(JIIICS. CONTINUED
SAMPLE MEASURE OF
ASSET SPECIFICITY
EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
METHOO OF
ANALYSIS
Vertical integration 1)inv. in plant/ OLS
in 146 firms current assets
2)inv, in plant/no.
of employees
3)gross value of
durable assets/no.
of employees
No strong relationship between vertical integration
and asset specificity.
Ah.minium industry
in the US
Site specificity
Physical asset spec.
Percent integrated Higher degree of upstream vertical integration in aluminium can be
explained by greater scale economies, higher barriers to entry,
higher transportation costs and greater asset specificity.
87 industrial
goods firms
Multiple regression
Multinomial logit
analysis
Industrial goods manufacturers are more likely to integrate forward
into distribution when asset specificity is higher.
Human asset spec.
(required training
and experience)
Masten, Meehan Components used Human OLS
& Snyder (1988) by Chrysler,Ford Physical Two-limit tobit
and General Motors Site logistic
Pisano (1990) 92 biotechnology NlIIlberof R&D Probit analysis
R&D projects suppliers
sponsored by SO
maj or pharmaceu-
tical companies
Investments in specialized technical know-how have strong influence
on the decision to integrate production within the firm.
Small-numbers-bargaining problems motivate firms to internalize R&D
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(make-buy-contract) and asset specificity. Few attempts are made
in order to determine the profitability of these strategies. As far as
I know, there are no studies that explicitly test abnormal
shareholder returns for bidders and targets in M&As classified on
the basis of this theoretical perspective.
Transaction cost theory can also be applied to hor iz o n t a I,
related and unrelated M&As. Even if there is potential for
synergies, market power and diversification economies among two
separate firms, integration is not necessarily an optimal solution.
But market failure associated with arm's- length transactions in
realizing these economies often explain multiproduct firms. As
argued by Williamson (1985), one should seek to minimize the s u m
of production and transaction costs when choosing institutional
form. If the firm chooses market solution, the total cost will be the
sum of the external price (EP) + transaction costs (Te), while
hierarchy solution implies a total internal cost, called (IP). An
activity will be integrated when EP + Te > IP.54 This can obviously
hold even in the case of EP < Ie (Jarillo 1988). As noted above when
discussing corporate diversification, 3 conditions should be met
before one decides to diversify: (l) synergy possibilities, (2)
transaction costs and (3) limits on obtaining increased factor
utilization by expanding the output on any single-end-product.
There will be no gain in expanding if there are no synergies.
Furthermore, without transaction costs, the factor can be
purchased in the market (cf. Kay's (1982) and Galbraith & Kay's
(1986) discussion on "trading synergies"). Finally, if a firm can
exhaust all synergies in the core factors with any single
commodity product, it does not have to diversify in order to obtain
increased utilization of the core factor. This claim is in accordance
with Teece (1980,1982) who argues that diversification is an
efficient way of organizing economic activity if synergies are
based upon "common and recurrent use of p r o p ri eta ry
54 Total cost when using strategic alliances (contract) is not
contemplated here.
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knowhow or common and recurrent use of a specialized and
indivisible physical asset" (p.223). There are several
difficulties associated with
knowledge:55 (1) recognition,
transferring p r o p r i eta r y
(2) disclosure and (3) team
organization.
which is a
Transfer may fail because of non-recognition,
manifestation of bounded rationality (Williamson
1975,1985). There are also severe problems of disclosing value to
buyers. In order for the buyer to avoid information impactedness
problems and opportunistic representations by the seller, the
buyer needs more information about the value of the knowledge.
However, as a result of this, a fundamental paradox arises: As
Arrow (1971: 152) nicely puts it: "its value for the purchaser is not
known until he has the information, but then he has in effect
acquired it without cost".5 6 If the know-how has a strong tacit and
learning by doing character, it might be necessary to transfer the
knowledge by team organization (see Alchian and Demsetz 1972). A
second reason for diversifying mergers is specialized and
indivisible assets. As discussed under the vertical integration
section, highly specialized assets often lead to bilateral monopoly
situations and therefore possibilities for opportunism and
appropriation of quasi rents (Williamson 1975,1985 and
Klein,Crawford & Alchian 1978). In order to avoid these hazards,
multipoint diversification can be engaged (Teece 1980). Using
these fundaments of transaction costs theory, Levy & Haber (1986)
55 Proprietary knowledge includes proprietary technological
knowhow, managerial/organizational knowhow and goodwill
(industry brand loyalty), Teece (1980).
56This problem is also nicely described in Caves (1982:5): "I have a
piece of knowledge that I know will be valuable to you. I try to
convince you of this value by describing its general nature and
character. But I do not reveal the details, because then the cost
would be out of the bag, and you would be free to use the knowledge
without paying for it. But you therefore decline to pay me as much
as the knowledge would in fact be worth to you, because you
suspect that I am opportunistic and overstate my claims. With
these conditions present, I cannot collect in an arm's-length
transaction the full net-revenue productivity of my knowledge. I
will underinvest in knowledge, or I may try to earn the most I can
from what knowledge I do acquire by putting it to work myself."
multiproduct form of
of added flexibility. in
also in terms of the
informational advantages which facilitate the transfers. In their
model the benefits depend on the productivity of firm-specific
capital in the firm's output sectors and on the covariances of the
derived demand for firm-specific inputs in each of the firm's lines
of businesses. However, these benefits must be weighted against
the costs of employing less specialized capital, monitoring diverse
activities and transferring capital among sectors.
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develop a model showing that the
organization provides benefits in terms
transferring firm-specific capital and
Diversification based on transfer of proprietary
knowledge/competence and/or specialized and indivisible physical
assets implies that the companies in some way are related. On the
other hand, un rei ate d mergers & acquisitions have fewer
opportunities for creating stockholder value. However, some
advantages may be created through the mechanism of in ter n a I
capital markets (Williamson 1975,Teece 1982, Jones & Hill 1988).
The basic point is that diversifying M&As can establish internal
allocation properties superior to those obtained by the (external)
capital market. The reason for this is that external capital markets
do not have the same access to inside information or the same
control instruments as the top management III the firm
(Williamson 1975). First, it is often costly to transmit information
about investment opportunities to investors and lenders (Teece
1982, Peavy 1984, Myers & Majluf 1984, Bruner 1988). Second, the
head office often has better control instruments than the external
markets because of access to internal audits, performance
monitoring systems, hire-and-fire polices and reward-and-
incentive schemes (Williamson 1975, Jones & Hill 1988). In sum,
firms pursuing unrelated diversification might achieve better
allocation of resources and reduced opportunism and enhanced
efficiency through better control.57
57 However, in my view, it is extremely doubtful that such a
rationale can justify the big takeover premiums that the bidder
must pay in order to make a successful takeover bid.
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There exist extremely few empirical studies that directly .test
implications from the transaction cost theory on horizontal,
related and unrelated diversification. Teece (1980) analyzes the
petroleum industry's diversification into alternative fuels. One of
the reasons for these mergers seems to be transfer of proprietary
knowhow to a specialized application (p.240). Gatignon & Anderson
(1988) analyze the multinational corporation's degree of control
over foreign subsidiaries. They find that full integration is more
likely when the proprietary content and the level of advertising is
high. In analyzing ownership structures of foreign subsidiaries,
Gomes-Casseres (1989) finds that transaction costs to a large extent
determine what is the most efficient organizational form for
cooperation. In addition to these three tests, I argue that many of
the diversification studies I reviewed above (in section 3) provide
strong indirect support for the transaction cost theory. Generally
one would expect lower average rents the wider a firm diversifies
because (1) wider diversification indicates less specific factors
which normally yield less competitive advantage and (2) a given
factor will lose more value when transferred to markets which are
less similar to that in which it originated. Since wider
diversification is correlated with less specific factors, one should
expect lower transaction costs and less need to integrate in these
cases (in accordance with transaction cost theory). Put
differently, narrow diversification58 is expected to be more
profitable than wider diversification. Bettis (1981), Rumelt (1982),
Palepu (1985), Montgomery (1985), Montgomery & Wernerfelt
(1986), Wernerfelt & Montgomery (1988), Amit & Livnat (1988b),
Lubatkin & Rogers (1989) and Geringer,Beamish & daCosta (1989)
provide results that are consistent with this kind of reasoning.
58That is diversification closely tied to the firm's strategic core.
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5. COSTS OF INTEGRATION (INTEGRATION VS.
MARKET)
Why not organize everything in one large firm? This basic
question initially posed by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985)
represents a key issue for this section: costs of integration. The
focus here will be on identifying these costs and explain how they
affect firms' boundary setting decisions.
Williamson (1985 :90) emphasizes the main differences between
markets & hierarchies:
"The main differences between market and internal
organization are these: (1) markets promote high-
powered incentives and restrain bureaucratic
distortions more. effectively than internal
organization; (2) markets can sometimes aggregate
demands to advantage, thereby to realize economies of
scale and scope; and (3) internal organization has
access to distinctive governance instruments."
Point (1) will be discussed here. (Point (2) and (3) were discussed in
section 4 above.) If synergies are realized by an outside supplier,
why not simply realize them after a merger in which a company
buys the outside supplier? One of the problems particular to
internal organization is that it often leads to an impairment of
incentives. Unlike market organization internal organization can
only seldom impose strict cost and efficiency controls to which the
firm must adjust. Williamson (1985:chap. 6) gives many examples
of problems connected to internal organization such as misleading
promises of high capacity utilization, transfer pricing problems,
accounting discretion, reduced innovation ability and reduced
career opportunities.59 Ceteris paribus, such internal costs tend to
favor a market solution rather than an internal organization-
based one.
59See Williamson's chap. 6 for concrete examples and discussion on
these points.
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Even if there is potential for considerable synergies between .two
firms, these effects do not come without costs. Internal
organization incurs administrative costs associated with operating
an "internal market"; Generally, the visible hand is more
expensive than the invisible hand. Realizing synergy effects
usually imposes costs of coordination, costs of compromise and costs
of inflexibility (cf. Wells 1984, Porter 1985, Ghoshal 1987). Costs of
coordination arise because realizing synergy effects requires that
scheduling, priority setting, problem solving, etc., must be
coordinated in order to share an activity. Coordination often makes
the management processes very complex (Wells 1984) and might in
some cases offset positive synergy effects (Porter 1985).
Compromise costs arise because "sharing an activity requires that
an activity be performed in a consistent way that may not be
optimal for either of the business units involved" (Porter 1985:332),
while costs of inflexibility reflects increased difficulty responding
to competitive moves and may also result in increased exit barriers.
The costs of internal organization is also strongly affected by the
external task environment and the firms "administrative heritage"
(Bartlett 1986). Organizational historyand management culture
(ingrained values, norms and practices of its management) define
administrative heritage and tend to influence the firms ability to
realize synergies by coordination value chain activities. Porter
(1990) highlights another important "cost" of integration. In a
recent study he finds a strong association between vigorous
domestic rivalry and sustainable competitive advantage; Domestic
rivalry creates pressure on firms to improve and innovate. Rivals
push each other to lower cost, improved quality and service. and
create new products and processes. Over time this constant
struggle to innovate and upgrade tends to create competitive
advantage for the firm in the "cluster". If M&As lead to
cooperation and cartels with no efficient competition. the self-
reinforcing process of innovating and upgrading that grows out of
rivalry will be dampened. Even though such a cartel may maintain
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profits for a time, it usually marks the beginning of the end of
sustainable competitive advantage.
Costs of coordination, compromise and inflexibility can easily
outweigh benefits from synergy, reduced transaction costs, etc.
However, some of these costs have, relatively speaking, been
reduced over the last decades. This trend may, in part, be due to
technological development, innovations in strategic planning
techniques and organizational innovations (M-form),(see Armour
& Teece 1978, Porter 1985:332, Williamson 1985:chap. 11, Hoskisson
1987, Jones & Hill 1988, Grant & Jammine 1988 and Grant,Jammine &
Thomas 1988). In addition to these more "permanent" costs of
internal organization, costs connected to the implementation
process of M&As are extremely important. 60 A discussion of these
phenomena
therefore
(1986)
lies outside the scope of this study. The reader is
referred to Porter (1985:chap.ll), Jemison & Sitkin
and Jemison (1987,1988) for discussion on the
implementation process in M&As.
Different M&A types are associated with differences in
bureaucratic costs. Building on Thompson's (1967) model of task
interdependence,61 Jones & Hill (1988) argue that related
diversification is associated with highest level of bureaucratic
costs, while unrelated diversification has the lowest level of
bureaucratic costs. Vertical integration is between these strategies
in terms of costs. The logic is that increased interdependence
requires more resources for performance monitoring and
appraisal activities and thereby increases bureaucratic costs. In
un rei ate d diversification each division functions as a self-
contained unit. This strategy has the lowest need for coordination,
and control is handled by standardization and formalization
(Thompson 1967). Vertical integration is based upon sequential
6 OMany acquisitions fail because of problems in the
implementation process.
61 Thompson divides interdependence into pooled, sequential and
reciprocal interdependence.
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interdependence which requires coordination between divisions.
Bureaucratic control (rules and procedures) leads to centralization
of more activities, less autonomy and less accountability of
operating divisions. Monitoring will be more difficult. Rei ate d
diversification requires interdivisional coordination and resource
sharing. Linkages must be established between divisions and, as a
result, the division will have less autonomy. This makes it difficult
to assign accountability for performance and increases the
monitoring problems. In addition to related diversification being
associated with highest level of bureaucratic costs, Jones & Hill
(1988) also argue that costs of integration increase at a geometric
rate for the case of related diversification, while costs of unrelated
and vertical integration increase only at a linear rate. This leads
them to conclude that the optimal level of integration is lower for
related integration than for unrelated and vertical strategies.
Costs of integration depend heavily on what kind of organizational
structure is applied. Hill & Hoskisson (1987) analyze how M-form
or gan i z a t i on 62 can be used to realize different economies of
integration. According to Williamson, M-form is characterized by
separation of strategic and operating functions, functional
autonomy of divisions, reallocation of resources from below-
average to
profitability.
above-average divisions and strong focus on
A pure M-form organization seems efficient In
but may be suboptimal in vertical and
1982,Porter 1985, Hill & Hoskisson 1987,
M-form focuses on autonomy and profit
unrelated diversification,
related integration (Kay
Jones & Hill 1988).
responsibility. In a setting with vertical integration, this may
create problems of coordination, integration and investments in
specialized assets (Hill & Hoskisson 1987). Similarly, related
diversification seems also to be inconsistent with pure M-form
organization. Realizing synergistic economies63 requires
62See Williamson (1975,1985) and Armour & Teece (1978) for
discussion of M-form structure.
63 Different types of synergies seem to require different degree of
coordination. Specifically, tangible interrelationships often
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coordinating and establishing linkages between divisions. Such
centralized coordination and sharing violates autonomy .and
accountability central to the M-form.64 To maximize profits here,
one cannot apply divisionalized
general, one can say that high
form (functional) structure
encourages M-form structure
organization in its pure form. In
degree of relatedness encourages U-
while low degree of relatedness
(Kay 1982: 135). Hoskisson (1987)
studies the relationship between M-form structure and
performance. He finds that M-form implementation increases
returns and decreases risk for unrelated diversifiers, while in the
case of vertical integration both return and risk decrease. In
related diversification there is no significant change neither in
returns nor in risk. These findings support the discussion above
concerning problems of strict use of the M-form in vertical and
related diversification.
6. MERGERS VS. STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
The aim of this section is to discuss the choice between M&As and
strategic alliances. Put differently, the question posed here is:
when do M&As seem to be a more profitable institutional mode of
organization than one based on alliances? Since the focus is on
M&As vs. strategic alliances, there will be no attempt here to
analyze other aspects of alliances such as sources of power in
networks, dynamic processes in networks (entry/exit, positioning/
repositioning), life cycle of joint ventures, creation of credibility,
reputation building, conflicts, choice between different forms of
alliances (form,focus,autonomy and duration), etc.6 5
require more complex coordinating devices than intangible
interrelationships (Hoskisson 1987).
64 How to overcome such increased monitoring problems that
appears in related integration is discussed in Porter (1985:chap.ll).
65 For further discussion of these aspects of strategic alliances, see
Reve (1986), Thorelli (1986), Contractor & Lorange (1988), Jarillo
(1988), Harrigan (1988), Kogut (1988,1988b), Hennart (1988),
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I will use the term strategic alliances (or networks) to characterize
"two or more organizations involved in long term relationships"
(Thorelli 1986:37), that is "long-term purposeful arrangements
among distinct but related organizations that allow those firms in
them to gain or sustain competitive advantage vis-a-vis their
competitors outside the network" (Jarillo 1988:32). If spot
transactions and hierarchy are regarded as polar cases of
institutional organization, then strategic alliances can be seen as
an intermediary organization form between these two extremes.
Strategic alliances require at least a partial overlap in domain
(Thorelli 1986).66 This eliminates "unrelated alliances" and leaves
us with horizontal, related and vertical alliances as alternatives to
hierarchy and spotmarket transactions.
Building on transaction cost theory, Williamson (1985) argues
that strategic alliances are an efficient mode of organization when
transactions are recurrent and asset specificity is medium.
Hierarchy solution is avoided because outside actors often can
realize synergies by aggregating demand and produce more
efficiently. Furthermore, strategic alliances do not eliminate
high-powered incentives and do not create the same bureaucratic
distortions as in a hierarchy solution. Market solution seems to be
insufficient because of asset specificity and ex post transaction
costs. An expected consequence of strategic alliances is reduced
transaction costs (Jarillo 1988) which can lead to a lower degree of
integration. This can increase the firm's competitive advantage by
allowing the firm to concentrate on its strategic core (see Reve
1990). As argued by Reve, core skills have high asset specificity
and should be governed internally, while complementary skills
have medium asset specificity and should be governed through
Buckley & Casson (1988), Hamel,Doz & Prahalad (1989) and Borys &
Jemison (1989).
66 Domain is defined as the business unit's products, markets,
technology and competence.
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strategic alliances. Firms that are positioned in strong strategic
alliances may enhance its competitive advantage by (1) "trading
synergies" (cf. Kay 1982)67 which is difficult for competitors not
positioned in equally strong alliances and (2) by avoiding severe
bureaucratic distortions. However, hierarchy often has an
advantage when it comes to reducing transaction costs. Point (1)
above implies that alliances which reduce transaction costs may
have important strategic implications: the company can
concentrate on those value activities which it performs well (its
strategic core). More distant value activities can be left to alliance
partners which in most cases will be able to handle these activities
more efficiently than the company itself.
One other reason for choosing strategic alliances over M&As is the
costs of divesting or managing unrelated activities (Kogut 1988).
Building on the analysis above, strategic alliances and hierarchy
seem to be efficient governance modes when asset specificity is
medium or high respectively. When choosing between alliances or
a hierarchy solution, it is therefore given that the investment to
some extent is specific. If a company A only needs a subset of the
assets held by company B, selling off the rest of the assets might be
precluded by the fact that the assets are firm specific. This is
owing to the fact that specialized assets "cannot be redeployed
without sacrifice of productive value"(Williamson 1985:54).68 An
alternative for A would be to keep the assets within the firm but
this might not be optimal because of increased bureaucratic costs
(see section 5 above). Here lies an incentive to use alliances
instead of M&As.
67 That is, other alliances partners realize synergies by
aggregating demand and efficient production.
68Hennart (1988:footnote 5) gives an illustrating example: "one
example might be a firm, such as Dole, which owns banana
plantations and operates a fleet of specialized ships and of
refrigerated warehouses. Dole could not sell its distribution
network separately from its plantations since ..... banana firms find
it necessary to integrate banana growing, shipping and
distribution. "
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Much of the same reasoning applies to the transfer of unique
know-how (see Teece 1980.1982). Such know-how can often be
transferred at low costs (public good characteristics) thereby
realizing net positive synergy effects. However. a full takeover of
the firm which has this knowledge may involve substantial
management costs especially if the acquired firm operates in
different industries than the acquirer. Furthermore. full
integration may make it difficult to keep these unique resources.
For example. there are fewer takeovers of small high-tech firms
and entrepreneurial R&D companies because unique assets can
"walk out the door" (see Lipton 1982.Marks 1982). This finding is in
accordance with Gomes-Casseres (1985). Porter & Fuller (1986) and
Harrigan (1988) who note that contractual relationships reduce
cultural frictions and conflicts between potential partners more
than a solution based on full integration. Apparently. one of the
reasons for this is that "close coordination may sap the morale and
creativity of personnel who are accounted to greater artistic
freedoms" (Harrigan 1988:152) and that a network solution often
avoids management and incentive problems often created by M&As
(Porter & Fuller 1986).
Industrial organization economics provides alternative.
often complementary, explanations for the choice between
strategic alliances and M&As.69 This perspective posits that firms
try to maximize profits by improving their competitive position
vis-a-vis rivals. Sometimes this lead may conflict with transaction
costs theory which focuses on minimization of production and
transaction costs.70 Harrigan (1988) notes that M&As (and equity
joint ventures) often are too inflexible if the basis for competitive
69 Industrial organization economics is often associated with
Porters' (1980,1985) work. This perspective is often also described
as "strategic behavior". I will use industrial organization
economics and strategic behavior synonymously here.
7OThe integration of these perspectives will be discussed in the
theory development chapter below.
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advantage changes frequently. Moreover, she argues that M&As
should only be considered in activities that are of high strategic
importance for the firm. This approach is taken so the firm can
concentrate on its strategic core, avoid tying up too much capital
and avoid huge bureaucratic costs when the degree of integration
becomes too high. Strategic alliances are often chosen because of
high political risk (Porter & Fuller 1986, Gomes-Casseres 1989b).
Often home governments are interested in keeping the local firms
independent instead of having them acquired by foreign firms.
The political risks of expropriation, the blocking of profit
repatriation, and so on, seem to be lower in the case of joint
ventures than in the case of a wholly owned operation (Buckley &
Casson 1988). A coalition can be preferred to M&As because it
represents a less irreversible commitment and because alliance
partners contribute to the firm's fixed costs (Ohmae 1989).
Moreover, another reason for seeking a joint venture is to gain
some capacity or competence needed to make the investment
succeed (Caves 1982). An especially important factor is the size of
takeover premiums (Nathan & O'Keefe 1989). With a 50 % takeover
premium, the advantages of M&As over strategic alliances must be
very big in order to choose integration. Even though full
integration increases revenues, reduces costs and/or reduces
systematic risk more than a solution based on alliances, it might
still be more profitable to choose alliances. This is because big
takeover premiums more than outweigh the net present value of
the advantages of M&As over alliances.
Despite the advantages of strategic alliances, this solution also has
significant problems. One problem is that alliances restrict the
firm's expansion into certain future lines of businesses (Contractor
& Lorange 1988). Alliances may also make it more difficult to
achieve synergies and linkages among separate activities in the
value chain. For example, it might be difficult to persuade an
alliance partner in a manufacturing coalition to perform enough
inspection, because after-sale service costs fall outside the
coalition. Problems may arise because of conflicts of interest
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between a parent firm and a joint venture partner (Caves 1982,
Hladik 1988). For example, assume that a parent firm owns .two
subsidiary divisions A and B. If either its subsidiary A or its
subsidiary B can serve market X, the parent firm will pick the
lower-cost supplier (call it A). But if B is a joint venture and can
earn a positive profit from serving X (but smaller profit than A), a
conflict arises between the parent firm and its local B partner, who
will want B to get the assignment. Another example is the case
where one of the collaborating firms in a partnership seeks to
avoid markets where it sells its own competitive products. This loss
of strategic flexibility in a joint venture context is an important
pro for full ownership. In an international setting, coordination
of activities on a worldwide basis is especially important. Without
majority control of the venture, this may cause severe problems.
Put differently, asymmetric net benefi ts tend to be destabilizing
and to create conflicts. Under full ownership global optimization
should be the lead ...~ In an alliance relationship, a firm cannot line
its pocket without taking into consideration the overall
profitability effects for the partner company. In alliances profits
and risks have to be shared, and one partner's decisions can
negatively influence another partner's profits. In my view,
problems in alliance relationships are likely to arise because of
contracting problems; alliance partners agree to collaborate in
certain areas of their domains. Since most firms pursue different
product-market strategies, activities performed in the alliance
relationship tend to have important effects on the partner's other
domain activities outside the alliance relationship. These side
effects might create different (dis)advantages for the various
firms in the alliance. Accordingly, conflicts arise from asymmetric
benefits. The stability of the alliance is then determined by the net
results of "alliance benefits" compared to "side-effect" benefits
from other domain activities. Asymmetric benefits often imply
that the alliance partners are unable to make decisions that are
compatible with an optimization of their current strategy. Since
partners in an alliance often have differing objectives,
coordination and governance costs tend to increase. It seems
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reasonable to expect that the more joint decision making is called
for, the more the differences in activities will be highlighted; A
golden rule seems to be that partnerships are going to be viable
only insofar as the value of the joint results to both partners is
superior to the opportunity cost they incur. In strategic alliances
one also faces the problem that personal and corporate pride and
nationalistic feelings can easily contribute to the termination of a
venture, whereas under full ownership stability is more likely to
be preserved. Shirking will often be a problem in alliances and
joint ventures (see Jensen & Meckling 1976, Alchian & Demsetz
1972, Harrigan 1984). Shirking problems are created because the .'"
incentives for a firm to contribute to the alliance are not as strong
as in the case of M&As. One example of such shirking is that firm A
uses proprietary information acquired from an alliance partner B
in its own business and thereby hurts its alliance partner.
Presumably shirking tends to be most severe when transaction
costs are relatively high. Another important cost of alliances is
that the partner may become a formidable competitor in the future
(Porter & Fuller 1986, Contractor & Lorange 1988, Hamel,Doz &
Prahalad 1989). Firms are often less willing to enter strategic
alliances in their core areas because this makes it more difficult to
protect the firm's strategic core (see Harrigan 1984). For example,
brand labels, technology, or the production or provision of quality
are often subject to degradation and undesired diffusion unless
controlled through equity ownership. Alliances transfer assets
and knowledge and often lower entry barriers which makes it
easier for a partner to initiate a competitive move. This problem
seems to be more severe if the markets are global as opposed to
multidomestic (see Porter 1986, Contractor & Lorange 1988). The
challenge is therefore to share enough skills and resources to
create advantage vis-a-vis companies outside the alliance while at
the same time preventing a full transfer of core skills to the
partner (Hamel, Doz & Prahalad 1989). This is consistent with
Gomes- Casseres (1989b) who finds that firms are less likely to form
alliances in their core business than in fields in which they have
less experience and competitive advantage. Furthermore, this fits
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nicely with the theory proposed in Reve (1990) who argues that
core skills should be governed internally while more distant
activities should be governed through strategic alliances.
In sum, strategic alliances are most important when asset
specificity is medium. In such cases alliance partners can realize
economies of scale and scope. and the firm avoids large
bureaucratic costs or losses of divesting unrelated activities. The
firm can thereby concentrate on its strategic core and create
competitive advantage by efficient organization. Alliances often
reduce management and incentive problems and reduce the
problem of unique assets "walking out the door". Alliances not
only sustain flexibility. they represent a less irreversible
commitment and do not tie up too much capital. Political risk is
often reduced and huge takeover premiums are avoided. However,
alliances often create new types of both ex ante and ex post
transaction costs as well as reducing freedom in competitive moves
(shirking. strategic inflexibility/domain conflicts). Alliances can
also create future competitors by transferring unique assets and
reducing entry barriers. A company should therefore be very
careful when transferring core skills through strategic alliances.
There exists quite a few empirical studies on joint ventures and
strategic alliances.71 However. empirical work on the choice
between alliances and full integration (M&As) is largely
undeveloped. The studies reviewed in section 4 above give support
for the theory that core factors and highly specific transactions
are integrated within one unit. In addition to these studies, Kogut
& Singh (1986) and Gomes-Casseres (1985.1989 a and b) address
directly the distinction between M&As and strategic alliances.
Kogut & Singh (1986) find that alliances are used more when the
cultural distance between the countries in which the firms operate
is large. They explain this tendency by referring to difficulties of
managing the post-acquisition process in such situations. Gomes-
71 Kogut 1988 gives a review of some relevant studies in this area.
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Casseres (1985,1989a) finds that the choice between alliances and
M&As, is likely to depend on contracting costs and of managerial
shirking. Alliances seem to be more likely when the contribution
needed from the local firm depends on a continued long-term
commitment from its owners. The same is true if the cooperation
benefits are based on the local firm's continued access to officials,
contracts with business groups, etc. Gomes-Casseres (1989 a and b)
find that alliances are best suited outside the companies core
business. The reason for this is that exploiting existing
competitive advantage from core factors is a task that should be
done within a hierarchy, while alliances are more appropriate
when a firm seeks to expand its capacity into new and more distant
fields.
7. TIMING AND FIRST MOVER ADVANTAGES
Timing and first mover advantages introduce the dynamics aspects
of corporate strategy in general and of M&As in particular. First
mover advantages may influence the way the firm organizes its
firm boundaries (mergers & acquisitions, internal development,
strategic alliances and market solution) as compared to a pure
static analysis. Boundary choices should only be made after
careful analysis of both static and dynamic factors that influence
the optimal mode of firm organization.
The general types of first mover advantages are: (1) Reputation:
reputation effects (e.g., Weigelt & Camerer 1988 and Nayyar 1990)
can be one of the important sources of competitive advantage
gained from early moves. Reputation is maintained through
experience by buyers and may create sustainable advantages that
are hard to overcome for later movers. (2) Pre e m p t iv e
positioning: preemptive positioning may allow the firm to take
advantage of a market opportunity it perceives and position itself
early. Preemption may also signal a commitment from the firm,
especially if the move implies sunk costs (e.g., Yao 1988). (3)
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Switching costs: swithcing costs tend to increase when asset
specificity and sunk costs increases. If an early mover locks
customers into a relationship that involves sunk costs, potential :
competition may find it hard to overcome this entry barrier. (4)
Channel access: early movers can also block channel access for
other firms especially if the distribution is based on contracts that
excludes other products from the channel. (5) Favorable access:
favorable access to facilities, inputs, location and other scarce
resources may create at least temporary advantages for early
movers. (6) Economies of scale and learning curve
benefits: economies of scale and learning curve benefits (e.g.,
Amit 1986) may be substantial for early movers. Scale economies
may be important when an early move leads to higher market
share. Learning curve advantages stem from the fact that in many
circumstances accumulated learning leads to a cost reduction as the
firm moves down the learning curve. According to Porter
(1986:chap. 2), first-mover effects are particularly important in
global industries, because of the association between globalization
and economies of scale, learning and flexibility achieved through
worldwide configuration/ coordination. (7,8) Definition of
standards and institutional barriers: Furthermore, first
mover advantages can arise because the firm can define standards
for products and input technology and take advantage of
institutional barriers (for example patent rights and takeover
legislation).
Porter (1985) identifies several first mover disadvantages that must
be traded off against the potential benefits from an early move.
Such costs are pioneering costs, demand uncertainty, sunk costs,
technological discontinuities and low cost imitation.
As in the case of synergies, the importance of first mover
advantages is often a function of impediments to economic activity
(see Yao 1988, Reed & DeFillipi 1990 and Nayyar 1990). Sunk costs,
transaction costs, imperfect information and causal ambiguity are
important underlying factors that tend to define the height of
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entry and exit barriers and also indirectly the importance of first
mover advantages.
To succeed in today's competition, many firms have to base their
corporate strategy on continuous innovation, change and a
constant search for better positioning. Timing and the ability to
adapt to both internal and external changes seem to be of high
importance for most corporate strategies.
8. EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF M&A PROFITABILITY
8.1. Introduction
This section reviews the empirical evidence showing how bidding
and target firms profit from M&As. I will focus exclusively on
studies using capital market data (change in stock prices). The
basic idea is that a public announcement of the merger will lead to
a stock price change that directly measures the expected net
present value of gains (or losses) from the merger. 72These
merger studies are categorized as "event" -studies which in general
focus on the effect of firm specific events on the company's stock
prices (see Brown & Warner 1980,1985 and Thompson 1985). Such
an approach has important advantages compared to alternative
methods (Eckbo 1987,1988). Using the change in factor or output
prices to infer the profitability effect of M&As is difficult because
it requires us to specify the firm's demand and cost function. Also
such a method forces us to determine when the merger will start
having an impact on product and factor prices, and what normal
change in product prices would have occurred without merger. In
addition to the problems mentioned above, if an empirical study is
based on accounting data, one will face problems associated with
72 See Fama (1976) for a review on how the effects of public
announcements about firm profitability is quickly incorporated
into stock prices.
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measuring systematic risk. temporary disequilibrium effects. tax
laws. arbitrary accounting conventions. etc. (Fisher & McGo.wan
1983. Benston 1985).
The empirical results on mergers and acquisition profitability
based on stock price data are found in financial economics and in
some recent studies from strategic management/industrial
organization economics. A problem with most of the studies in
financial economics is that they treat M&As as a homogenous
phenomenon when it comes to the strategic background of the
integration.73 The recent studies from the strategy area start out
with the assumption that different types of mergers have different
potential for value creation. They test various hypotheses
developed from theory in economics and corporate strategy. using
the empirical tool provided from financial economics.
8.2. Measurement problems
Before reviewing existing empirical results, it is important to be
aware of the measurement problems associated with the studies.
One important problem is that investors partially anticipate the
takeover announcement (Malatesta & Thompson 1985). If the
announcement is partially anticipated, one cannot measure the
economic impact 74 by examining the announcement effect alone.
In such cases the observed abnormal return only measures the
unexpected component of a merger announcement. This type of
measurement problem seems to be especially problematic when a
firm announces that it will start a general acquisition program.
Schipper & Thompson (1983) find that firms which announce
73Exceptions here are Asquith & Kim (1982), Eckbo (1983.1985),
Eckbo & Wier (1985), Schipper & Thompson (1983), Allen & Sirmans
(1987) and Morek, Shleifer & Vishny (1990).
74Economic impact is the net present value of the event.
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acquisition programs realize a significant positive abnormal
return indicating that the present value of future anticipated
acquisitions will be reflected in stock prices at the inception of the
program. Balakrishnan (1988) argues that a merger
announcement could be the culmination of a series of related
strategic moves by the acquiring firm to enter a new industry, and
therefore that a significant fraction of the gains could have been
anticipated by the capital market well ahead of the acquisition.
Similarly, Ruback (1982,1983b) examines the stock market response
to the variety of events that precede takeovers and argues that
several of the events could have been anticipated. In general,
stock price runups that occur before tender offers are announced
may be due to (1) news and speculation in the media about control-
related events, (2) acquisition of a foothold block by the
perspective bidder before a formal bid is made, (3) the deal's hostile
or friendly nature and (4) insider trading (see Jarrell & Poulsen
1989b for discussion).
Another important problem is the "size-effect problem", that is
the acquiring companies are often much larger than the target
companies. Even though the total gain is split equally between
buying and selling companies, the abnormal return will be a much
lower percent for the buyer than for the seller. Even large gains
relative to the transaction will often be buried in the normal
variation of the acquiring company's equity value. If the
acqumng company's equity is 100 and the target company's equity
is 10, a 1 % abnormal return for the acquiror and a 10 % abnormal
return for the target company will imply an equal sharing of the
total gains from the transaction. In the VS the acquiring firm is
often 10 times larger than target firms (Eckbo 1987), which may
explain why many studies do not find
for acquiring companies (see below).
Eckbo (1986) documents that merger
significant abnormal returns
For mergers in Canada,
gains are more equally
shared. In Canada bidders and targets are on average about the
same size. His study therefore indicates that the size-problem may
explain some of the results in the VS studies which report no
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abnormal return for acquiring firms. Asquith, Bruner & Mullins
(1983) also report this in their study of gains to bidding firms from
mergers. Asquith et. al divide merger bids into two categories: bids
where the equity value of the target firm is less than 10 % of the
bidding firm's value and bids where the target value is greater
than 10 %. They find that the cumulative excess return are
significantly greater when the target firm is larger. This result is
consistent with the size effect problems. Similarly, Jarrell &
Poulsen (1989) find that the relative size of targets to acquiring
firms plays a significant role in disguising the gains to acquiring
firms from takeover.
Instead of only measuring the percentage gains, Halpern (1983)
suggests that one also should measure the dollar gains. This is done
in Malatesta (1983), Dennis & McConnell (1986), Chatterjee (1986)
and Bradley,Desai & Kim (1988). However, these methods do not
avoid all problems since the error term, et, in the market model is
homoscedastic while the variance of the dollar error term is
heteroscedastic. This problem will be further discussed in the
empirical part of this study.
8.3. Empirical results
Tables 3 and 4 at the end of this section give a review of empirical
results from financial economics.I 5
(l) Tender offers - announcement effects
In tender offers all studies show that target companies realize a
large positive abnormal return (about 20 - 30 %). This is a natural
75Jensen & Ruback (1983), Eckbo (1987,1988), Jarrell, Brickley &
Netter (1988), Copeland & Weston (1988:chap. 20), Jarrell (1988),
Roll (1986,1987,1988), Magenheim & Mueller (1988) and Jarrell &
Poulsen (1990) all discuss empirical evidence from the market for
corporate control.
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consequence of the high takeover premiums that exist in this
market (see Jarrell, Brickley & Netter 1988 and Nathan & O'Keefe
1989). For bid der firms the results tend to be positive - even
though not all studies are conclusive. Dodd & Ruback (1977),
Chamber & Hoffmeister (1978), Bradley (1980), Bradley, Desai & Kim
(1988) and Franks & Harris (1986) all find that bidder firms realize
significant positive abnormal returns. Bradley, Desai & Kim (1983),
Jarrell & Poulsen (1987), Doukas & Travlos (1988) and Eckbo &
Langohr (1988) do not find any abnormal returns for bidders in
takeovers, while Bradley,Desai & Kim (1988) find significant
negative abnormal returns for bidders in the period 1981-84 (see
table 4).
(2) Mergers - announcement effects
Tar get firms al so realize large significant abnormal returns in
mergers (15-20 %). However, the empirical evidence that the
bid der firms realize positive abnormal returns in mergers is
weaker than in the case of tender offers. Asquith, Bruner &
Mullins (1983), Dennis & McConnell (1986), Allen & Sirmans (1987)
and Eckbo (1986) find significant positive abnormal returns for
bidder firms while Dodd (1980), Asquith (1983), Eckbo (1983),
Malatesta (1983) and Morek, Shleifer & Vishny (1990) find zero
abnormal returns. None of the studies report significant negative
returns. The percentage gain seems to be lower in mergers. One
factor that might influence this is that mergers are anticipated
more extensively than tender offers.
(3) Post-merger performance
Post-merger performance studies analyze the stock prices for
merging firms in the year after the event date. For ten der
offers, Dodd & Ruback (1977) find that there is no abnormal
return in the 12 month period after the announcement month.
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Similarly, in the case of mergers, Mandelker (1974), Malatesta
(1983) and Eckbo (1986) find zero abnormal returns for bidding
firms in the year following the announcement date. However, it is
disturbing that Langetieg (1978) and Asquith (1983) find a
significant negative abnormal return in the 12-month period after
the event date. These post-outcome negative abnormal returns are
inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that stock price
reactions around the announcement date overestimate the future
efficiency gains from mergers. If so, investors can consistently
beat the market by selling short right after the announcement
date and hold this short position until the speculative gains
diminish. The results in Langetieg (1978) and Asquith (1983) must
however be interpreted cautiously. The problem with these two
studies is that they use a pre-merger benchmark to estimate post-
merger abnormal returns.j 6 Since bidders on average perform
abnormally well prior to a merger announcement, use an
abnormal performance as a normal return in the market model by
applying a pre-merger benchmark. When trying to measure the
abnormal return from merger, one compares these returns to a
prior positive return. A likely consequence is therefore an
understatement of the gains from merger. Loderer & Mauer (1986)
show that the choice of benchmark is important for the statistical
results. By changing from a pre-merger benchmark to a post-
merger benchmark the post-merger bidder firm's abnormal
returns change from significantly negative returns to
insignificant abnormal returns. Franks, Harris & Mayer (1988) and
Franks, Harris & Titman (1990) report similar results and conclude
that findings of poor performance after takeover are likely due to
benchmark errors rather than mispricing at the time of the
takeover.
It is interesting to note that bidder returns have decreased over
time (see table 4). Jarrell & Poulsen (1987) find that takeover
76The other studies which report no abnormal return use a post-
merger benchmark.
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premiums on average were 19 % in the 1960s, 35 % in the 1970s and
30 % in 1980-85. Bidder returns were 4.4 %, 1.22 % and -1.10 % for
the periods 1960s, 1970s and 1980s respectively. Similarly, Bradley,
Desai & Kim (1988) also document that bidder returns decrease over
time: 4.09 % (1963-68), 1.30 % (1968-80) and -2.93 % (1981-84). This
development may in part be due to Williams Amendment act, the
laissez-fair attitude of the Reagan Administration, sophisticated
tactics to repel takeovers (poison pills, targeted share repurchases,
lock up provisions and supermajority and fair price amendments)
and the advent of investment banking firms that specialize in
raising funds to finance corporate takeovers (Bradley,Desai & Kim
1988).
Table 5 sums up recent studies that classify mergers according to
some kind of strategic direction or strategic fit. The assumption in
these studies is that different M&As have different potential for
value creation. Chatterjee (1986) analyzes 157 mergers (no
tender offers) and finds that both unrelated and related, non-
horizontal bidders realize insignificant abnormal returns, while
target companies realize 12.3 % and 17.5 % abnormal returns for
related and unrelated mergers respectively. Chatterjee indicates
that the "size-effect" problem may be important in his sample.
Lubatkin (1987) finds that bidders in product concentric and
vertical integration realize significant positive abnormal returns
and no abnormal returns for bidders in conglomerate and
horizontal/market concentric mergers.7 7 Singh &
Montgomery (1987) find zero abnormal returns for bidders in
both related and unrelated mergers.f 8 Related targets realize
larger abnormal returns than unrelated target companies.
Shelton (1985,1988) finds that business fit is important in
creating value. Identical, related-complementary and related-
supplementary acquisitions create value, while unrelated
acquisitions provide no positive gains. Eckbo (1985) finds that
77 See supplement 3 for classification schemes.
78The size effect problem seems to be large in this study.
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bidders in horizontal mergers realize positive gains as opposed to
bidders in vertical or conglomerate mergers. Morek, Shleifer. &
Vishny (1990) find that neither related nor unrelated bidders
realize abnormal returns in acquisitions. Finally, Seth (1990 a
and b) find that total value created both in related and unrelated
acquisitions is positive, that performance differences between
related and unrelated diversification strategies depend upon the
basis of classifying firms as following one or the other strategy
(Seth 1990a) and that the major source of synergistic gains for
unrelated acquisitions is linked to the coinsurance effect.
In sum, the empirical results we have indicate that M&As on
average create positive gains for both bidders and targets.7 9
Target company shareholders realize huge positive abnormal
returns and seem to capture the lion's share of the gains, while
bidders abnormal returns are more questionable. Bidders seem to
realize positive abnormal returns in tender offers, while they
realize zero or positive gains in mergers. Bidder returns have
decreased the last years. Related M&As seem to create more value
than unrelated mergers. Support for this can be found in Eckbo
(1985), Allen & Sirmans (1987), Singh & Montgomery (1987) and
Shelton (1988). The next section will discuss the distribution of
gains between target and bidder firms in mergers and acquisitions.
790ne should be careful with such a conclusion. Some studies find
significant posiuve abnormal returns for targets, but zero
abnormal returns for bidders. The size-effect problem and the
problem with partially anticipated events may here hit back the
other way. It is possible that bidders who realize zero abnormal
returns in the studies in reality realize significant negative
abnormal returns (even though one has not been able to measure
this in the studies). Such a negative return may therefore in
dollar more than outweigh the positive abnormal return in dollar
that the sellers realize. The total effect of those mergers may
therefore be negative.
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9.DISTRIBUTION OF GAINS
9.1. Competition in the market for corporate control
In section 7 above we saw that empirical results indicated that
target shareholders captured the lion's share of gains from M&As.
However, the results are complicated by size-effect problems and
problems with partially anticipated events. A controversial issue is
therefore whether competition in the market for corporate control
drives bidder gains towards zero or whether measurement
problems hide bidder gains.
Even though the market for corporate control is competitive, both
bidding and target firms can realize positive abnormal returns. A
competitive takeover market implies that the gains to the
successful bidders are bounded by zero and the difference between
the target's value to the successful bidder and the target's next
highest value (Ruback 1983). In order for there to be a difference
in value for the target between the successful bidder and
competing bidders, there must exist some kind of "unique" or
"specialized" resources.80 If the target owns a unique resource,
then no other firm in the industry is a close substitute for a
particular target. If the gain stems from a specialized resource
owned by the bidder, other potential bidders are not feasible
substitutes for the actual acquirer. If there is substitutability
among targets and bidders, one should expect that the returns to
bidders will be positively related to the number of alternative
targets available and negatively related to the number of potential
bidders (James & Wier 1987).
In addition to specialized resources/unique synergies, other
important factors that seem to affect the distribution of gains
between bidder and target firms are: (a) method of payment, (b)
801 will discuss the content of "unique" or "specialized" resources
in chapter 3: theory development and hypothesis.
TABLE 3
REVIEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL ECONOMICS TABLE 3 - CONTINUED
Sample Event Abnormal Abnormal
period period return return
bidder (%) seller (%)
MERGERS:
USA:
Dodd (1980) 1970-77 -20,0 d 0.8(60,0.7) 21.8(71,11.9)
Asquith (1983) 1962-76 -19,0 d 0.2(196,0.3) 13.3(211,15.7)
Eckbo(1983) 1963-78 -20,+10 d 1.6(102,1.5) 14.1(57,7.0)
Asquith,Bruner &
Mullins (1983) 1963-79 -20,0 d. 3.5(170,5.3) 20.5(35,9.::)
Publ ic
Malatesta (1983) 1969-74 announcem. 0.9(256,1.5) 16.8(83,17.6)
month
Eckbo (1985) See table 4
Eckbo & \Jier (1985 ) 1963-81 -20,+10 d 3.0(60,1.8) 25.7(87,10.7)
Dennis & McConnell
(1986) 1962-80 -6,+6 d 3.2(90,3.9) 13.7(76,2.5)
Allen & Sirmans
(1987) 1977-83 -10,0 d. 8.5(38,3.1)
CANADA:
Publ ic
Eckbo (1986) 1964-84 announcem 0.8(1138,3.0) 3.6(413,6.9)
date
Time O = announcement day
In parenthesis: (sample size, t-statistic)
d=days, m=months
Sample Event Abnormal Abnormal
period period return return
bidder(%) seller(%)
TENDER OFFERS:
USA: Offer
Dodd & Ruback 1958-78 announcem. 2.8(124,2.2) 20 .6(133,25 .8)
(1977) month
Kummer& Hoffmeister
(1978) 1956-74 ... 11- 5.2(17,2.0) 16.9(50,10.9)
Bradley (1980) 1962-77 -20,+20 d 4.4(88,2.7) 32.2(161,26.7)
Jarrell & Bradley
(1980) 1962-77 -40,+20 d 6.7(88,3.4) 34.0(147,25.5)
Bradley,Desai &
Kim (1983) 1963-80 -10,+20 d -0.3(94,0.2) 35.6(112,36.6)
Jarrell&Poulsen
(1987) 1980-85 -10,+20 d -0.04(159,-0.04) .............
Huang & \Jalkling
(1987) 1977-82 -50,+50 d 30.9(204,18.3)
Bradley,Desai & 5 dbefore
Kim (1988) 1963-84 the first 1.0(236,2.6) 31.8(236,51)
offer to 5
d after the
last offer
Doukas & Travlos
(1989) 1975-83 day O 0.1(301,0.8)
FRANCE:
Eckbo & langohr
(1988)
offer
1966-82 announcem. -0.3(53,0.2) 16.5(90,37.6)
week
UK:
Post merger/post tender offer studies: bidders' abnormal returns in
the period after the announcement
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (X) FOR BIDDER FIRMS IN SUCCESSFUL TENDER
OFFER CONTESTS
SAMPLE
PERIOD
EVENT
PERIOD
ABNORMAL
RETURN
BIDDERS(%)
Dodd & Ruback (1977) 1958-78 0,+12 m -1.3(124, -0.41)
Jarrell and Poulsen (1987)
--- ........... _ ..... _ .. - .. -- - ..... -- -_ ........
Sample period 1960s 1970s 1980s
-10,+5 d 4.40 1.22 -1.10
(t-stat) (4.02) (2.12) (-1.54)
-10,+20 d 4.95 2.21 ·0.04
(t-stat) (3.52) (2.87) (-0.04)
Number of observations 106 140 159
TENDER OFFERS:
MERGERS:
USA:
Mandelker (1974)
langetieg (1978)
1941-62 0,+12 m after 0.6(241,0.3)
effective date
1929-69 0,+12 m after -6.6(149,-3.0)
effective date
1962-76 0,+240 d -7.2(196,-4.1)
1969-74 0,+12 m after -2.9(121,-1.1)
approval
1963-80 +13,+25 m -5.2(146, -3.1)*1
-1.1<105,0.3)*2
1964-83 0,+12 m 1.0(1138,1.9)
Bradley,Desai & Kim (1988)
Asquith (1983)
Malatesta (1983)
loderer & Mauer (1986)
Event period: five days before the first offer to five days after
the last offer
CANADA:
Eckbo (1986)
Sample period 1963-1968 1968-1980 1981-1984
Total (236) 4.09 1.30 -2.93
(z-stat) (5.88) (1.58) (-2.61)
Single bidders (163) 4.62 1.74 -1.08
(z-stat) (5.99) (2.04) (-1.14)
Multiple bidder (73) 1.62 0.27 -5.10
(z-stat) (1.05) (0.22) (-2.87)
*1 = Used a pre-merger benchmark
*2 = Used a post-merger benchmark
TABLE 5
TABLE 5 - CONTINUED
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT/FINANCIAL ECONOMICS THAT
CLASSIFIES MIAS BASED ON CORPORATE STRATEGY DIMENSIONS Singh & Montgomery (1987):
Day O = announcement day
In parenthesis: (sample size, t-statistic)
Sample period: 1975-1980
Event period: -5,+25 d
Sample period: 1969-1972
Event period: -2,+2 d
Abnormal Abnormal
return return
buyer (%) seller (%)
Related -0.6(40, 35.9(40,***)
Unrelated -1.9(37, 21.9(37,**)
Chatterjee (1986)*1:
Abnormal
return
bidder (%)
Abnormal
return
seller (%)
Shelton (1985,1988):
Sample period: 1962-1983
Event period:-1,+1 days
related, non-horizontal 1.7(16,1.6)
unrelated 2.1(9,1.3)
12.3(17,8.7>
17.5(13,10.9) Total effects:
Sample period: 1948-1979
Event period: -18,-1 months
Unrelated
Related supplementary
Related complementary
Identical
-0.5(?, -0.7>
2.5(?,2.19)
1.7(?, 1.26)
2.6(?,1.71)
Lubatkin (1987)*2:
Abnormal Abnormal
return return
bidder (%) seller (%)
Product concentric 8.4(102,***) 17.6(104,***)
Horizontal and market
concentric -1.9(56 16.5(65,***)
Conglomerate 4.4(153 14.4(71, ***)
Vertical integration 12.5(39,**) 27.7(36,***)
Eckbo (1985):
Sample period: 1963-1981
Event period: -20,+10 days
Abnormal
returns
bidder (%)
Abnormal
returns
seller (%)
Horizontal mergers:
Non-horizontal
1.6(160,1.9) 18.7(104,12.0)
Morck,Shleifer & Vishny (1990)
Abnormal Abnormal
returns returns
bidder (%) bidder (%)
1975-79 1980-87
Related 1.54 (34 2.9 (57
Unrelated 0.2 (120 ) -4.1 (115
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takeover legislation, (c) takeover defenses and the phenomenon of
(d) multiple bidding.
(a) Method of payment
Empirical evidence tends to support the hypothesis that tar get
firms in c ash tender offers outperform targets in sec u ri ty
exchange offers (see Huang & Walkling 1987, Eckbo & Langohr
1989 and Eckbo, Maksimovic & Williams 1990).81 This difference in
abnormal return for target firms in cash vs. security exchange
offers may explain some of the difference in returns between
tender offers and mergers as reported in section 7 above;
Historically, tender offers have been associated with cash
payments while mergers have been associated with stock
payments. According to Eckbo & Langohr (1989) the difference in
abnormal returns for targets in cash compared to security
exchange transactions might often be attributed to information
asymmetries between the bidder and the target. The intuition
behind this is that cash is a costly medium of exchange since the
bidder bears the full cost of overpaying for the target. In
equilibrium, cash has the advantage of serving to "preempt"
competition by signaling a high valuation for the target (Fishman
1989).
For a c q u irin g firms Travlos (1987) finds that pure stock
exchange bidders realize significant losses at the announcement of
the takeover proposal as opposed to cash-financing bidding firms
which show that their shareholders earn "normal" rates of return
over the announcement period. Travlos argues that this is
consistent with the signaling hypothesis a la (Myers & Majluf
1984) which implies that financing a takeover through exchange
of common stock conveys the negative information that the
81 Huang & Walkling find CARs of 29 % to targets in cash
mergers/tender offers while only 14 % to targets in security
exchange offers. Similarly, Eckbo & Langohr document a 28 % CAR
in cash offers vs. only 5 % in stock exchange offers.
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bidding firm is overvalued (See Eckbo, Giammarino & Heinkel 1987
for theoretical discussion). Furthermore, by using cash one .can
avoid a potential negative co-insurance effect that is associated
with common stock financing (Lewellen 1971). Using cash may
also increase value through reduced agency problems (see Jensen
1986). Finally, according to Fishman (1989) cash can be used as an
instrument in making preemptive takeover bids.
To sum up, evidence indicates that both bidders and targets gain
higher abnormal returns in cash offers than in stock offers.
(b) Takeover legislation
In July 1968 the Congress passed the Williams Amendment Act. The
major provisions of this act are its disclosure requirements, its
regulated minimum tender period and its antifraud provisions that
give target management standing to sue for injunctive relief. In
addition to the Williams Act important state tender offer legislation
is often tougher on aspiring acquirers than the Williams Act. 8 2
'The disclosure and delay requirements of takeover legislation is
likely to increase the purchase price of target firms (takeover
premiums) and to decrease return to acquiring firms. Empirical
evidence based on US data (Jarrell & Bradley 1980, Schipper &
Thompson 1983, Bradley.Desai & Kim 1988 and Nathan & O'Keefe
1989) and French data (Eckbo & Langohr 1988) tend to support such
a hypothesis.
(c) Takeover defenses
The concept of takeover defenses includes all actions by managers
to resist having their firms acquired.8 3 Such resistance might
82 For detailed discussion of securities law aspects of corporate
acquisitions, see Gilso (1986), Gilson & Kraakman (1989) and
Karpoff & Malatesta (1 90).
83 Common takeover defenses are staggered board elections,
supermajority provisions fair price amendments, poison pills, dual
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often lead to higher offer prices in M&As. Poison pills and dual
class recapitalizations seem to have the most severe influence, on
the takeover premiums. This potential increase in takeover price
should be traded off against the fact that takeover defenses may
lower the probability of the company being acquired.
Furthermore, takeover defenses can affect the value of the firm
even if it is not acquired.f 4
(d) Multiple bidding
Conditions which foster an increase in multiple bidding tend to
increase target premiums and reduce bidder returns. The factors
discussed above (method of payment, takeover legislation and
takeover defenses) will often affect the number of bidders in a
takeover context.85 Empirical evidence indicates that target
companies realize significantly
multiple bidder situations (James &
1988 and Michel & Shaked 1988).
higher abnormal returns in
Wier 1987, Bradley,Desai & Kim
The same evidence indicates that
acquiring company returns are reduced when there is strong
competition among bidding firms (Jarrell & Pouslen 1989).
However, as noted by Bradley,Desai & Kim (1988), this does not seem
to be a zero sum game; In multiple bidder acquisitions the total
class recapitalizations, targeted repurchases (greenmail), standstill
agreements, litigation by target management,
acquisition/divestitures and liability restructuring, leveraged
cash-outs, scorched earth, pac-man, white knights, disclosure of
hidden values and change in state of incorporation. See Ruback
(1988), Eckbo (1988), Jarrell, Brickley & Netter (1988), Jensen &
Warner (1988), Jarrell & Poulsen (l987b),Gilson (1986), Gilson &
Kraakman (1989) and Weston, Chung & Hoag (1990) for overviews
of the most common takeover defenses.
84 A potential negative effect is that the agency problem
(management vs. shareholders) will increase. On the other hand,
value might increase as managers stop wasting time and corporate
resources worrying about a hostile takeover.
85 Furthermore, the existence of multiple bids probably implies
that specialized resources were found in the target firm and could
be put to use by any bidder so as to increase their expected cash
flow' (Halpern 1983).
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synergistic gains are larger. Thus, the targets in the multiple
bidder situations realize greater gains not only at the expense of
the acquiring firms shareholders but also from the greater
synergistic gains that accompany these transactions.
9.2. The takeover process, auctions and distribution of
gains
Current research on takeover bids emphasizes the study of the
process through which acquisitions might be carried out and the
division of gains between the various parties involved. Grossman
& Hart show in their classic 1980 article that shareholders can
"free ride" on the raider's improvement of the corporation,
thereby seriously limiting the raider's profit. Dreyfus (1986) notes
that the degree of competition taking place in the takeover market
(based on various sources of gains) may interact nontrivially with
the resolution of the free-rider problem discussed in Grossman &
Hart (1980). The reason for this is that the target's reservation
values may differ according. to the source of gains accruing to
bidders given a certain level of allowed dilution. Following this
lead, Shleifer & Vishny (1986) analyze a model in which the
presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial
solution to this free-rider problem. In their framework, a profit
after the costs of a takeover can be realized through an increase in
value of shares held by the large shareholder even though the
shareholder does not, on average, profit from the additional shares
purchased through the tender offer. Furthermore, Bagnoli &
Lipman (1988) show that when there are a finite number of
shareholders, some stockholders must be pivotal in the sense that
they do recognize that they may affect the outcome of the bid. In
their model, making some stockholders pivotal is crucial because it
forces them to choose whether or not a bid succeeds. Hence, they
cannot free-ride, so exclusionary devices such as dilution and two-
tier offers are not necessary for successful takeovers.
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Bradley, Desai & Kim (1988) analyze the tender offer process and
show how bidding firms use front-end loaded two-tier offers8? to
solve the free-rider problem and argue that the highest valued
allocation of the target resources will acquire control of the target.
They also show how the potential for competing bids by target
managers solves the prisoner's dilemma and ensures that
successful tender offers will be value-increasing transactions for
target stockholders. Furthermore, collective action on the part of
target stockholders or arbitrageurs can also solve the prisoner's
dilemma. Finally, fair-price statutes and fair-price amendments
may be another solution to the prisoner's dilemma.
Takeover bidding contests are in many respects similar to English
auctions. 8 7 Bidders submit successively higher bids until a high
bid stands. One important difference between takeover bidding
contests and English auctions, however, is related to the timing of
the auction; while English auctions for art or real estate typically
take place over periods as short as several minutes, takeover
bidding contests can last for weeks or even months. The time
factor involved in takeover contests allows potential bidders to
search for information while the auction is under way.
Fishman (1988,1989), Khanna (1986) and Berkovitch & Khanna
(1986) provide alternative models for takeover contests. Fishman
(1988,1989) builds a model where the takeover bidding process is
viewed within a context of asymmetric and costly information. He
uses search costs to explain preemptive bidding in tender offers
and shows that in equilibrium, a first bidder may make a high-
premium initial offer to deter a second bidder from competing. A
high initial bid signals a high first-bidder valuation, and it is this
86Front-end loaded two tier offers are theoretically equivalent to
dilution.
87See McAfee & McMillan (1987) and Milgrom (1985,1987) for
excellent surveys of the literature and theory of auctions. Milgrom
& Weber (1982) is a classic article that covers many aspects of
auctions.
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information that deters a second bidder from competing. Khanna
(1986) explains preemptive bidding through the sequential arrival
of bidders. and also studies the effect of resistance by target firms.
Based on his model he shows that preemptive bidding is an optimal
strategy for the opening bidder. Moreover. expected returns to the
winner decrease as the number of rival bidders goes up, while the
level of the optimal preemptive bid increases with the number of
bidders. Berkovitch & Khanna (1986) model tender offers as an
auction where bidders arrive sequentially and payoffs are
determined competitively. On the other hand, a merger is modelled
as a sequential bargaining game between two managements.
The models briefly mentioned above, all build on the principle of
independent. private valuation auctions. It is likely that different
bidding firms have different synergy potentials in a takeover
situation with a certain target. Of course, this is a matter of degree:
some synergies are very general in the sense that most bidders can
realize them. Other synergies may. however, be uniquely related
to a certain bidder-target relationship. This issue will be further
discussed in chapter 3 below. The models above analyze interesting
issues connected to the takeover process.
interesting aspects are not discussed explicitly.
However, many
For example, these
articles ignore questions such as: Can certain synergies be realized
by acquiring other companies? How close "substitutes" are
alternative targets? Will one merger exhaust the synergy
potential or is it possible that the synergy potential will exist for
several takeovers? Is it reasonable to believe that the bidder or
target can realize the synergy potential without integrating (for
instance internal development)? Will new firms enter the
industry such that closer substitutes for the bidder or target will be
players in the game? Will the same synergy potential exist n
periods from now? Is there an asymmetry in information between
bidder and target when it comes to the synergy potentials that
exist? Do different types of synergies imply a different degree of
asymmetry of information? Do different types of synergies imply
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different degree of asymmetry of information? In my view, the
questions raised here highlight interesting issues that should. be
analyzed in a takeover contest. An understanding of these aspects
may greatly improve the bidders ability to realize abnormal
returns from an M&A transaction.
The winner's curse hypothesis can be related
takeovers (Varaiya 1988, Giliberto & Varaya 1989).
to corporate
This hypothesis
states that the winner of an auction tends to be the one who most
overestimates the true value of the auctioned object. That is, the
winning bidder has, on average, a value estimate which exceeds
the true value of the auctioned object. One should, however, note
that the winner's curse hypothesis assumes that the auctioned
object has the same value to all prospective bidders. This implies
that the winner's curse hypothesis may be valid in common value
takeover auctions where bidders are expected to be able to realize
the same synergies with the target.
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Ill. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a model for strategic
mergers and acquisitions. The model will be normative arguing
that abnormal stockholder returns are more likely to be realized
when choosing an efficient mode of organization that creates
shareholder value through sustained competitive advantage. It
will be focused on the relative advantages of market organization,
hierarchy and solutions based on alliances. The interaction
between types of synergy, mode of economic organization,
financial markets and profitability is shown to be a key issue in
the model. Interesting relationships between theories proposed in
the corporate strategy area and in financial economics will be
highlighted.
The chapter starts out by integrating perspectives from the
strategy area (especially industrial organization economics and
transaction cost theory). This is followed by the development of a
model for strategic mergers and acquisitions.
takeover price and the link between strategy and
key elements in the model. The model will then be
types (horizontal,related,unrelated and vertical).
Value creation,
finance are the
linked to M&A
To measure
variations in value created by M&As, we need a classification
system that can be used in the empirical testing. Based on such a
classification system, hypotheses regarding expected effects of
merger strategies are developed.
2. INTEGRATION OF PERSPECTIVES
I will mainly use two different perspectives in developing an M&A
model: transaction costs theory and industrial organization
economics. It is important to realize that these two perspectives, to
a large extent, are complements rather than substitutes. The
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perspectives have many common traits, but there are also
important differences. Transaction costs theory as developed. by
Williamson (1975,1985), is driven by cost-minimization
considerations. The major premise of this perspective is that firms
transact by the mode which minimizes the sum of production and
transaction costs. Industrial organization economics 1, on the other
hand, emphasizes maximization of profits through improving the
firm's competitive position vis- a-vis its rivals. Competitive
strategy is the search for a favorable competitive position in an
industry. Industry attractiveness is determined by five
competitive forces: bargaining power of suppliers and buyers,
threat of new entrants, threat of substitute products and rivalry
among existing firms. Through their strategies firms can position
themselves and often influence some of the five forces. A key
issue is creating sustainable competitive advantage through
positioning and generic strategies (cost leadership, differentiation
and focus») Since both perspectives address many of the same
questions, it seems obvious that there is a need to coordinate the
perspectives and identify situations where conflicts among them
exist and then "tell a story" about how to solve the problem.
In general, transaction cost theory focuses on efficient boundaries
based on minimization of production and transaction costs specific
to a particular economic exchange. The analysis seems to be less
dependent on competitive positioning and choice of product-
market strategy. Cost efficiency is the central theme regardless of
timing, entry barriers, collusion and strategic behavior. However,
industrial organization economics analyzes efficient boundaries by
1 I associate industrial organization economics especially with
Porter's (1980,1985) work. This perspective also goes under the
heading "positioning model".
2 Cost leadership is a strategy based on creating competitive
advantage through low costs, while differentiation strategy aims at
performing some activities in the value chain uniquely such that a
price premium that exceeds the cost of differentiating can be
obtained. Focus strategies imply that firms concentrate on (a)
certain segment(s) in the industry.
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using profitability as a starting point. For instance, in some cases
integration will be recommended based on a profitability
assessment even though integration in the actual situation is not
compatible with minimization of the sum of production and
transaction costs. It can be the case that benefits from for example
timing or overcoming entry barriers outweigh the cost
disadvantage of extending the firm's boundaries. Put differently,
one chooses a solution that does not minimize the sum of
production and transaction costs because other factors outweigh
the disadvantage of not doing this. In such conflicting cases one
must address both perspectives simultaneously in order to come up
with a reasonable solution. Actually, I will argue that transaction
cost (Te) theory is largely encompassed (explicitly and implicitly)
in the industrial organization economics (lOE) perspective both
because cost efficiency is a major factor in the positioning model
and because Te theory has important implications for the five
determinants of the industry structure. Basically, one cannot use
the positioning model without analyzing how Te theory affects for
example entry barriers) Therefore, in my view, Te theory should
be integrated into the positioning model to improve decisions about
efficient boundaries.
First of all, choice of generic strategy (cost leadership,
differentiation,focus) has important transaction cost implications.
As noted by Jones & Butler (1988), a firm's decisions about
product/market choices affect transaction costs. Specifically, they
argue that differentiation strategy tends to increase transaction
costs because the products are more complex and nonstandardized
creating a need to reduce customers' performance ambiguity.
Often the firm must incur asset-specific investments as more
resources are devoted to maintaining customer-specific relations.
One example here can be specialized sales teams. In general, when
3On the other hand, Te theory is often used more independently
without addressing industry structure and competitive positioning.
This might lead to wrong decisions because the emphasis is too
narrow.
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a firm differentiates by making complex product/market choices,
the range and variety of its transactions with customers increase
and, thus, transaction costs increase.
As mentioned above, TC theory also has important implications for
the five determinants of the industry structure. Most ENT R Y
BAR R lER S listed by Porter (1980,1985)4 tend to be affected by
asset specifici ty. Consider the economies of scale entry barrier.
This barrier depends critically on the presence or absence of sunk
costs. Without sunk costs, entry and exit become essentially
costless and the market is "contestable". Since asset specificity
refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to
alternative uses without sacrifice of productive value, the element
of sunk costs will be important when asset specificity is high. A
firm that has made a transaction specific investment will face high
exit barriers. Potential entrants, therefore, face strong expected
retaliation. Product differentiation is another entry barrier
which implies brand identification and customer loyalties. As
noted earlier, product differentiation is closely related to asset
specificity and transaction costs. A third barrier is c a p i t a I
re q u ire men t s . This barrier is most effective when asset
specificity and sunk costs exist. Asset specificity implies low exit
opportunities because of low resale value. When information is
imperfect, lending institutions have problems determining the
creditworthiness of the borrower and will often be unable to
monitor and control downstream actions of the borrower.
Switching costs are also closely related to TC theory. In general,
when asset specificity increases, switching costs tend to increase.
A fifth entry barrier is access to distribution channels. High
asset specificity tends to imply that wholesale and retail channels
for a product are limited. If competitors have these channels tied
4Porter lists 8 different entry barriers: Economies of scale, product
differentiation, capital requirements, switching costs, access to
distribution channels, absolute cost advantages (proprietary
learning curve, access to necessary inputs, proprietary low-cost
product design), government policy, expected retaliation.
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up, it will be harder to enter the channel. Absolute cost
advantages also seem to be a more effective entry barrier in. the
case of high asset specificity; favorable access to raw material and
favorable locations are closely related to site specificity.
Another main determinant of industry structure is INTENSITY OF
RIVALRY AMONG EXISTING COMPETITORs.5 Te theory seems
to affect this determinant too. Differentiation strategy and
switching costs tend to distinguish the firm from competitors.
The more unique the firm's strategic core, the easier it is to protect
it from competitors. The rivalry will often be more intense when
there are high exit barriers. One major source of exit barriers is
asset specificity.
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES is a third determinant of industry
structure. Product differentiation and switching costs tend to affect
the buyer's propensity to substitute.
Asset specificity also influences BARGAINING POWER OF
B U Y E R S . When the goods or services are differentiated/non-
standardized, there might be a lack of substitutes which lowers
bargaining power of buyers. Furthermore, as asset specificity
increases, switching costs increase and bargaining power is
lowered.
BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS is a final determinant of
industry structure. The factors increasing suppliers' bargaining
power mirror those that make buyers powerful. The
differentiation and switching costs buyers face tend to increase
bargaining power for suppliers.
5 Porter (1980) divides this component into 8 major factors:
Numerous or equally balanced competitors, slow industry growth,
high fixed or storage costs, lack of differentiation or switching
costs, capacity augmented in large increments, diverse
competitors, high strategic stakes and high exit barriers.
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As we can see from the analysis above, transaction cost theory has
important implications for all five determinants of industry
structure. Even though Porter only sporadically mentions asset
specificity, a lot of his discussions on industry structure implicitly
assume that such investments are done. Put differently, most of
the specified determinants of industry structure must be evaluated
according to sunk costs, transaction costs and imperfect
information.6 The identification of how these two underlying
factors affect the determinants is important for choosing
successful strategies to exploit market failures.
There are many elements in Porter's industry structure analysis
that are not mentioned in transaction costs theory. Among the
most important are market foreclosure, property rights, learning
curves, timing (first-mover advantages), governmental
regulation/subsidies, market growth, capacity utilization/fixed
costs, "rules of the game" for the industry, market concentration,
price sensitivity, product importance for the buyer and buyers'
information, signaling and multipoint competitors. Even though
some of these elements may be influenced by transaction costs,
several of them are unique to the lOE perspective. In my view, one
should therefore use Te theory as an integrated part of the broader
approach presented in industrial organization economics. In
boundary decisions, for example, first-mover advantages may play
a decisive part. First movers often reap sustainable cost or
differentiation advantages. Important first mover advantages
include: rapidly building reputation, preemptive positioning,
unique channel access, learning curves, securing patents,
definition of standards and switching costs. Many of these
advantages focus on how to create income streams that would not
be generated unless the firm moves quickly. For instance, if the
firm does not already have a position in a strong network such that
it has to invest much time in building such a position, M&As might
6 Sunk costs, transaction costs and imperfect information seem to
be the two most important factors of market failure.
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be a more viable strategy. This implies that M&As can be preferred
to alliances even though integration implies higher total costs
(sum of production and transaction costs).
3. TOWARD A MODEL FOR MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS
3.1. Value creation, strategic core and efficient
boundaries
The aim of this section is to analyze how value can be created
through M&As. It will focus on creation of total value from
integration.7 As we will see later, the concepts of strategic core
and efficient boundaries will be key elements in the model.
The goal of the model is to provide some guidance for how to make
decisions about efficient firm boundaries. Should the firm make
the product itself, buy/sell spot in the market or rely on some kind
of alliance? Before making a decision to integrate, one must
evaluate the relative advantages/disadvantages of M&As, internal
developments, market solutions and strategic alliances. The
problem can be illustrated like this:
No Use market!
alliances
Market
Solution
Hierarchy Strategic
Alliances
7 The distribution of gains as implied from the functioning of
financial markets will be discussed under section 3.2. below.
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Following the criterion of max stockholder value, the rule should
be: merge or acquire only if M&A > Max (market, strategic
alliances, internal development). Building on this conceptual
starting point, we need to identify specific determinants of
efficient organization. What are the main factors explaining
revenue, cost, risk and investment outlay differences among
different forms of organization? How can value be created? What
is the role of strategic core ("uniqueness", "distinctive
competence", etc) and how is it defined? Economies of scale and
scope often explain joint production, but when should such joint
production be organized within a single firm?
These are some of the most fundamental and important questions in
strategic management. Much research is currently being done in
the area, but many questions are unsolved. By inspecting the
figure presented above, one sees that boundary decisions are
complex and rest on interdependencies between the different
forms of economic organization: M&As cannot be analyzed
properly without evaluating market solution, strategic alliances
and internal development. A decision to rely on strategic alliances
should not be made before having analyzed M&As, market solution
and internal development, etc. One has to determine what are the
opportunity costs. What is the best alternative? It is reasonable to
believe that boundary decisions will be improved by using an
approach based on the above framework.
As discussed previously in this study, important rational motives
for integration may be accounted to synergy, reduced transaction
costs, market power and diversification effects. The key issue is
how to realize value creation through efficient organization. I will
present a general framework here. Under section 3.3. below this
framework will be seen in light of different types of M&As
(horizontal, related, unrelated and vertical).
According to Arrow (1974), organizations are a means of achieving
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the benefits of collective actions in situations in which the price
system fails. My starting point is that a low level of integration is
preferable until proven otherwise. This assumption is consistent
with the fundamental premise of transaction costs analysis that
hierarchy should only be chosen in cases where frequency and
asset specificity are high. According to economic theory,
economic pressures drive parties to perform effectively at a low
cost and to deal with each other in "fairness and good faith" -
otherwise they will be replaced. However, when one or both of the
parties invest in transaction specific assets, the competitive
pressure will be low, ex post, because the parties now are in a
bilateral bargaining relationship. The bargaining power strongly
depends on degree of asset specificity: high asset specificity
indicates a large sacrifice of productive value if the exchange
relationship is prematurely terminated and therefore restricts the
parties' exit possibilities. In the vein of Williamson (1975,1985) and
Klein, Crawford .& Alchian (1978), highly specialized assets lead to
bilateral monopoly situations and therefore possibilities for
opportunism and appropriation of quasi rents: the partner may in
an uncertain world extract new contract terms, become inflexible
and otherwise violate the letter and spirit of agreement. When
asset specificity is high and these assets are very valuable,
integration is thought to be the solution. As discussed earlier in
this study, strategic alliances are most important when asset
specificity is medium. In such cases alliance partners can realize
economies of scale and scope because of aggregation of production,
and the firm avoids large bureaucratic costs. The firm can thereby
concentrate on its strategic core and create competitive advantage
through efficient organization. The stronger the strategic
alliances are, the lower the expected level of integration. The
reason for this is that the stronger the exchange relationship
among two partners is, the larger is the reduction of expected
transaction costs. Using the language of strategic management,
one can say that strong alliances may increase the firm's
competitive advantage by allowing the firm to concentrate on its
"core skills", "distinctive competence" or "strategic core".
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A very interesting outcome of transaction cost theory, is the
concept of "strategic core". Williamson established the link
between transaction specific investments and integration.
Strategic core is what a firm should focus on to create sustainable
competitive advantage. Strategic core often forms the basis of
abnormal returns and distinguishes the firm from other firms.
This implies that in most cases strategic core is highly specific.
Following Williamson's lead, the strategic core should therefore be
within the firm's boundaries (hierarchy). If a firm wants to
merge with or acquire another firm, it is often because the
exchange relationship is highly specific. This can be the case if
the firm wants to transfer the use of its strategic core to other
companies or applications. Low or medium specific exchange
relationships seem to be more efficiently handled by relying on
markets or strategic alliances.
Since the strategic core of a firm has an important impact on
efficient boundaries, the concept should be carefully defined and
specified.8 I define strategic core as highly specific assets that
provide the foundation of a sustainable competitive advantage for
the firm. Unless there is an advantage over competitors that is not
easily duplicated or countered, long term profitability is likely to
be elusive. The strategic core consists of production factors that
help the firm compete and realize abnormal returns. In many
ways one can say that without a strategic core, there is no obvious
reason for the firm to exist. Strategic core has important effects on
both product- markets and financial markets:
8 Interesting discussions of the concept of strategic core and its
identification can be found in f.ex. Wells (1984), Day & Wensley
(1988), Irvin & Michaels (1989) and Reve (1990). See also relevant
market failure literature discussed above (Lippman & Rumelt 1982,
Yao 1988, Reed & DeFillipi 1990 and Nayyar 1990)
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Product-market,..---.t
effe cts
Financial marketL..---.t
effe cts
The product-market effects refer to the firm's ability to extract
rent from the industry in which it operates. The strategic core will
also have important financial markets effects in an M&A context.
This section (3.1) will focus on the product-market implications. In
section 3.2 a central theme is to analyze how the strategic core
affects the profitability for bidders and targets in mergers and
acquisitions (financial market effects).
The "core" -concept can be further elaborated by analyzing the
underlying factors that create the strategic core: (A) "Internal
factors" (physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, site
specifici ty, dedicated assets, image and reputationjf and (B)
"External factors" (strong external alliances).
Physical asset specificity refers to assets such as equipment,
machinery and processes that are specific to the transaction.
Several examples of physical asset specificity are provided in the
literature, f.ex. Klein, Crawford and Alchian's (1978) classical
stamping machine example (the ownership by automobile-
producing companies of the giant presses used for stamping body
parts). Production processes and machinery can lead to cost
advantages, but the sustainability is inversely related to the
competitors' ability to imitate the technologies. In a weak
appropriability regime, low-cost imitator manufacturers may end
up capturing all of the profits from an innovation (Teece 1987).
9 The four first factors correspond to Williamson's (1985)
determinants of asset specificity. TC theory therefore has direct
implications. for the application of the strategic core concept.
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However, even in a weak appropriability regime, there may exist
technological advantages due to first mover advantages (learning
curve,etc.).
Human asset specificity is often the most important factor
when defining 'a firm's strategic core. Core skills can be:
(1) - Specific know-how in any value chain activity
(2) - Organizational structures and systems
(3) - Organizational culture.
Skill-based competitive advantages often take a long time to
develop, but generally have significant impact on economic
performance and are difficult for competitors to replicate.
Examples of skill-based strategic cores: 10
Company:
Marriott Hotels
Wal-Mart
McDonald's
VF Corporation
Core skills:
Consistent high-quality service
Purchasing, logistics and customer service
Site selection, high-quality service,
product innovation, communications
Manufacturing, operations/planning and
disciplined product line development
(l) - Specific know-how in any value chain activity. According to
Winter (1987) there
knowledge/competence:
use/observable in use,
sy stem/independent.
extremely difficult to communicate from its possessor to another
person in symbolic form. When the knowledge is not observable
in use, it is difficult for outside actors to discover the underlying
knowledge. The knowledge is complex when the amount of
information required to characterize the knowledge in question is
are four important dimensions of
tac it/articula ble, not observable in
complex/simple and an element of a
Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is
10Source: Irvin & Michaels (1989)
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high. Finally, the knowledge might be just an element of a much
larger knowledge set. Strategic cores based on tacit, complex, non-
observable, or "an element of a system"-type of knowledge are
likely to have the largest impact on competitive advantage because
these dimensions tend to imply high specificity and causal
ambiguity.
Knowledge is often tacit or has a leaming-by-doing character. In
a setting with team production this type of knowledge becomes
even more important. In team production, several types of
resources are used. The output yielded by a team is not the sum of
separable outputs of each of its members, and it is often difficult to
determine each individual's contributions to the value creation
process. The knowledge and organizational routines that are used
in team production are often tacit, complex and difficult to specify.
Put differently, complete productive knowledge of a firm may not
be known to any single member of the firm and is unlikely to be
codified in any useful way within the firm. Much of what is going
on in the firm is "learned" through experimentation and
remembered by being incorporated in corporate culture and
organizational routines. Such lack of codified production
knowledge makes outside imitation difficult.
(2) Organizational structures and systems. Organizational
structures are important in carrying out a chosen strategy. The
aim of these structures is to increase profitability by increasing
efficiency and/or reducing the complexity of administrative and
managerial tasks. Organizational systems provide information,
planning, control and rewards to get the job done. Organizational
structures and systems may create a competitive advantage for
firms. There exists a large literature on these and related topics.
For some nice overviews of organizational structures and systems,
see Galbraith (1973), Kaplan (1982), Hrebiniak & Joyce (1984),
Porter (198S:Chap. 9-11) and Hill & Hoskisson (1987).
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(3) - Organizational culture. Corporate culture may also be a source
of sustainable profits (Barney 1986a). As in the case of tacit
knowledge, culture is an important element of production and may
be most difficult for any individual to describe or "know". Thus,
culture is inherently difficult to imitate and may permit a firm to
earn a stream of excess profits. Firms without valuable, rare, or
imperfectly imitable culture cannot expect their cultures to be the
source of sustained competitive advantages.
Site specificity may create competitive advantage owing to asset
immobility conditions. Good locations can attract customers or
reduce costs of production. Location of production facilities, access
to raw materials and closeness to markets are often a basis for
abnormal returns.
Another core factor can be dedicated assets. Dedicated assets are
investments by a supplier that would not otherwise be made for the
prospect of selling a significant amount of a product to a particular
customer. One example is preparation of bidding packages in
construction (Reve 1990)
Image/reputation (e.g., Weigelt & Camerer 1988 and Nayyar
1990) is a key factor in competition. This factor departs from the
"internal focus" on a firm's resources and adopts a more "external
focus" on how a firm's products are perceived by the environment.
Reputation is especially important for goods or services for which
quality cannot be physically ascertained before purchase and
when after-sales service from the supplier is important. Because
image/goodwill are maintained through the buyer's experience,
consistency of product/service quality are critical for any
reputation-based strategy. Reputation may be an important source
of competitive advantage. In many cases reputation can be applied
in related areas by adding new product lines or acquiring related
firms and transferring the reputation from the buying to the
selling company. One important type of reputation is brand name.
Brand name capital creates control problems because it is
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especially subject to degradation. Control problems are easily
created whenever one party can free ride on the efforts of others,
receiving benefits without bearing costs.
Finally, strong external alliances may be a core factor for
many firms. Distinctive alliances with buyers, suppliers,
regulatory agents and sometimes existing and potential rivals, may
lead to more efficient organization than other firms. If the firm is
able to build and maintain alliances better than its competitors,
this might be a strategic core for the firm. Sometimes these
alliances can be used in other related areas such that abnormal
returns increase by expansion.
In addition to abnormal returns stemming from a firm's strategic
core, interfirm differences in profitability may also be explained
by uncertain imitability as discussed by Lippman & Rumelt
(1982) and Rumelt (1984). Uncertain imitability exists because of
uncertainty in the creation of new production functions and acts
as an entry barrier. This uncertainty exists because there is
ambiguity as to what the factors of production actually are and how
they interact. Put differently, the precise reasons for success and
failure cannot be determined since it is difficult to know to which
inputs to attribute the performance of a successful firm. It should
also be noted that there seems to be a close relationship between
strategic core and ambiguity. For instance, specific knowledge and
corporate culture are often tacit, complex and difficult to specify.
Furthermore, many products and processes are unstructured and
poorly-understood. Such core skills and assets often tend to be
correlated with high ambiguity.
As indicated earlier, differentiation strategy (Porter 1980,1985) is
closely related to asset specificity and transactions costs.
Differentiation strategies often involve high product quality,
advanced features and high levels of service which demand
investment in specialized skills and assets as well as continuous
change. On the other hand, cost-based strategies often rest on low
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factor costs, economies of scale and large initial capital investment
(Porter 1990). This implies that a differentiation strategy often
creates a more sustainable advantage than those based on cost-
based strategies.
Having identified determinants of the strategic core, I now turn to
the implications. As discussed earlier, strategic cores are highly
specific and should be governed internally (hierarchy), while less
specific activities should be governed vi a strategic alliances or
markets. The concept of strategic core has very important
implications for M&As.l1 Assume that there exists excess capacity
in the firm's core factor. Excess capacity means that there is a
fixed factor that is not fully utilized or that there exist, what I will
call, "public good synergies". Some assets in the firm do not have
any upper capacity limits for transfer. This is the case if the
underlying factor is intangible. Important examples are transfer
of brand name, image, reputation or alliance relationships. The
marginal cost of transferring such public good assets is, per
definition, less than the average costs of retaining those assets for
the firm. When there are possibilities for transfer of the strategic
core to related areas in order to realize synergy effects, interesting
relationships between degree of diversification, strategic core and
transaction cost theory must be analyzed. Strategic core, which
yields positive abnormal returns, implies high asset
specificity/uniqueness and only potential for narrow
diversification. Wider diversification, on the other hand, indicates
less specific factors that normally create fewer possibilities for
competitive advantage. A given strategic core will lose more value
when it is transferred to markets which are distant to the original
market where the firm built its core skills. Put differently,
abnormal returns will decrease as the firm moves away from its
current scope. This phenomenon can be illustrated like this:
11 The discussion under this section (3.1) will be general. Under
section 3.3. this general theory will be applied to different merger
types.
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Degree of
diversification
Broad
Narrow
Low High Uniqueness
of assets
The figure above shows expected abnormal returns from related
M&As. If the firm has excess capacity, it should first diversify to
the closest market compared to its current business. If the firm
still has excess capacity, it should go on to the second closest
market. This should continue until the marginal rents become
negative.I2
In sum, the level of abnormal returns stemming from competitive
advantage tend to be inversely· related to the degree of
diversification. The wider the degree of diversification, the less
the level of abnormal returns.
The sustainability of competitive advantage is closely related to
the concept of strategic core. Sustainability hinges on how easily
unique assets can be replicated by competitors. If certain assets
cannot be bought in factor markets, rivals may either attempt to
imitate them by accumulating similar assets or substitute them by
I 2To be correct one must also take into
premiums and competitive bidding in
integration is the chosen mode of entry.
consideration takeover
financial markets if
98
other assets (Dierickx & Cool 1989). A general theme in corporate
strategy is that a firm should implement strategies that cannot be
duplicated by rivals. The firm's ability to realize abnormal returns
is a function of competitive statics and dynamics:
Competitive
statics
Competitive
dynamics
Abnormal
retu rns+ =
In such a setting, the concept of strategic core seems to play a vital
role. As already discussed above, transaction costs theory (and
thereby strategic core) seems to have an important impact on
industry structure (see section 2 above). Strategic core increases
entry barriers (economies of scale, product differentiation, capital
requirements, switching costs, access to distribution channels and
absolute cost advantages). It also has important impact on
intensity of rivalry among existing competitors, threat of
substitutes and on bargaining power of buyers and suppliers. The
situation can be illustrated like this:
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Physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, site specificity,
dedicated assets, image/reputation and strong external alliances
are determinants that define the strategic core and are highly
specific. Since these underlying factors are also major
determinants of the industry structure, a strong strategic core
tends to provide sustainable competitive advantage by facilitating
the firm's ability to get a strong position in the industry.
Since the basis for creating sustainable competitive advantage
changes continuously, the firm must at any time be willing to
adapt to the changing conditions. The strategic core should be
looked upon as a dynamic concept which should be redefined as the
environment evolves. Innovations, change in market demand and
competitor attacks are important examples of factors that may
affect the firm's ability to realize abnormal returns.
The concept of strategic core
efficient boundaries of firms.
provides the foundation for
The firm exists because of its
strategic core. Core skills should be governed internally because
of their highly specific nature. If a firm forms alliances in their
core business, it runs the risk of high transaction costs. The
alliance partner may, for example, be able to capture much of the
core skills and thereby become a formidable competitor in the
future. If the firm has excess capacity in its strategic core, it may
be a viable strategy to extend firm boundaries. The basic question
is what's the best way of transferring unique resources. In an
M&A context, at least four conditions must be fulfilled before one
can justify integration: (1) there must be a potential for net
positive synergy effects, (2) transaction costs must prevent an
efficient market in relevant factors, (3) there need to be limits on
obtaining increased factor utilization by expanding the output of
any single product and (4) the value creation gains must exceed
the takeover premium.
Transactions of medium asset specificity should be governed
through strategic alliances. This tends to be more efficient than
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hierarchy because outside producers aggregate production and
thereby realize synergy effects. In addition, the firm avoids
bureaucratic costs that often increase geometrically with the
degree of integration. Hierarchy provides an advantage when it
comes to transaction costs. However, strong alliances based on
trust and mutual benefits may, in the case of medium asset
specificity, be an efficient organizational mode for handling such
costs.
Transactions of low asset specificity should be governed outside the
)
firm 's boundaries. The market ensures efficient production, and
the firm avoids increased bureaucratic costs from high degree of
integration.
To sum up section 3.1., the acquisition process should be
approached like this:
r " r " r '""
Define
Benefits and M&A> Max
costs of (strategic alliances,
strategic r-+ integration, .... market, internal
core takeover price development)
"- ~ "- ~ '- ..)
One should first define the firms core skills. Based on this, one has
to evaluate the benefits and costs of integration, and the
investment must be analyzed in the light of the effects of financial
markets (distribution of gains). Before M&A is chosen it must be
compared to alternative modes of economic organization/entry
(strategic alliances, market, internal development).
3.2. Takeover price and synergies
As pointed out above, the concept of strategic core has important
effects on both product-markets and financial markets. The issue
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in this section is to highlight how the strategic core affects the
distribution of gains between bidders and targets in a takeover
contest. Based on a sample of 681 takeovers in the 1963-85 period.
Nathan & O'Keefe (1989) find that takeover premiums have
approximately doubled from the period 1963-73 to 1974-85. The
mean cash tender offer takeover premium rose from 41 % to 75 %,
the mean cash merger premium rose from 29% to 70 % and the
mean stock merger premium rose from 32 % to 67 %.13 Moreover,
Bradley, Desai & Kim (1988) document that returns to stockholders
of acquiring firms have decreased over time. The mean abnormal
return to acquiring firms is 4.1 % (Z=5.9) in 1963- 68, 1.3 % (Z=1.5)
in 1968-80 and -2.9 % (Z=2.8) in 1981-84. Possible explanations for
this development might be takeover regulation, aggressive
investment bankers and the development of junk bond markets. It
goes without saying that the premiums observed during the last
decade represent a big barrier for bidding firms.14 Assume a
situation where A acquires B. Assume that B's pre-offer value is
100, that the takeover premium is 60 % and that the
implementation period 15 is two years. Furthermore, assume that
the discount rate is 10 % and let the takeover gains (net present
value of future gains at the end of the implementation period) be
denoted X. The break-even takeover gains in this example are:
60 = X/(1.1)2 => X = 93.6
Required break-even takeover gains increase with takeover
13Supplement 4 provides a detailed overview of takeover premiums
for 681 successful offers in the period 1963-85.
14 One should, however, remember the measurement problem
associated with the empirical studies we have in this area. Partial
anticipation and size- effect problems might to some extent hide
abnormal returns for bidders.
15 I define the implementation period as the period from when the
offer is accepted (payment) to when net positive synergies start
becoming realized. In practice it seems that corporate
restructurings take a long time to implement, which postpone the
realization of takeover gains.
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premiums and the length of the implementation period.16 The
problem presented above can in general be described as:
TP= VC
(1+ d)IH
where
TP = Takeover premium
VC = Net present value of takeover gains at the end of the
implementation period
d = discount rate
IH = Implementation horizon (years)
This formula may be used when choosing among various ways of
organizing economic activity (M&As, internal development,
strategic alliances and market).17 For example, strategic alliances
might be a more profitable strategy even though VC is higher in a
takeover than in a solution based on alliances. This might be the
case because of high takeover premiums (TP) or that takeover is
more risky (higher d). On the other hand, takeover might be a
quicker way of realizing value gains (reducing IH). Assuming that
the acquiring firm has the ability to choose its efficient
boundaries, it must be able to understand the bases for realizing
abnormal returns. In an M&A setting bidder gains are, as we saw
in the discussion above, a function of value creation and takeover
premium: 18
Bidder gains = f(value creation, takeover premium)
Bringing this a step further, value creation is a function of
16 Supplement 5 gives an overview based on the example above
using various combinations of takeover premiums and
implementation horizons.
17 In the case of internal development or strategic alliances, TP
should be changed to 10 (10 = Investment Outlay).
1 8 The following discussion abstracts from differences in
implementation horizon among the different modes of economic
organization.
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competitive statics and dynamics (see section 3.1. above):
Value creation = f(competitive statics, competitive dynamics)
Furthermore, takeover premiums seem to be a function of several
factors:
Takeover premium =
f(unique synergies and industry structure, method of payment
takeover legislation, takeover defenses, free-rider problem and
fraction of shares bought, preemptive bidding, timing, business
cycles, agency problems, hubris, capital requirements)
Method of payment may affect takeover premiums because of
information asymmetries (Eckbo & Langohr 1988, Fishman 1989).
Takeover legislation contains disclosure and delay
requirements which are likely to increase the purchase price of
target firms. Takeover defenses often tend to increase offer
prices (especially poison pills and dual class recapitalizations). The
takeover process itself also has important implications for takeover
premiums. According to Grossman & Hart (1980) shareholders can
free ride on the raider's improvement of the corporation; that is
if incumbent shareholders understand the improvement plan, they
have incentives to stay on unless they at least get the value of the
improvement in return for their shares. This free rider problem
can be solved by using front-end loaded offers (Bradley, Desai &
Kim 1988) in which the offer price is greater than the expected
postoffer price. According to Fishman (1988,1989), high bids (and
thereby high takeover premiums) can signal a high valuation of
the target and thus serve to preempt competition. Timing can be
important since it is often decisive when it comes to number of
potential bidders, their potential for realizing synergies. etc. (see
f.ex. Khanna 1984). Takeover premiums can also be affected by
agency problems. Managers may acquire firms even though
they, ex ante, do not expect positive abnormal returns from the
investment. This seems especially to be the case when the
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corporation has a lot of free cash flow (Jensen 1986,1988,1989 a and
b). Managers also run the risk of overbidding (h u bris). Roll
(1986.1987). Even if they intend to make profit on the transaction.
the winner of a takeover contest is often the loser because he pays
too much.19 Access to funds for takeovers may also be an
important determinant of takeover premiums. The junk bond
market has had a significant impact on the takeover market. A
final determinant of takeover premiums that I have identified. are
unique synergies. I will spend much time on this factor since it
is closely related to the major theme of this study: mergers and
acquisitions in a corporate strategy perspective.
As noted by Barney (1986b.1988.1989). relatedness among a bidder
and a target is not a sufficient condition for acquiring firms to
realize positive abnormal returns. Put differently. even though
big synergy potentials obviously exist. the required takeover
premium may be so high that the target captures most of the gains.
This result is closely related to the concept of "strategic factor
markets" introduced in Barney (1986b). The basic notion behind
this concept is that when the cost of resource acquisition equals
the value created by implementing a strategy. this strategy
generates only normal returns even if it successfully creates
imperfect competition in product- markets. A key issue is
therefore to identify situations where bidders are also expected to
profit from a takeover. that is when the cost of resource
acquisition (takeover premium) is less than the value created by
the merger.
I will divide synergies into two types: (1) general synergies and (2)
specific synergies. General synergies are synergies that can be
realized by many firms. Synergies are general in the sense that no
firm has a sustainable advantage in realizing these synergies. and
that several firms are able to realize the same dollar amount of
19 This assumes that there are significant common value elements
associated with the target.
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synergy potential. A bidder who wants to acquire a company based
on general synergies, is not expected to realize positive abnormal
returns from the transaction. Even though the synergy potential
is large, such synergies are likely to be bid away since many
bidders can realize the same synergies. These bidders will enter
into a competitive bidding which will drive the takeover price
upwards until the abnormal returns for the bidders on the margin
become negative. In such a case, the abnormal returns are
distributed to the shareholders of the target firm. It can be argued
that if one bidder at the outset has private information about the
synergy potential, then he may realize positive abnormal returns.
Such an argument is, however, very doubtful. First of all, takeover
legislation requires that the bidder discloses information about the
transaction. Moreover, there is a regulated minimum tender
period where alternative bidders can collect information and
analyze the target. If other bidders are/expect to be able to
duplicate the synergies, they can enter a bidding which will tend
to drive bidders' abnormal returns toward zero. The other bidders
can also receive information from the target. There exist
incentives for the target firm to inform potential bidders about the
general synergy potentials in order to unfold competitive
dynamics. And, in some cases, the target may be able to realize
these synergies by itself. Therefore, as a general rule, bidders can
only expect normal returns from M&As based on general
synergies.
Specific synergies are synergies based on transfer of some
elements of a firm's strategic core (see section 3.1. above).
Synergies based on strategic core are highly specific and often
provide a foundation of sustainable competitive advantage for the
firm. Such synergies are not easily duplicated or countered by
competitors because of uniqueness and since strategic core has
important effects on entry barriers, rivalry, threat of substitutes
and on bargaining power of buyers and suppliers that tend to
improve the focal firm's position. Bidders who base their takeover
decision on transfer of core factors seem, apriori, to be in a better
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position to realize posiuve abnormal returns. Even if the market
for corporate control is competitive, the bidder can realize positive
abnormal returns in such a situation. If a certain bidder has a
specific synergy potential which is larger than the synergy
potential that any other bidder can realize, there is no strong
substitutability among bidders. Assume that A has a synergy
potential stemming from excess capacity in its strategic core which
by definition is difficult to duplicate for other firms. If A can
create larger value in a merger with C than any other bidder B,
and A is building on its strategic core, one should expect A to have
a higher probability of realizing an abnormal return than other
bidders. Imperfections in the product-markets are not bid away
even though the financial markets are efficient. Sustainable
competitive advantage based on strategic core is not likely to be bid
away in the takeover market as long as other firms' specific
synergy potentials are smaller in dollar terms than the focal
bidder's and as long as other mechanisms, such as overbidding by
other bidders, are not dominating.
In general, one might say that if target firms own unique
resources that generate larger dollar gains with potential bidders
than any other targets, a competitive market for corporate control
will result in the target capturing much of the gains. If the bidder
transfers his core factors, one should expect the bidder to realize
some of the gains if the dollar value of his synergy gains is bigger
than the gains that competing bidders can realize. This proposition
is consistent with the hypothesis that gains to bidders are
positively related to the number of alternative target firms
available and negatively related to the number of other bidders.
James & Wier (1987) provide evidence supporting such a
hypothesis.2 O
There also seems to be an interesting relationship between the
20Bradley, Desai & Kim 1988 and Michel & Shaked 1988 also find
evidence indicating that target companies realize higher abnormal
returns in multiple bidder situations.
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concept of strategic core and preemptive bidding. Fishman
(1988,1989) provides a model where high initial bids can signal
high valuation and thus serve to preempt competition. In his
model, bidders' costs of observing their own valuations of the
target, Ci' is an essential factor. These costs are regarded as sunk
when they are imposed. The initial bidder's expected payoff
increases when competing bidders' costs of observing the target's
value are increasing. In other words preemption becomes cheaper
for bidder 1, and the target's equilibrium expected payoff
decreases. Synergies based on a strategic core are often complex,
difficult to describe and difficult to understand (eg., Barney 1986a).
This situation tends to increase the costs of observing the target's
value (Ci) and therefore increases the initial bidder's equilibrium
expected payoff because preemption is cheaper.
As argued above, one should expect the bidder's share of the gains
to be larger when the number of similar targets increases.
Conversely, when the number of actual or potential bidders grows,
a target can expect a rise in its share of the gains. Many bidders
relative to the number of targets will increase the targets'
reservation prices. This will happen because targets incorporate
the possibilities of a competitive bidding among bidders which tend
to result in higher takeover premiums. Based on my discussion of
general and specific synergies, I will provide three general cases
to highlight the issues: case (1) - several bidders, one target, case
(2) - one bidder, several targets and case (3) - several bidders,
several targets. In most real M&A situations there will exist
elements of both specific and general synergy potentials. In the
following cases I will assume that all firms are able to realize the
same level of general synergies, while the firms have different
levels of specific synergies. I will also assume that the market
solution with no sharing represents the base case; synergies and
costs that are created in M&As, internal development and alliances
are evaluated relative to a solution based on market transactions.
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Definition of variables:
Yo= Target value if there is no takeover. Assume that there
exists no private information on Vo
bi= bidder
ti= target
G= General synergies
GSi= Gross specific synergies company
Clj= Increased bureaucratic costs as a result of higher level of
integration for company i
TCli= Change in transaction costs of transferring resources
company i2 I
Si = Net specific synergies company
Siti= Net specific synergies company i target
OBi= Overbidding by bidder
Bi = Bid from acquirer i
TP= Takeover premium
VC: Value creation (net present value)
1= l n
Overbidding is the difference between takeover premium and
value creation:
(1) OB = TP - VC
Value creation stems from specific and general synergies minus
change in bureaucratic and transaction costs because of the
transfer:
(2) VC = G + GSi - Cli - TC1i
Net specific synergies company is defined as:
2 lit is assumed that even though hierarchy is chosen. there will be
a certain level of transaction costs associated with the internal
transfer.
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that is gross synergies minus increased bureaucratic costs .and
transaction costs as a result of the transfer.
therefore be rewritten:
Value creation can
(4) ve =G + Si
Case J: Several bidders, one target
The situation can be illustrated like this:
I b1 II
J b2 I ... t 1I -
I bn II
Assuming that different firms can realize different levels of net
specific synergies, the firms can be ranked in descending order
depending on their value creation potential:22
22 As showed in the diagrams, bidder n has the highest value
creation potential followed by n-l, etc.
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82
81
G G G
................
nvo
t + bn t + b2 t + b1 target
In order for bidder n (bn) to be able to acquire the target, it must at
least bid:
(5) Bn > Max (Vo + G+ Sl + OBI,
Vo +G+ S2 + OB2,
Vo + G + Sn-1 + OBn_1)
Bidder bn must at least pay as much as the next highest bid. At
maximum bn will pay Vo + G + Sn if he is able to avoid overbidding.
The difference between the value created if bn takes over the
company compared to the next highest bid must somehow be
distributed among bn and the target. Formally this difference is:
(6) Sn - Max (Sl + OBI, S2 + OB2' ......., Sn-1 + OBn-1)
since Vo and G are common for all companies. It is difficult to
determine the distribution of this difference between the winning
bidder and the target firm. This will be discussed in general after
all the three cases have been presented.
It is interesting to note from the above example that even net
specific synergies do not constitute a sufficient condition for a
bidder to realize positive abnormal returns. If for example three
l l l
firms can realize the same level of net specific synergies,2 3 it does
not matter that firm 1 realizes synergies based on shared image/
product reputation, that firm 2 realizes synergies based on
economies of scope in specific machinery while firm 3 builds on
the firm's corporate culture. What is important is not how specific
synergies are realized, but the expected dollar level of the net
synergy effects. Accordingly, in a situation with three bidders,
which can realize say 100 in specific synergies, and one target, it is
likely that these three firms will enter a competitive bidding
process such that the lion's share of the gains goes to the target.
Case 2: One bidder, several targets
I will here assume that all targets are valued at Vo and that no
other bidder can realize specific synergies with any of the targets.
Illustration of the situation:
b1
t 1
t2
tn
In such a case the bidder must at least pay Vo + G.
Case 3: Several bidders, several targets
In the real world it is likely that there exist several actual and
23For the moment I assume that overbidding does not take place.
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potential bidders and targets with different degree of
substitutability:
b1
b2
bn
t 1
t2
tn
Consider bidder n's problem in such a situation: bn is able to realize
general and specific synergies with different targets. So are many
other bidders. bn 's strategy in such a case should not necessarily
be to choose the target with whom it can realize the largest net
specific synergies. Most likely, bn 's optimal strategy is to find a
target where the difference between bn 's highest possible bid
(zero abnormal return bid) and the next highest bid, is largest.
Maximizing the difference rather than the absolute level of net
synergies seems to be the most viable strategy. Put differently, bn
should look for a target with which the specific synergy potential
rei a tiveto alternative bidders' synergy potential is maximized.
This can be formalized as follows.
Optimal target for bn is to choose ti such that:
(7) Max
{ [Sotl - max(SItI + OBItI, S2tl + OB2t1,····'Sn-ItI + OBn-It1)],
[Sot2 - max(SIt2 + OBI t2, S2t2 + OB2t2,····'Sn-It2 + OBn-It2)],
or equivalently:
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n
MaxL<Snti
i=l
(n-l)
- max L(Sjti + OBjti))
j=l
In sum, the discussion above shows that synergies, per se, do not
generate abnormal returns for bidding firms. Synergies must be
specific and, in addition, generate dollar value in excess of other
bidders' ability to realize specific synergies with the target. Only
then is the bidder expected to realize abnormal positive returns. A
bidder must therefore, in addition to understanding its own value
creating ability in a takeover, have some understanding of the
nature of synergy potentials between other bidding firms and
targets [see formula (7)].
The final distribution of gains between the winning bidder and the
target is a very complex issue. Assume that bn is the winning
bidder. Certain elements of the total value creation are expected to
be distributed to the target because of obvious competitive reasons.
Specifically, the value of general synergies (O) will most likely be
captured by the target. Moreover, the value of the second highest
sum of net specific synergies (Si) and overbidding (OBi) is also
likely to be distributed to the target since these elements (together
with O) constitute the value of the second highest bid. Formally,
the part of the total value creation that is likely .to go to the target
is at least (the target's lower bound):
(8) O + Max (Sl + OBI' S2 + OB2' , Sn-l + OBn-l)
The rest-value that is to be distributed between the winning bidder
and the target is according to equation (6) above [Sn - Max (Sl +
OBI' S2 + OB2' , Sn-l + OBn-I)]. This seems to be the upper bound
of gains for the bidding firm. The distribution of this amount
among the winning bidder and the target rests on a complex
interaction of different factors. According to a traditional English
auction, the winning bidder would only have to pay some small
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amount epsilon (e) more than the second highest bid to win the
contest:
(9) Vo + G + Max (Sl + OBI. S2 + OB2 Sn-l + OBn-l) + e
This leaves the winning bidder firm with most of the upper bound
of the value creation:
(lO) Sn - Max (Sl + OBl. S2 + OB2•......• Sn-l + OBn_l) - e
However. other aspects of the bidding process tend to create a more
uncertain outcome. Put differently. the target often has a higher
reservation price than the second highest bid. implying that the
bidder must pay more than the second highest bid plus epsilon (e).
Often one ends up in a bargaining situation24 where the outcome is
difficult to predict. Many factors might affect the level of the
winning bid: facing a "splitting-a-pie" problem. one has to decide
whether discounting is appropriate. Bargaining takes time. If the
bidder rejects an offer it has to wait for a better offer to appear. It
is uncertain whether such an offer will appear and, if it does.
when it will appear. With an infinite horizon and a stationary
environment. the market value of the target and the synergies will
be the same at the beginning of every period. Then the cake does
not diminish over time. However. sometimes a synergy potential
only lasts for a certain period of time or changes in the
environment require rapid realization of the synergies. In such
cases discounting seems to be appropriate. The target's
expectations also seem to be an important factor affecting its
reservation price. Does the target expect bids that are higher than
the highest present bid from newentering firms or existing
firms? Is there an asymmetry of information between bidder and
target when it comes to the synergy potentials that exist? Do
different types of synergy imply different degrees of asymmetric
24See Rubinstein (1982). Sutton (1986) and Kreps (1990) for
discussions of bargaining theory.
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information? Do different target shareholders have different
expectations as to what will constitute a successful bid? Does. the
target have information indicating that other existing or potential
bidders face possibilities for developing specific synergy within
reasonably short time? What does the target expect about
alternative targets for the bidder? These questions are important
for the target to analyze; according to Bradley, Desai & Kim (1983)
permanent revaluation of the target shares from tender offer
announcements requires actual combinations of the target
resources with those of the acquiring firm. They find that the
targets' positive announcement effects from unsuccessful tender
offer bids are completely reversed within five years of the initial
unsuccessful bid if no subsequent successful offer occurs. The
target must therefore take into consideration the probability of not
receiving a subsequent takeover bid. An interesting question for
the target when evaluating such a probability, is whether the
bidder's ability to realize synergies will be exhausted by one
merger or whether it is possible that the synergy potential will
exist for several takeovers. As I discussed earlier in this study,
"public good synergies" have a very high capacity indicating that
synergy may be realized in several mergers. Another factor is
whether it is reasonable to believe that the bidder can realize the
synergy potential without integrating (eg. through strategic
alliances or internal development). If the bidder believes that the
takeover premium becomes too high, he may choose another mode
of economic organization than integration.
3.3. The M&A model and merger type
Under section 3.2. above it was shown that a bidder is not expected
to realize positive abnormal returns unless he can create net
specific synergies with the target and unless the value of these net
specific synergies outweighs the sum of net specific synergies and
overbidding for the highest alternative bid. In the case of bidder
n, there is a necessary condition of
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Sn >0.
Otherwise Sn - Max (Sl + OBI. S2 + OB2•....• Sn-l + OBn-l) - e will not
be positive. Merger or acquisition should be chosen when the net
benefits from this solution exceed those created in alternative ways
of economic organization:
Merger & Acquisition > Max (Market solution. strategic alliances.
internal development)
This requirement can be formalized. Assume that firm n has excess
capacity in some of its production factors. The firm wants to find
an efficient mode of realizing these synergy potentials. In cases
like this. a comparative analysis of institutional modes of economic
organization should be undertaken. I assume that the transfer is of
a medium or highly specific kind ruling out the spot market
alternative as a potentially efficient one.
The net benefits from integration (value creation - takeover
premium) have been formalized above:25
(6a) OSn - CIn - TCIn - Max (OSI - CII - TCII + OBl. OS2 - CI2 -
TCI2 + OB2.······.OSn-l - CIn-1 - TCIn_l + OBn-l)
Similarly. net benefits from strategic
determined. Define:26
alliances can be
CA = Change in bureaucratic costs when using strategic
alliances
TeA = Change in transaction costs when using strategic alliances
lOA = Investment outlay strategic alliances27
25 As we remember. Sn = OSn - CIn - TCIn (equation 3).
26 All these variables can be regarded as net present values of
expected future cash flows.
27 Building strategic alliances through trust and long term
11 7
Net benefits from strategic alliances are:
(11) - lOA + G + GSn - CA - TCA.
It is assumed that the same synergies can be realized through
strategic alliances as through M&As. Investment outlay,
bureaucratic costs, transaction costs and distribution effects are
however expected to be different.
A third solution is internal development. Assume that the
synergy potential is still the same, but that investment outlay
(entry costs), bureaucratic costs and transaction costs are expected
to be different from M&As or strategic alliances. For instance,
bureaucratic costs may be different from those in M&As because in
M&As one often has to buy a whole company with all the associated
peripheral activities and divisions which may increase the
bureaucratic costs more. Transaction costs are also likely to be
different. For example in a hostile takeover, there may exist larger
barriers of cooperation among the acquiring and acquired
company compared to cooperation among the existing firm and a
division created by internal development. Define:
CID = Change in bureaucratic costs when using internal
development
TCID = Change in transaction costs when using internal
development
1010 = Investment outlay internal development
Net benefits from internal development are
(12) - 100 + G + GSn - CID - TCID.
relationships implies that the investment outlay is spread out over
time. As opposed to the takeover price which is paid at time 0, lOA
must be discounted back to the starting point of the cash flow
analysis.
l l 8
Therefore, M&A should be chosen when:
(13) GSn - Cln -TCln - Max (GSI - CII - TCII + OBI, GS2 - CI2 - TCI2 +
OB2, ..····,GSn-l - Cln-l - TCIn-l + OBn_l) >
Max (-lOA + G +GSn - CA - TCA, -IOID + G + GSn - CID - TCID)
According to (3), Sn = GSn - Cln - TCln. Similarly, net specific
synergies in the case of strategic alliances can be defined as Sn a =
GSn - CA - TCA and in the case of internal development Snid = GSn -
CID - TCID. Hence, expression (13) above reduces to the following
expression:
(Ba) Sn - Max(Sl + OBI, S2 + OB2•..... Sn-l + OBn_l) >
G + Max(-IOA + Sna' -1010 + Snid)
The rest of this section will explore when these requirements are
expected to be fulfilled.
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, strategic core seems to be the
ultimate reason for having firms. To reiterate, the strategic core
consists of highly specific assets that form the basis of sustainable
competitive advantage for the firm. These highly specific assets
should be governed internally ( hierarchy) while less specific
activities should be governed via strategic alliances or markets.
Excess capacity in the strategic core gives possibilities for
realizing synergies. Synergies based on transfer of strategic core
are, per definition. highly specific and should therefore be
transferred internally. Synergy effects stemming from transfer of
core skills are expected to create sustainable competitive advantage
for the firm because the strategic core increases entry barriers,
and also has important impact on the intensity of rivalry among
existing competitors, the threat of substitutes and the bargaining
power of buyers and suppliers. There is also a strong relationship
between the strategic core and takeover premiums. As established
above, a necessary requirement for the bidder to realize positive
l l 9
abnormal returns is that synergies are specific. The winning
bidder's upper bound of gains is determined in equation (10).
Using the concept of synergies, strategic cores and takeover
premiums as a starting point, different types of M&As can be
analyzed. Horizontal, related, unrelated and vertical integration
are expected to have different effects for both bidder and target
firm. The different types of M&As can best be analyzed in the
context of a comprehensive model for corporate takeovers (see
figure next page):
According to the model, one should first define the strategic
core/type of transaction. Determinants of value creation
(synergy, transaction costs, market power, diversification, costs of
integration, takeover premiums) are affected by strategic core,
industry structure (industry rivalry, suppliers, buyers, substitutes,
potential entrants) and M&A type (horizontal, related, unrelated,
vertical). Finally, value creation in a takeover must be compared
to the net effects of alternative organizational forms (markets,
strategic alliances, internal development).
In the following, a systematic approach is applied to analyze the
different M&A types. The standard set up is:
1. Definition of strategic cote! type of transaction
2. Benefits and costs of integration, takeover price
3. M&A > Max (strategic alliances, market, internal development)?
3.3.1. Horizontal and related M&As - bidders2 8
The total net gain from value creation in a takeover contest is VC -
28 Previous in this study hor iz o n t a I merger was defined as a
merger between companies that are operating in approximately
the same product- market. Rei ate d merger is a merger between
related companies (same product or market, and/or technology
and/or competence).
COMPREHENSIVE MODEL:
Corporate strategy and takeover premiums
..
M & A type:
1. Horizontal
2. Related
3. Unrelated
4. Vertical
-.......
Value creation:
1. Synergy
2. Transaction costs
3. Market power
4. Diversification
5. Costs of integration
6. Takeover premiums
Industry structure:
1. Industry rivalry
2. Suppliers
3. Buyers
4. Substitutes
5. Potential entrants
I~
M&A>
Max (Market,
strategic alliances,
Internal development) ?
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TP = G + GSn - CIn - TCIn - TP. As discussed above, a necessary
condition for bidder n to realize positive abnormal returns is .that
Sn > O. Since G is expected to be bid away in the acquisition market,
bidder n's gains from M&A is according to equation (6a). To
maximize abnormal returns, bn needs to maximize this equation
(for a given target). Under section 3.1. it was 'argued that abnormal
returns from diversification (GSn) increase when asset
specificity / degree of uniqueness of strategic core is high and
degree of diversification is narrow. Costs of integration are
expected to increase with number of linkages among divisions.
Given a sufficient degree of uncertainty/complexity implying a
need for adaptive and sequential decisions (Williamson 1985), TCIn
is a function of asset specificity. Define:
a= asset specificity/ degree of uniqueness of strategic core.
O za ~ I, where a close to zero denotes general transactions and a
close to 1 denotes highly specific transactions.
d= degree of diversification. O ~ d ~1, where d close to zero denotes
narrow diversification and d close to 1 denotes wide diversification.
h = number of linkages
GS n- CIn and TCIn can be expressed as functions of a.d and h:29
GSn(a,d)
CIn(h)
TCIn(a,h)
G Sn is expected to increase when a increases and to decrease when
d increases. CIn increases when h increases and TCIn increases
when a and h increase:3 O
29It should be noted that GSn, CIn and TCIn here are evaluated for a
given production rate (quantity level given). For instance, if we
assume U- formed cost curves, the absolute level of GSn (given a
and d) will first increase as quantity increases, and after a certain
point decrease as economies of scale and scope are exhausted (eg.
Jones and Butler 1988).
3 OWhen the number of linkages increases, complexity and
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dGSn(a,d)/da >0
dGSn(a,d)/dd <o
dCIn(h)/dh >0
dTCIn(a,h)/da >0
dTCIn(a,h)/dh >0
M&A should be chosen according to (13). It is obvious that merger
or acquisition is not optimal for the potential bidder n unless
highly specific synergies are dominant and outweigh the sum of
net specific synergies and overbidding for the highest alternative
bid. This result implies that to integrate a must be high and d low,
and h must not be so large that CIn nullifies GSn. If a is low, GSn
will not be dominant and the transaction costs disadvantage of
using alliances or the market will not be large.
1. Definition of strategic corel type of transaction
The essence
maintenance
competitive
advantage.
of strategic management is the development and
of the firm's strategic core and the selection of
strategy such that this core promotes competitive
The strategic core must be carefully defined. A firm
must avoid being too general when defining core skills.
Furthermore, a firm should focus on only a few core factors.
Strategic core generally has significant impact on economic
performance and is extremely difficult for competitors to replicate.
2. Benefits and costs of integration, takeover price
The core factors form the foundation of competitive advantage
(abnormal returns) for the firm when it is fighting its battles in
uncertainty are expected to increase the number of cases where
adaptive and sequential decisions is needed.
122
the product-markets. Excess capacity in the strategic core defines
possibilities for the firm to realize specific synergies by merging
horizontally or into related areas. As we recall from earlier
discussions, net benefits from integration (value creation
takeover premium) are
GSn - CIn - TCIn - Max (GSI - CII - TCII + OBI, GS2 - CI2 - TCI2 +
OB2, ..····, GSn_1 - Cln-I - TCIn-l + OBn_l)
Specific synergies (GSn) depend on excess capacity in a highly
specific core. Synergy can be realized by sharing both internal
and external relations. It is not enough that the synergy potential
is highly specific. In order to justify integration, it must also have
a large percentage impact on costs, revenues and/or risks.
Moreover, the total dollar value of the firm's specific synergies
must be significantly larger than alternative bidders' specific
synergy potentials. Since strategic core is highly specific, the
transfer of excess capacity creates larger value the narrower the
diversification. Specific synergies will lose more value when they
are realized in markets which are distant from the original market
where the firm built its strategic core; as the firm moves away
from its current scope, abnormal returns will decrease. Put
differently, the strategic core's marginal rent decreases the
farther away from its origin it is used.
Since the transfer of core factors to competitors or related areas is
highly specific, the transfer should be governed internally to
minimize transaction costs. Trading specific synergies in the
market is very difficult owing to problems of shirking,
leapfrogging of technology, etc.
In theory, horizontal and related mergers can lead to increased
market power. Collusion focuses on how rivals can increase rent
by coordinating production rates. However, we have no empirical
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support that M&As significantly increase market power) 1
Costs of integration can easily outweigh even large gross
specific synergies. Realizing synergy effects usually imposes costs
of coordination, costs of compromise and costs of inflexibility. In
horizontal and related M&As, interdivisional coordination and
resource sharing is required. In such a case, costs of integration
[CIn (h)] tend to increase at a geometric rate with the addition of
reciprocal linkages (h). The number of reciprocal linkages is 1/2
(h 2 - h) = 1/2 h(h - 1). The more synergy links that exist, the
higher is dCIn (h)/dh. Therefore, one should expect a lower level
of horizontal/related integration than vertical and unrelated
diversification) 2
3. M&A > Max (strategic alliances. market. internal development)
Assume that the transfer of resources is of high or medium asset
specificity thereby ruling out the market solution. M&As and
internal development are both "hierarchy" solutions. Many
aspects may distinguish the two types of economic organizations:
internal development is often a more risky way of entry and might
be problematic when there are high entry barriers (Yip 1982).
Often acquisitions serve as an attractive alternative to investment
in R&D and innovations because they offer immediate entrance to a
new market and/or a larger share of a market served currently by
another firm (Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland 1990). Put differently,
31 See Eckbo (1983,1985), Eckbo & Wier (1985), Stillman (1983) and
James & Wier (1987).
32 This is consistent with Jones & Hill (1988) who conclude that
related diversification is predicted to be more profitable at lower
levels of diversification than unrelated diversification. One
should, however, be aware that both costs and synergies can
increase at a geometric rate. If, for example, certain assets are to a
large extent underutilized, the marginal increase in synergies
(benefits) may outweigh a large marginal increase in bureaucratic
costs. Jones & Hill (1988) provide an interesting discussion on how
synergies covaries with changes in bureaucratic costs.
124
M&As may often be a good substitute for innovations and internal
development. However, greater relatedness often facilitates direct
entry. Moreover, the more closely related the two markets are, the
fewer complements the firm needs for its own tangible and
intangible resources. An acquisitive entry in a related market is,
therefore, more likely to involve purchase of unwanted assets
(Chatterjee 1990). Expected retaliation (Porter 1980) is an
important factor. For instance, direct entry adds new capacity to
the industry. This might trigger price cutting or other reactions
from competitors. Supply and demand conditions are therefore
important when choosing entry method. For instance, if the
concentration ratio of an entered industry is high, acquisitive
entry is more probable than direct entry, especially in cases with
low market growth (Chatterjee 1990). According to Teece (1982),
choice of acquisition or direct entry may depend on slack. If slack
appears gradually over time, direct entry might be more effective.
This is because direct entry "can be tailored as an incremental
approach to diversification" (p. 58). On the other hand, if slack
resources emerge suddenly, then M&As are expected to be
advantageous. Furthermore, the availability of takeover candidates
might be decisive when choosing entry mode (Yip 1982, Singh &
Montgomery 1987). Timing is often to the advantage of M&As
especially when first mover advantages are important or when
timing influences required takeover premiums or competition in
the market for corporate control. In horizontal mergers, M&As
lead to one less competitor. Even though this does not increase
market power (Eckbo 1983,1985), it may reduce expected retaliation.
M&As may be chosen because the firm then gets hold of important
complementary resources (Teece 1982). Sometimes a firm, A, is
dependent on drawing on another firm, B's, resources because A
lacks the necessary resources itself and cannot readily develop
them. Put differently, a merger with B may create internal and
external (access to network) synergies that do not exist if A
pursues internal development. A major difference between
internal development and M&As is cost of entry; M&As impose
large takeover premiums which, in many cases, offset most of the
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value created. Even though both M&As and internal development
are classified as "hierarchy", they are likely to be associated with
different internal transaction costs. For example, if the takeover is
hostile, barriers to cooperation and opportunism among the
integrating firms are easily created. Moreover, the two firms may
have incompatible corporate cultures making the implementation
of the takeover difficult. In most cases, exchange of information
and skills is more fluid in start-ups than in acquisitions.
Differences in bureaucratic costs are also likely. In the case of
integration, A may have to buy a large complex company, B, even
though it is only interested in some parts of B. In such a case the
increased bureaucratic costs may be larger than the increased
costs associated with internal development.
M&As must also be compared to strategic alliances. Earlier in
this study it was argued that the strategic core is highly specific
and should be governed internally while transactions of medium
asset specificity should be governed by strategic alliances. When
asset specificity is medium, outside actors can often realize
synergies by aggregating demand and produce more efficiently.
Moreover, strategic alliances do not eliminate high-powered
incentives and do not create the same bureaucratic distortions as in
a hierarchical solution. Even though hierarchy is associated with
lower transaction costs, strong strategic alliances based on trust
and long term relationships may partly offset this transaction cost
disadvantage in the case of medium asset specificity. In sum, when
transactions are medium specific, a firm should rely on strategic
alliances to "trade synergies", retain high-powered incentives and
avoid bureaucratic distortions. Therefore, to be positioned in
strong strategic alliances creates competitive advantage for the
firm because it can concentrate on its strategic core and farm out
more distant value activities to alliance partners. The key point is
that transaction costs lead the firm to integrate. These transaction
costs can be reduced by developing trust and long-term
relationships. Since outside producers in the case of medium asset
specificity often produce more efficiently [external price (EP) <
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internal cost (LCj], value is created because of more efficient
organization.
On the other hand, horizontal and related M&As seem to be justified
only when transferring resources stemming from the strategic
core, that is only when highly specific assets are transferred.
High specificity often implies that outside actors cannot realize
larger synergies than the firm itself. Furthermore, integration is
expected to have big transaction cost advantages compared to
strategic alliances. However, the transaction cost advantage of
integration must be traded off against possibly higher
bureaucratic costs and takeover premiums. An important factor
affecting the takeover premium (and thereby the choice between
integration and alliances) is the other potential bidders' specific
synergy potentials (GSi - Cl] - TClj). The bidder is expected to
realize positive abnormal returns only when he can realize net
specific synergies which are larger than the sum of net synergies
and overbidding for the highest (potential) alternative bid.
3.3.2. Unrelated M&As - bidders
J. Definition of strategic core
When considering an unrelated takeover, there is no need for
defining the firm's strategic core. Since an unrelated merger
integrates companies without major commonalities in products,
markets, technology or competence, there is no transfer of core
skills.
2. Benefits and costs of integration, takeover price
Benefits from unrelated M&As, if any exist, stem from
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infrastructure synergies33 (Porter 1985), reduced bankruptcy
costs (Lewellen 1971, Oalai & Masulis 1976, Shastri 1982), internal
capital markets (Williamson 1975, Teece 1982) or multipoint
competitor effects (Wernerfelt & Karmani 1985). Moreover, Myers
& Majluf (1984) present a model where given asymmetry in
information between managers and shareholders a firm with
.insufficient financial slack may not undertake all valuable
investment opportunities. Synergies can therefore be realized
when a merger takes place between a firm rich in cash and a firm
poor in financial slack.3 4 Most of the synergy potentials in
unrelated mergers do not seem to generate large synergy effects
and they are quite general in nature. In addition to being
associated with small synergy effects, unrelated diversification is
likely to infer only small additional bureaucratic costs: in
unrelated M&As each division functions as a self-contained unit.
Such a strategy has the lowest need for coordination and control is
handled by standardization and formalization.
Even if there are small expected net positive synergy effects from
an unrelated takeover, these effects can hardly justify the large
takeover premium required to gain control of a company. First of
all, the size of the synergy effects are expected to be small. Second,
most of the synergies seem to be quite general (O). Third, the firm
is not expected generate larger synergies than other potential
bidders. The formal necessary requirements discussed under
section 3.2. above do not seem to be satisfied.
3. M&A > Max (strategic alliances, market, internal development)
Strategic alliances require at least partial overlap in domain and
33These synergies may be created through shared financing, cash
utilization, accounting, legal department, government relations,
hiring and training.
34See also Lang, Stulz & Walkling (1990) for an interesting test of
the free cash flow hypothesis and bidder abnormal returns.
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can therefore be ruled out as an alternative to unrelated
integration. Internal development should in this case be evaluated
as an entrepreneurial venture where the entrepreneur does not
have special information or skills/resources. The market
alternative, however, seems to be a viable strategy. The market
alternative can here be thought of as paying out dividend to
stockholders. This is according to Jensen's (1986, 1988, 1989 a and
b) "free cash flow theory". Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of
what the firm needs for projects with positive net present values.
Such free cash flow must be paid out to shareholders in order to
maximize value for shareholders.
3.3.3. Vertical M&As - bidders
1. Definition of strategic corel type of transaction
In vertical mergers, as in the case of horizontal and related
integration, it is important first to specify the firms strategic corel
type of transaction, Transaction costs seem to be an especially
important determinant in vertical boundary settings.
2. Benefits and costs of integration, takeover price
Vertical integration is in most cases expected to create smaller
synergy effects than those in horizontal and related mergers) 5
Another rationale for vertical integration is vertical market
foreclosure (Comanor 1967): by merging with one of its customers
an input supplier can effectively remove this customer's
35 However, sometimes there also exist substantial synergy
potentials in vertical integration. Therefore, one should not rule
out the synergy rationale as a possible important factor in vertical
boundary settings.
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purchases from the open market. Conversely. by merging with
one of its suppliers an input customer can remove that firm's sales
from the open market. The effectiveness of market foreclosure
depends on entry barriers in the industry and therefore specific
assets. sunk costs. transaction costs and imperfect information (see
Yao 1988). Transaction costs are important in vertical
relationships. When transactions are highly specific one faces ex
post bilateral monopoly situations where competitive pressures are
dampened and opportunism are created. An obvious advantage of
integration is reduced transaction costs. A higher degree of
vertical integration leads. however. to higher bureaucratic costs
because of centralization of more activities. less autonomy. less
accountability of operating divisions and more difficult
monitoring. Assume there are no synergies to be realized in a
vertical merger. According to the formal discussions of takeover
premiums under section 3.2. above. to realize positive abnormal
returns bidder n must reduce transaction costs more than the
expected increase in bureaucratic costs (TCIn - CIn > O). In
addition. this value creation must be larger than TCl] - Cli + OBi for
all competing bidders i (i = 1,....•n-I),
3. M&A > Max (strategic alliances, market, internal development)
When transactions are highly specific. integration is a better mode
of organization than a market solution because lower transaction
costs are expected to outweigh scale and scope disadvantages+f as
well as increased bureaucratic costs. As asset specificity decreases.
strategic alliances will be relatively more efficient than
integration: outside actors can realize synergies. high-powered
incentives are retained and bureaucratic distortions and takeover
premiums are avoided. When asset specificity is high. integration
is expected to be more efficient than strategic alliances. However.
36The disadvantages are supposed to be small because of the highly
specific nature of the transactions.
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if the differences in transaction costs between integration and
alliances are not too large and/or if integration imposes large
bureaucratic costs compared to alliances. there might be cases
where large takeover premiums cannot be justified. In this case.
an alliance solution is better than integration.
The evaluation of internal development is described in the
above discussion 3.3.1. (horizontal and related M&As). Hierarchy is
assumed to be optimal when transactions are highly specific. If
the firm needs specific complementary skills provided upstream or
downstream in the value chain. it might have problems developing
these skills itself. Internal development should be easier when the
specific factor can be bought in a market (for example specific
machinery). Then the firm can establish a division around their
machinery equipment.
3.3.4. Tar~et returns
The difference in profitability for target firms as a function of
strategic group is hard to predict because the model indicates that
two opposite forces are important. From the model we remember
that the winning bidder must pay at least as much as the highest
alternative bid. This implies that an unrelated bidder must pay at
least as much as other unrelated and horizontal/related bidders.
This implies that the premium in unrelated mergers is not
necessarily much lower than the one in related mergers. One way
of arguing is that when related/horizontal bidders do a successful
takeover. specific synergies are important and they are therefore
able to bid more than unrelated bidders. Because of bargaining
mechanisms discussed above. one may expect that the target shares
some of the gains based on specific synergies. Following the same
line of argument. if unrelated bidders succeed taking over the
target. this outcome may indicate that specific synergies are not
that important and the gains to the target is therefore smaller.
Based on these arguments one should expect that
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horizontal/closely related targets realizes higher abnormal
returns than related targets which in turn realizes higher returns
than unrelated bidders.3 7
Overbidding is a factor that may reverse the order of profitability
for targets in different groups. It is argued in the literature that
unrelated transactions are associated with fewer gains than
various types of related transactions. Therefore. it is often argued
that. in unrelated takeovers. management acts as empire builders
which implies that growth is more important than profitability
(agency problem. free cash flow hypothesis). or the takeover is a
result of management "hubris" (Roll 1986.1987) or "winner's
curse". Put differently. the fact that an unrelated bidder wins a
takeover contest may be an outcome of overbidding and that the
bid is higher than other (potential) bids from firms that can create
specific synergies (in addition to more general synergies); If an
unrelated bidder overbids and makes a high enough bid. one may
expect that the target realizes more than in horizontal/closely
related and related takeovers.
4. MERGER & ACQUISITION CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM AND ITS VALIDITY
The system of classifying M&As into strategic groups is based on
SIC-codes. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) classifies firms
by type of activity (see SIC Manual 1988). The structure of the
classification makes it possible to analyze data on a division. a two-
digit major group. a three- digit industry group or a four-digit
industry base.3 8 Firms or plants that are assigned the same four-
3 7 Such a conclusion is based on the assumption that
horizontal/closely related transactions on average involve higher
level of specific synergies than related transactions which in turn
involve higher levels of specific synergies than unrelated
takeover.
38First digit = Division (ex.: Mining. construction. manufacturing.
etc. )
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digit code are expected to have fairly homogenous products or
technologies. If firms and plants agree in fewer digits, they. are
believed to be less homogenous (eg., Clarke 1989).
Two key elements in the takeover model discussed above are
strategic core and takeover premiums. Highly specific strategic
cores provide possibilities for only narrow diversification if the
cores' rent creating capabilities are to be maintained. Wider
diversification indicates less specific factors that will normally not
create significant competitive advantage. Put differently, a gi ven
strategic core will lose more value when it is transferred to
markets which are distant from the original market where the
firm built its core skills. Furthermore, wider diversification makes
it more difficult for the bidder to realize positive abnormal returns
because of competitive bidding in the market for corporate control.
To analyze central aspects of the model, the classification should be
chosen such that one gets some insights into the degree of
di versification.
The classification system chosen here is:3 9
(1) Horizontal integration integration among companies
within the same four-digit SIC code.
(2) Closely related integration - integration among companies
Second digit = "Major group"
Third digit = "Industry group number"
Fourth digit = "Industry number"
See supplement 6 for a brief overview over Standard Industrial
Classification Groupings.
39 The empirical analysis in this study will focus on horizontal,
related and unrelated integration. Vertical integration will not be
analyzed because of difficulties of obtaining firm specific data
describing asset specificity for large samples of firms.
Furthermore, SIC code 6711 which is used for holding companies, is
not treated as a separate line of business. For transactions where at
least one of the parties has SIC 6711 (in my sample this applies to 23
transactions), the Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory is
used to obtain the 4-digit SIC-codes of the three main lines of
business (by sales) that the firm operates in. The transaction is
then classified according to the most common SIC-codes among the
bidder and the target.
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within the same three-digit SIC code (but different four-digit SIC
code).
(3) Related integration - integration among companies within
the same two- digit SIC code (but different three-digit SIC code).
(4) "Unrelated"
industries.
integration integration across two-digit
For the future, (1) and (2) will be referred to as strategic core
M & As, (3) as related, not core M&As and (4) as u n re I a te d
M&As
Integration among companies within the same four-digit SIC code
(horizontal integration) is believed to be quite homogeneous for
products and technologies. Closely related integration indicates
integration among companies within the same industry group.
This kind of narrow diversification makes it possible to transfer
specific core factors and realize positive abnormal returns.
Related integration represents integration among companies
which are fairly narrowly linked. The abnormal returns for
bidders in related integration are expected to be close to zero. The
reason for this is that specific synergies in most cases are smaller
and thereby make it harder to justify high takeover premiums.
"Unrelated" integrations describe M&As across two-digit industries
and represent diversification into areas either unrelated to or less
closely related to a firm's primary activities and technologies.
An important question is: is the SIC code is a valid measure? Is
there a strong linkage between the strategic concept (e.g.,
strategic core) and the way these concepts are measured (SIC-
codes)? It is important that the link between concept and measure
is strong enough so that we really measure what we want to
measure. This can be referred to as content validity (see
Venkatraman & Grant 1986).
SIC-codes are associated with many limitations. The SIC definitions
tend to be production oriented rather than demand determined.
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Furthermore, the definitions include nonhomogeneous products
and exclude sales of similar products that are included in different
SIC groups or are imported (Benston 1985). However, Montgomery
(1982) finds empirical evidence supporting high degree of
correspondence between SIC levels of diversity and Rumelt's
categorical measures. This indicates convergent validity among
these two types of measures.
Another problem is that SIC-classes provide no disaggregate
business level data. All of the company's operations are reported
in a single four-digit SIC category. That is, each establishment40 is
to be classified according to its primary activity. Primary activity
is determined by identifying the predominant product or group of
products produced or handled with a company or enterprise. This
is a serious limitation in an age of diversified firms (See Scherer
1980:269-272). Put differently, since many firms produce products
in more than one SIC-code, interrelationships among various
products/markets and among merging firms are, to a large extent,
masked (Young 1989). Since the firms are classified according to
the four-digit code that corresponds to the primary activity, this
grouping can result in a SIC that is not consistent with the most
"reasonable" two- or three-digit classification. An example given
by Clarke (1989) is a three product firm, where product 1 (SIC 3211)
accounts for 40 % of total value, products 2 (SIC 2842) and 3 (SIC
2845) each account for 30 %. The overall assigned SIC code would
be 3211 which implies a three-digit SIC of 321 and the two-digit SIC
of 32. This code misleads us because 60 % of the value is created in
the 284 three-digit SIC and the 28 two-digit SIC.
The way M&As are classified in this study should, however, give an
indication of the degree of relatedness among merging firms.
Since firms are compared on the basis of the primary activity,
40The Standard Industrial Classification for establishments differs
from classifications for enterprises (companies) or products. An
enterprise consists of all establishments having more than 50 %
common direct or indirect ownership (SIC Manual 1988).
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there is a risk that a bidder, A, and a target, B, are grouped as
unrelated even though they are related. For example, if A has a
primary activity with SIC code 3211 and B has a primary activity
4327 and a secondary activity 3241, this transaction will be
classified as unrelated instead of related, not core. On the other
hand, since a secondary (or even more distant) activity usually
accounts for much less than 50 % of a firm's activity, this
classification may make sense. When A buys B, A has to pay a
premium on all B's assets. Assume that B operates in two main
areas 4327 which account for 80 % of total sales and 3241 which
accounts for 20 % of total sales. Even though A's primary activity
and B's secondary activity are related, A has to pay a premium X on
all B's assets. Since 80 % of the assets are unrelated, it makes more
sense to regard this takeover as unrelated, than related. However,
there are limitations to such an argument. If A buys B because of
B's secondary activity which is related to A and A sells of the rest of
B's primary assets shortly after the takeover, A may realize positive
abnormal returns. One thing that could be done in future research
is to . split the unrelated group into those cases where the bidder
and target have a related second or third main area, but are
unrelated in terms of primary activities. Furthermore, one could
account for whether the bidder restructures the target shortly
after the takeover - say within 0-3 years after the takeover. If
such restructuring takes place. and if the bidder can obtain a sales
price which are not much below the takeover price (pretakeover
value plus premium) on the divested unrelated assets, there is
reason to expect that A can profit from the takeover. In my sample
of takeovers (see chapter 4 below) both bidders and targets have to
be listed on the NYSE or AMEX stock exchange at the time of the
announcement of the transactions. "Raider-type" takeovers in
which one or a few private investors/ LBO firms go in and
restructure large conglomerates by splitting them up is not that
common in this sample. Accordingly, the problem of analyzing
unrelated takeovers may be reduced in this study.41 Another
41 However, it is beyond dispute that a further examination of this
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reason to compare primary SIC codes is the size effect problem
discussed in chapter 2 above; Acquiring firms are often much
larger than the target companies. Even though the total gain is
split equally between buying and selling companies, the abnormal
return in percent for the buyer is much less than for the seller.
This study seeks to reduce this problem by only including those
transactions where the target represents at least 10 % of the equity
market value of the bidder 2 months prior to the announcement of
the transaction (see description of the sample selection process in
chapter IV below). Assume that one decides to compare the three
or four most important SIC codes among bidder and target, and that
the most common SIC code among the firms determines the
classification of the transaction. Even though the third most
important business areas for the bidder and the target are related,
these market values are not, in many cases, readily available. As a
result, the adjustment for size-effects are complicated.
One can probably argue that the classification system applied here
is to some extent conservative in the sense that transactions will
more often be considered unrelated than related since only
primary activities are compared. This may cause a problem if the
firm's secondary activity is not much smaller than the primary
activity. One should notice, however, that this problem is probably
reduced because of the big sample applied in the study.
There are also other problems associated with developing
hypotheses based on aggregated data. First, there will be no
attempt to measure the synergy potential in a specific merger. As
discussed earlier, one necessary condition for profitable mergers is
that they involve potential for significant synergies. In this study,
we will assume that when merging firms are related, the synergy
potential is larger than when firms are unrelated. In most cases
this will be true. However, there may be related M&As where the
group in terms of analyzing intertemporai restructuring decisions
would provide interesting insight into value creation and value
distribution associated with these transactions.
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synergy potential is negligible because the capacity is almost fully
utilized or the potential for synergy exists only in value chain
activities which count for only a small percentage of the
company's costs or revenues. Secondly, according to the model
discussed above, the bidder must be able to realize larger specific
synergies with a target than those potentially created by
alternative bidders. This would require identification of potential
bidders and analysis of their value creating capabilities in all
value chain activities with a target. Such information is not
readily available and will not be used in this study.
5. HYPOTHESES
The empirical part of this thesis is more limited in scope than the
broad and lengthy theoretical model presented above. A main
focus when developing the hypotheses is the relationship between
strategic core, type of synergies. takeover premiums and abnormal
returns; As discussed above, the degree of diversification is
expected to provide some insights into the type of synergies that
one seeks from a transaction and how these affect the abnormal
return for bidder and targets. This is the focus of the empirical
part. Specific and general synergies and takeover premiums are
important building blocks in the overall model above, and the
results from this study are expected to have some implications for
how to organize firm activities because of the interdependencies
among choice of institutional mode (hierarchy, strategic alliances
and markets). There are, however, no explicit attempts in this
study to measure the costs/benefits of different types of strategic
alliances, internal development, etc. Based on the chosen
classification system, certain hypotheses follow directly:
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Acquiring firms
Hypothesis 1 (STRATEGIC CORE M&As):
Acquiring firms in horizontal and closely
related integration are expected to realize
positive abnormal returns.
Horizontal and closely related integration represent narrow
diversification which indicates transfer of highly specific assets.
Such assets form the foundation of sustainable competitive
advantage for firms. Since assets are transferred to areas closely
related to the firm's main activities, they are not expected to lose
much value. Moreover, since strategic core and synergies based on
these assets are highly specific, transaction costs are important
and internal transfer (hierarchy) is therefore often a better
solution than alternative forms of economic organization. The
mechanisms of the market for corporate control also tend to
require specific synergies in order for bidding firms to realize
positive abnormal returns.
Hypothesis 2 (RELATED,NOT CORE M&As):
Acquiring firms in related integration are
expected to realize zero abnormal returns.
In related integration the degree of diversification is not as
narrow as in horizontal and closely related integration. This
indicates that synergies are often less specific and will normally
create less economic rent. Other modes of economic organization
(for example joint venture, informal alliances, formal contracts)
are often more efficient. Furthermore, the takeover market tends
to bid away potential value created in the takeover from bidders to
the target.
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Hypothesis 3 (UNRELATED M&As): Acquiring
firms in "unrelated" integration are expected
to realize negative abnormal returns.
In unrelated M&As the value creation potential is expected to be
small and quite general in nature. These synergy effects can
hardly justify the larger takeover premiums required to gain
control of a company. The resources spent in a takeover of an
unrelated firm should have been used for other projects with
positive net present values or paid out to shareholders in the form
of dividends.
Acquired firms
Hypothesis 4: All acquired firms are expected
to realize positive abnormal returns from
integration
Since the takeover premiums are so big, shareholders in acquired
firms are expected to gain significantly from takeovers.
Hypothesis 5: Acquired firms in strategic
core M&A are expected to realize higher
abnormal returns than acquired firms in
related integration which in turn are
expected to realize higher
than acquired firms
integration.
abnormal returns
in unrelated
One should here remember that the winning bidder in an
unrelated takeover has to pay at least as much as any other
potential unrelated and related bidder:
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Vo + G + Max (Sl + OBI. S2 + OB2•.......• Sn-I + OBn-I)·
This implies that the premium in unrelated mergers is not
necessarily much lower than the one in related mergers. All the
same. hypothesis 5 is likely to be justified because of bargaining.
If a related bidder can create much higher total gains than the
next highest bid. then the target will probably capture some of the
gains of this "excess value". One should. however. be careful here
because the outcome of such bargaining processes is very difficult
to predict. Another important point is that if the unrelated bidder
overbids. the order of the profitability among targets in different
strategic groups may be reversed.
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IV. DATA ANDMETHODOLOGY
l.INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the data and sample selection for the empirical
testing of the hypotheses is discussed. There is also a description of
data characteristics and distributions of announcements (strategic
classification, multiple/single bids, size-effects, calendar year,
method of payment). Finally, this is followed by a discussion of the
chosen methodology.
2. DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
2.1. The data and sample selection
The empirical part of this study is based on M&As that were
announced in the period 1970-1987. The data set is compiled in
Gretland (1990).
identified by
Acquisitions.1
As an initial screening, the transactions are
searching the Rosters of Mergers &
The Roster lists all companies involved in
mergers and acquisitions as well as such related activities as
foreign acquisitions, sell- offs/divestitures, joint ventures and
cooperation agreements) To be included in the Roster a
1The calendar years that are searched in this study (ranging from
1970 to 1988) refer to the years in which the transactions are
reported in the Roster. Since the Roster operates with effective
dates, the actual announcement dates of the transactions might be
. in a different year. For the transactions reported in the Roster for
1988, only those with announcement dates in 1987 are being used
in the study.
2An alternative index to obtain information about M&As that was
considered, is the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) statistical
report on mergers & acquisitions. This index contains information
about M&A transactions in the time period 1948-1978. To be
included in this series, a merger must involve an acquired
company that is primarily engaged in manufacturing or mining
and have assets of at least $ 10million at the time of the acquisition.
There are two main reasons why the FTC index is not being used in
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transaction must be valued at $ 1 million or more.3 Partial
acquisitions of five percent or more of a company's capital stock
are also included in the Roster if the payments are $ 1 million or
more. Where price data of transactions have not been revealed,
the transaction is included if it is believed to meet the price
threshold. Furthermore, the Roster only contains transactions that
are actually completed. Unsuccessful bids4 are not reported.
According to Asquith (1983) the market does not seem to
distinguish between successful and unsuccessful merger bids
before or on the announcement date. However, the success or
failure of a merger bid is predicted shortly afterwards, well in
advance of the outcome date. In an efficient capital market,
increases in the probability of mergers should cause prices of
target firms to adjust in one direction and decreases in the
probability of merger should cause prices of target firms to adjust
in the opposite direction. The results in Asquith (1983) exhibit
precisely this pattern.
The Roster includes approximately 85,000 transactions- for the
1970-1987 period implying a relatively extensive search. My
sample is restricted to transactions where both targets and bidders
are noted on either NYSE or AMEX at the time when the transaction
takes place. Therefore, each transaction had to be cross-checked
against cuslp-Iists.f There are several reasons for restricting the
this study: (1) As opposed to the FTC series, the Mergers &
Acquisitions Roster provides opportunity for analyzing
transactions where the acquired company is primarily engaged in
activities outside manufacturing or mining, and (2) I selected a
more recent sample period (1970-1987) which is only partially
overlapping with FTC's sample period.
3 In the 1970s the criterion was "major" transaction. In practice,
this implied that transactions down to $ 750,000 were included.
4Unsuccessful takeover bids are bids that are abandoned usually
because of the lack of shareholder approval or too few shares
tendered.
5Both bidders and targets are listed separately.
6Cusip lists are lists that contain historical names of firms that at
some time have been listed on either NYSE or AMEX.
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sample to M&A transactions where both bidders and targets are
noted on the exchange. Information about the transaction is more
easily available, it makes it possible to compute market values of
firms, and the size-effect problem 7 may be reduced. After
screening the transactions in which both bidder and target are on
the stock exchange, I check whether the firms in the transaction
are actually listed at the time when the transaction takes place. The
cusip-lists provide the names of firms that at some time have been
listed on the stock exchange. In many cases where both bidder and
target names in a transaction are identified from the cusip-Iists,
either the target or the bidder is not listed a t the transaction time
(even though it had been listed either before or after the
transaction was completed).
Furthermore, the sample is restricted to mergers and acquisitions
only. Sell- offs, divestitures, equity carveouts and joint ventures
are not included in the sample. Joint ventures are not included
because they do not necessarily imply buying control of a firm.
Sell-offs are not included because they have certain traits that
differ from M&As (see Hirschey & Zaima 1989, Sicherman &
Pettway 1987, Jain 1985, Alexander, Benson & Kampmeyer 1984 and
Rosenfeld 1984). Usually the acquisition of divested assets is
initiated by the seller, and, typically, only one potential buyer
actively negotiates to purchase the divested assets (Jain 1985).
Thus, there might be reason to believe that the divestiture market
often is less competitive than the takeover market.
Given the requirements that the time period for announcements is
1970-1987, that both target and bidder are noted on either NYSE or
AMEX at the time of the transaction and that the transaction is an
M&A (not sell-off, joint venture, etc.), we identified an initial
sample of 578 transactions. This initial sample is reduced for
several reasons. First, since this study's aim is to measure
7 See discussion in chapter 2, section 7.2., about measurement
problems.
TABLE IV.1.:
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
578 Initial Sample (Requirements: time period 1970-1987, both
bidder and target on NYSE or AMEX at the time of the
transaction, the transaction is an M&A - not sell-off, joint
venture, etc,)
- 40 Listed as M&As in the Roster, but the bidder was already in
control
- 5
-219
Not mentioned in the Wall Street Journal Index
Target < 10 % of the equity value of the bidder
Transactions with concurrent major corporate events
Sum (number of transactions)
285
~
279
285
- 17
268
Number of transactions (bidders)
Bidder data missing on the CRSP-tapej too few observations
Final sample of bidders
Number of transactions (targets)
Target data missing on CRSP-tapej too few observations
Final sample of targets
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announcement effects of changes in control, 40 transactions are
deleted because the bidder is already in control (even though. the
transaction is listed in the Roster). There are often follow-up
mergers after tender offers that do not imply any change in
control. The sample therefore excludes merger proposals preceded
by successful tender offers. Second, five transactions were not
mentioned in the Wall Street Journal making it difficult to
determine announcement dates. Third, only those transactions in
which the target represents at least 10 % of the equity value of the
bidder are included. This is done to avoid some of the measurement
problems that arise when the target is very small relative to the
bidder.8 The size of the target (bidder) firms are measured as the
value of outstanding equity of each firm two months prior to the
target's (bidder's) event date. The value of outstanding equity is
calculated as
where
V n ( ) = Value of outstanding equity for security n
p n ( ) = Closing price security n
Sn( ) = Number of shares outstanding for security n
an-2 = 2 months prior to announcement date for security n
If an -2 is not a trading date, the last trading date before an -2 is
selected. Fourth, to insulate the announcement effects from other
contemporaneous corporate events, the Wall Street Journal Index is
reviewed for all firms. Twentynine transactions that experienced
concurrent major corporate events for the period 20 days before
and 20 days after the announcement date are deleted from the
sample. Major corporate events are defined as the following
events: other takeover activities, divestitures. common stock
repurchases, exchange offers, newofferings of securities, large
new contracts and announcements of large unexpected changes in
8 See discussion on measurement problems earlier in this study.
For empirical support see Asquith,Bruner & Mullins (1983) and
Jarrell & Poulsen (1989).
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corporate profits. This sample construction process results in a
total of 285 transactions. These 285 transactions form the basis. for
the analysis of takeover performance. In some cases, however,
bidder or target data are not available on the CRSP-tape9 (because
of too few observations/missing returns). The final sample
therefore consists of 279 bidding firms and 268 target firms.
Data on stocks are collected from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) of the University of Chicago. Errors in this
database are not common. All dividend and distribution
information, name structures and delisting information from the
machine-readable data are checked against second sources such as
the Cusip Directory, Moody's Dividend Record, Commerce Clearing
Houses's Capital Changes Reporter, Moody's Manuals, the New York
Stock Exchange Weekly Bulletin, the American Stock Exchange
Weekly Bulletin, Bank and Quotation Record. The Wall Street
Journal. and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Machine-
readable data are checked for internal consistency. and secondary
sources are used to check suspect information. Information that is
not available in machine-readable form is hand-coded and verified
(see Stock File Guide. CRSP; Graduate School' of Business. University
of Chicago. 1990). FORTRAN programs are used to access the data
needed for this study. The programs are written to get the
different variable data necessary for my specific purposes.
Data on the degree of diversification (SIC codes) are obtained from
the CRSP -file and Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory
(MDD).
Other variables used in this study besides stock returns and
strategic classification. are multiple bidders, method of
9About the CRSP-tape. see section below.
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payment an d time period.10 A takeover is classified as a
multiple bidder contest if the contest involves an identifiable
second bidder, i.e. a firm, an investor group or management team
that is mentioned in the press and is actively participating in the
contest by engaging in one of the following activities: (1) making
formal tender offer or merger proposals including LBO/MBO and
going private proposals, (2) negotiating a merger possibility with
target management, or (3) announcing a plan to make a bid. One
should note, however, that the multiple bidder variable often only
represents the possibility of future higher bids. For target firms,
the announcement date is the first date on which the news of the
merger bid first appears in the Wall Street Journal. At this date it
is often uncertain whether there will be later competing bids in
the contest. If it turns out to be a multiple bidder contest ex post,
this may be only partially anticipated ex ante by the market. The
empirical results therefore measure the markets assessment of the
probability and the value of future higher bids at the
announcement date and the surrounding days around the
announcement date (see methodology discussion below). In some
cases, though, the second bid appears closely after the first bid. In
such cases, by using a measurement window of several days, the
effects of multiple bids may be measured more directly. One faces
the measurement problems for bidders as well but in somewhat
different form. If the first bidder finally wins the contest after a
later bidder has submitted a bid, the problem is analogous to the
solution of measuring multiple bidder effects for targets. However,
often the winning bidder comes in late in the contest as a "white
knight". In this case, the market knows that this is a multiple
bidder contest (since earlier bidders have already submitted bids)
and therefore more directly measures the effects of a multiple
bidder situation.
The method of payment is identified from the Wall Street
1OFor a discussion of the effect of these variables on the creation
and distribution of abnormal returns among bidders and targets,
see earlier in this study.
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Journal Index and the Journal of Mergers & Acquisitions at the
announcement date of the proposed takeover. The takeover is
defined as a stock exchange offer if the entire transaction is
financed through an exchange of common stock, cash offers if the
entire amount is paid in cash and mixed if the amount is paid
through a combination of common stock and cash. Some problems
exist when bids are revised after the announcement date or if the
transactions are multiple bidder contests. If the transaction is a
single bidder contest, but this bidder changes its initial bid by
changing its method of payment, I use the method of payment in
the initial bid. If the transaction is a multiple bidder contest, one
faces different situations: (1) If the initial bidder eventually wins
the contest, the initial method of payment is used, (2) if a later
bidder wins the contest, this bidder's initial bid is used even though
it differs from the first bidder's method of payment. This is not
strictly correct because the transaction is classified according to
the later bidder's method of payment which differs from the
target's method of payment. The target's method of payment should
have been the same as the initial bidder's method of payment
target's
only 14
for the
because this is the method of payment at the
announcement date. l l This problem is, however, not big;
transactions in the sample where the method of payment
bidder and for the target are different, are identified.
Finally, the time variable dummy indicates whether the
transaction is announced in the 70s or the 80s.
2.2. Determining announcement dates
The announcement date is defined as the day on which the news of
the merger bid first appears in the Wall Street Journal. It is
obtained by searching the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI) and
11 Remember, the announcement date for the target is the day on
which the news of the takeover bid from the initial bidder first
appears in the Wall Street Journal.
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looking for the first day where the takeover plan is first
announced. The announcement date is the first date where there is
an appearance of a takeover rumor, discussion, proposal,
agreement or understanding in the WSJI. Highly speculative
rumors, where the name of the bidder (or target) is not mentioned,
are not used as announcement dates because they are unlikely to
have a strong impact on the markets assessment of the probability
that a takeover will take place. However, if the target's (bidder's)
management announces that it has received (given) a bid from (to)
an unidentified bidder (target), that day is regarded as the
announcement date even though the bidder (target) is yet to be
identified. It can be argued that it is hard to classify rumors as
"highly speculative" or not, and that this difficulty may create
problems in interpreting the results. In most cases, however, a
more certain proposal or agreement tends to follow a few days after
the rumor if the rumor is shown to be credible. Using a window
capturing days both before and after the announcement date
therefore reduces the importance of this problem. Furthermore,
most of the announcements are of the type "agreement in
principle" or "announced an offer" whereas the "rumor"-type
announcements represent significantly fewer cases. Where
rumors and discussions of takeover activity between two (or more)
named firms are reported in the WSJI previous to a merger plan,
agreement or understanding, the announcement day is considered
the day upon which the rumor or discussions are first mentioned.
Target firms are often pursued by more than one bidder. In such
cases, the targets' stock prices begin to rise at the announcement
date of the first bid. If a second (or later) bidder wins the contest,
the announcement date for the target firm may be considerably
earlier than that for the bidder. The announcement date for the
target is the date of the first announcement, whereas the bidder
announcement date is the date upon which the winning acquiror
in question first show any interest in the target.
The Mergers & Acquisitions Roster operates with effective dates;
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that is the date when the merger is approved by stockholders or
control is obtained through tender offer. It would be incorrect to
use this date as an announcement date because at the effective date
most of the market reaction to the initial announcement preceding
the effective date has already been impounded in the stock prices
of the bidding and target firms.1 2
Most of the reaction to a takeover occurs on the day before and the
day of the announcement day (see Asquith 1983). Therefore, to
measure the gains for a takeover as correctly as possible, accurate
identification of the announcement date is very essential. Total
abnormal returns to targets and bidders will be computed by using
parameters for various time periods (windows) around the
announcement date which capture leakage of information and
changes in expectations.
2.3. Data characteristics and distri bu t ion of
announcements
Tables IV.2.A-N below present the data characteristics and
distribution of announcements for the entire takeover sample.
Analysis of the tables reveal that unrelated M&As are very common
in the sample: 62% of all transactions are unrelated, whereas core
M&As and related, not core M&As each constitute around 20% of the
sample size. Wide degree of diversification in large takeover
transactions where both bidder and target are listed on the stock
exchange is therefore the rule rather than the exception in this
particular sample.
12According to Dodd (1980) the date of shareholder approval (=
effective date) occurs on average of 102 days after the first public
announcement of a merger. Dodd shows that much of the stock
price movements take place around the announcement date. In
completed merger proposals, the average abnormal return around
the date of stockholder approval is generally small.
TABLES IV.2. A - N:
A: DISTRIBUTION BY STRATEGIC ClASSIACATION
Core Related,not Unrelated Total
M&As core M&As M&As
BIDDERS:
Number 56 48 175 279
Percentage 20.1% 17.2% 62.7% 100%
TARGETS:
Number 54 47 167 268
Percentage 20.1% 17.6% 62.3% 100%
B: DISTRIBUTION BY COMPETITION
Multiple Single Total
bids bids
BIDDERS:
Number 86 193 279
Percentage 30.8% 69.2% 100%
TARGETS:
Number 82 186 268
Percentage 30.6% 69.4% 100%
C: DISTRIBUTION BY DECADE
1970s 1980s Total
BIDDERS:
Number 123 156 279
Percentage 44.1% 55.9% 100%
TARGETS:
Number 121 147 268
Percentage 45.1% 54.9% 100%
D: DISTRIBUTION BY METHOD OF PAYMENT
Stock Cash Mix Total
BIDDERS:
Number 95 141 43 279
Percentage 34.1% 50.5% 15.4% 100%
TARGETS:
Number 97 128 43 268
Percentaga 36.2% 47.8% 16.0% 100%
E: DEGREE OF COMPETITION
STRATEGIC Multiple Single Total
CU\SSIACATlON: bids bids
BIDDERS:
Core 26.8% 73.7% 100%
Related, not core 29.2% 70.8% 100%
Unrelated 32.7% 67.3% 100%
TARGETS:
Core 25.9% 74.1% 100%
Related,not core 29.8% 70.2% 100%
Unrelated 32.3% 67.7% 100%
F:DECADE
STRATEGIC 1970s 1980s Total
ClASSIACATION:
BIDDERS:
Core 41.1% 58.9% 100%
Related, not core 47.9% 52.1% 100%
Unrelated 44.0% 56.0% 100%
TARGETS:
Core 42.6% 57.4% 100%
Related, not core 46.8% 53.2% 100%
Unrelated 45.5% 54.5% 100%
G: METHOD OF PAYMENT
STRATEGIC Stock cash Mix Total
CU\SSIACATION:
BIDDERS:
Core 51.8% 32.1% 16.1% 100%
Related, not core 33.3% 52.1% 14.6% 100%
Unrelated 28.6% 56.0% 15.4% 100%
TARGETS:
Core 53.7% 33.3% 13.0% 100%
Related, not core 34.0% 51.1% 14.9% 100%
Unrelated 31.1% 51.5% 17.4% 100%
H: METHOD OF PAYMENT
DEGREEOF Stock Cash Mix Total
COMPETITION
BIDDERS:
Single bids 38.3% 46.1% 15.6% 100%
Multiple bids 24.4% 60.5% 15.1% 100%
TARGETS:
Singlebids 40.3% 44.1% 15.6% 100%
Multiple bids 26.8% 56.1% 17.1% 100%
I:METHOD OF PAYMENT
DECADE: Stock Cash Mix Total
BIDDERS:
1970s 43.9% 41.5% 14.6% 100%
1980s 26.3% 57.7% 16.0% 100%
TARGETS:
1970s 47.1% 36.4% 16.5% 100%
1980s 27.2% 57.1% 15.7% 100%
J:DECADE
DEGREEOF 1970S 1980S Total
COMPETITION:
BIDDERS:
Single 44.0% 56.0% 100%
Multiple 44.2% 55.8% 100%
TARGETS:
Single 45.7% 54.3% 100%
Bidders 43.9% 56.1% 100%
K: DATA CHARACTERISTICS - BIDDERS
Stock Cash Mix Total
Strategic 1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s
Classification M S M S M S M S M S M S
Core 5 13 3 8 1 3 5 9 7 56
Related, not core 2 8 5 2 7 8 8 4 2 48
Unrelated 8 18 2 22 16 22 20 40 4 9 7 7 175
Total 15 39 6 35 19 32 33 57 4 14 9 16 279
L: DATA CHARACTERISTICS - TARGETS
Stock Cash Mix Total
Strategic 1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 1970s 19805
Classification M S M S M S M S M S M S
Core 5 14 2 8 1 3 5 9 6 54
Related,not core 2 8 5 2 6 8 8 4 2 47
Unrelated 8 20 4 20 12 20 18 36 6 10 6 7 167
Total 15 42 7 33 15 29 31 53 6 14 8 15 268
M=multiple
S=single
BIDDER CHARACTERISTICS
17.20%
55.90%
44.10%
• Core M&As
Il Related M&As
Il Unrelated M&As
• Multiple
Il Single
• 1970s
• 1980s
15.40%
50.50%
• Cash
• StockIl Mix
TARGET CHARACTERISTICS
17.60% • CoreM&As
• Related M&As
III Unrelated M&As
• Multiple
.. Single
54.90%
16.00%
45.10%
• 1970s
• 1980s
47.80"10
• CashIl Stock
I11III Mix
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Single bids are more common than multiple bids. In the sample,
2/3 of the transactions involve only one bidder. The other 1/3 of
the transactions have another identifiable second bidder, Le. a
firm, an investor group or management team that is mentioned in
the press and is actively engaging in the contest.
The transactions are fairly evenly distributed among the two
decades involved. Fortyfive percent of the transactions take place
in the 1970s and 55% in the 1980s.
Cash represents the major payment method for the entire sample,
accounting for about 50% of all observations. Stock is used as
means of payment in 34% of the cases and a mix between stock and
cash is used in 16% of the transactions.
When one combines degree of competition and strategic
classification, the data reveals that multiple and single bids are
fairly evenly distributed among core, related, not core and
unrelated transactions on a percentage basis. In each of the
strategic categories about 1/3 of the bids are multiple and 2/3
single. Similarly, combination of decade and strategic
classification indicates an approximately identical distribution of
announcements for the three strategic groups as a function of
time: around 45% in the 1970s and about 55% in the 1980s. A
combination of method of payment and strategic classification
reveals, however, that there is a more systematic relationship
between type of takeover and method of payment. In core M&As,
stock is the major payment method (50%), where cash and mix
account for 35% and 15% respectively. On the other hand, cash
seems to be the predominant payment method (>50%) in
transactions where bidders and targets are related, not core or
unrelated. Stock and mix account for around 30% and 15%
respectively for these categories. Since cash transactions are
usually associated with tender offers and stock exchange offers
with mergers (eg., Huang & WalkIing 1987), the data indicates that
core M&As involve more merger transactions relative to tender
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offers than the two other groups. To bring this point a step
further, consistent with conventional wisdom, a hostile acquisition
appears more likely to be undertaken through tender offer than
through mergers and is therefore more likely to be cash offer than
a stock offer. If this is true, one should expect fewer hostile offers,
in the sample of core M&As than in those for related, not core and
unrelated bidders.
Table IV.2.H. combines method of payment and degree of
competition. Cash seems to be used more often when the takeover
ends up in a multiple bidder contest. However, the difference
between single and multiple bids when it comes to the method of
payment is not that substantial.
Table IV.2.I. reveals that the payment method has an interesting
time dimension. There are clear indications that cash has become
more popular in the 1980s; In the last decade, stock exchange offers
were applied in only 25% of the cases compared to 45 % in the
1970s.
Finally, if one combines decade and degree of competition, there is
no sign of time dependence on the single/multiple bidder variable;
approximately 45% of both single and multiple bids take place in
the 1970s and the rest (55%) in the 1980s.
In table IV.2.E above, the data indicates that multiple and single
bids are fairly evenly distributed among core, related, not core and
unrelated transactions on a percentage basis in the entire sample.
To gain additional insight into the multiple bidder transactions,
data on the attributes of alternative bidders is collected. The
alternative bidders are found by searching the Wall Street Journal
Index for the time period surrounding the transaction that is
analyzed. Based on a total of 86 multiple bidder transactions, 75
have two bidders, eight have three bidders, one has four bidders
and two transactions have five bidders. Furthermore, the 86
multiple bidder transactions contain 15 core, 14 related,not core
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and 57 unrelated transactions. The distribution of other (non-
successful) bidders' relations to the target and the type of takeover
transactions in my classification scheme is:
.-
Other bidders'
relations to target Core Related, Unrelated Private
not core investor(s) ,
Classification of LBO/MBO
transaction ~ my
sample
Core 50.7 % 7.1% 14.3% 28.6%
Related, not core 14.3% 31.6% 34.5% 20.2%
Unrelated 19.6% 10.8% 57.8% 11.8%
In core M&As, 50% of the competing bidders are closely related to
the target. Put differently, the winning bidder in the sample core
M&As faces other bidders that are closely related in half of those
transactions. The remaining part of alternative bidders are
related, not core (7.1%), unrelated (14.3%) or private
investor(s)/LBO/MBO (28.6%).
When the transaction is classified as related, not core, the
alternative bidders' relation to the target is distributed more fairly
among the different groups: core=14.3%, related, not core=31.0%,
unrelated=34.5% and private investor(s)/LBO/MBO=20.2%.
In multiple bidder contests where the winning bidder is unrelated
to the target, 57.8% of the alternative bidders are also unrelated to
the target. About 30% of the bidders are related - either core
(19.6%) or related, not core (10.8%). The private
investor(s)/LBO/MBO group accounts for 11.8%.
In multiple bid transactions in which the winning bidder is closely
related to the target (core M&A), many of the alternative bidders
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are also closely related to the target. The fact that there are more
than one core bidder, may indicate that the target possesses a
specialized resource that provides a synergy opportunity for
several core bidders, or that the synergy potential is industry
specific (as opposed to firm specific). Both of these factors tend to
reduce bidder returns. For the unrelated group many of the
alternative bidders are also unrelated (57.8%). This may indicate
that specific synergies are less dominating in those multiple
bidding transactions or that other unrelated bidders tend to enter
an auction process when previous bidders are also unrelated.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Regression model
Event studies generally seek to measure abnormal security
performance associated with firm-specific events. The assumption
is that abnormal returns reflect net present values of changes in
expected future cash flows. The event study method was introduced
by Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969) who found a technique to
identify the impact of a specific event on a security's rate of
return 13. Different models (and combinations of them) have been
used in empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions 14: ex post
CAPM, empirical market line and the market model. The market
model, which is widely used in event studies, seems to be well-
specified under a variety of conditions (Brown & Warner 1985:25),
there is no evidence that more complicated methodologies convey
13 One of the major implications of the efficient market hypothesis
is that stock prices respond rapidly and in an unbiased manner to
the announcement of new information. A large body of empirical
evidence indicates that stock price changes provide the best
estimate of the effect of a specific event on the value of the firm.
14 See Halpern (1983) and Copeland & Weston (1988) for brief
discussion of different aspects of event studies. Lubatkin &
Shrieves (1986) give a general discussion of market performance
measures in strategic management research.
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any benefit (Brown & Warner 1980:249) and, finally, the model
seems to be as well-specified as a procedure based on generalized
least squares (Malatesta 1986:38). As discussed earlier in this study,
using an event study methodology provides more benefits than
alternative methodologies. First of all, it is difficult to use a change
in factor or output prices to infer the profitability effect of M&As
because it would require one to specify a finn's demand and cost
function. Secondly, it would require an assessment as to when the
merger will start having an impact on product and factor prices.
Third, one would also have to define the normal change in product
prices that would have occurred without a merger. In addition, if
an empirical study is based on accounting data, one would face
problems associated with measuring systematic risk, temporary
disequilibrium effects, tax laws, arbitrary accounting conventions,
etc.
In this study, the abnormal returns are estimated by using the
following market model: 15
6
Rjt = aj + bjRmt + LYjndnt + ejt
n=l
where
= the continuously compounded daily rate of return on
security j on day t
= the continuously compounded daily rate of return on the
CRSP value-weighted market index on day t
= normally distributed error term of security j on event day
t, with an expected return equal to zero, and which is
independent of both rm t and dn t
= cov(Rjt,Rmt)/var(Rmt)
= intercept term
= average daily abnorm al return for firm j over event
period n
= dummy variable which takes on a value of one if t is in
15 For a description of this version of the market model, see
Binder(1985), Thompson (1985), Malatesta (1986) and Eckbo,
Maksimovic & Williams (1990).
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event period n and zero otherwise
Since the explanatory variables in the return generating process
are the same for each of the N stocks. N return equations have to be
estimated:
6
Rlt = al + blRmt + LY lndnt + el t
n=l
6
R2t = a2 + b2Rmt + LY2ndnt + e2t
n=l
6
RNt = aN+ bNRmt + LYNndnt + eNt
n=l
The specification of the market model is based on the assumption
that stock returns follow a multivariate normal distribution. This
model controls for marketwide variations through the independent
variable Rm t- The parameter bj measures the sensitivity of the jth
firm's return (Rjt) to movements in the market index (Rm t). The
term bjR m t is the portion of the return to security j that is due to
marketwide factors.
Observed returns for security j at time t are calculated as follows:
where
Rjto = returns security j time t
Pjt = security j's closing price at time t
Ojt = cash adjustment for security j time t
Fjt = price adjustment factor security j time t
F jt is used to adjust to stock prices after a distribution (cash
dividends, capital adjustments and other distributions) so that a
comparison can be made on an equivalent basis between prices
before and after the distribution.
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The total windor of returns used for the regression analysis. is -
360,+20 days relative to the announcement day (=day O). The
parameters aj and bj are estimated in the period -360,+20 whereas
the Yjn 's are estimated over the period -60,+20 (total of 81 days).
The nonoverlapping event periods relative to the announcement
date are chosen to be:
event period 1: -60,-41
event period 2: -40,-21
event period 3: -20,- 2
event period 4: - 1, O
event period 5: 1, 10
event period 6: 11, 20
It is worthy to note that in the market model used here, the
parameters (aj and bj) are estimated from data covering the entire
sample period (both the event and the non-event periods).
Compared to a market model based on a standard two-step procedure
(e.g. Fama 1976), this model slightly increases the efficiency of the
estimators (Eckbo, Maksimovic & Williams 1990). The abnormal
return parameter Yjn is estimated for the specific event period and
directly isolates the average daily abnorm al return for firm j over
event period n that is due to the event. Thus, the parameters in the
regression are estimated simultaneously.
Missing observed returns are handled as follows: if a daily return
is missing, this day is removed from the time series (and therefore
reducing the number of observations for the parameter
estimation). This change is then accounted for in the regression
analysis and in the test of significance of hypothesis. The window
[-1,0] is given special treatment. If both days are missing, the firm
is thrown out of the analysis. If only one return observation is
missing (either day -lor O) then the firm is kept in the analysis.
However, when creating portfolios, the firm is only included for
event periods other than [-1,0]. When abnormal returns and Z-
statistics are computed over two or more event periods, firms that
do not have two return observations in the window (-1,0) are
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excluded.
3.2. Computing abnormal returns
Abnormal return to firm j over event period n (ARjn) is computed
by multiplying the event parameter Yjn (ne l •....•6) by the number
of observations in the event period (hjn): 1 6
Since the ARjn reflects the impact of all news in period n (not only
the M&A announcement). the firm-specific abnormal return must
be aggregated to a portfolio in order to study generalizable
performance differences. One collects a sample of takeovers
consisting of different firms in different time periods. This is done
to randomize impacts of news announcements unrelated to the
merger or acquisition announcement. The average abnormal
return for a portfolio for the nth event period is computed as:
1 Nn
ARn=N L,ARjn
n . 1
J=
where
Nn = number of securities in portfolio (number of independent
takeover announcements) for event period n
ARn = unbiased estimate of average abnormal returns of
merger/acquisition announcements over event period n
16Each firm's event parameter (Yjn) must be multiplied with the
number of observations in the specific time period for that firm.
The reason for this is that the number of period specific missing
returns varies among different firms.
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3.3. Test of significance of hypothesis
To test whether the Yjn 's are statistically different from zero, the
following z-statistic is computed:
Nn
Z __ 1_~ _Ij_n_
n-~~Syjn
J=1
where Syjn is the standard deviation of Yjn' Assuming that the Nn
events are independent, Zn is approximately unit-normal variate
under the null hypothesis that ARn = O.
The Z-value for
abnormal returns
(assuming both
events):17
the sum of two event parameters that measures
over periods of different length is computed as
event periods contain the same number of
Nn
--I-I(ARj3 + ARj4)Z3+4 - _r::--
"Nn 2
Syj(3+4)
je l
where
17 This holds because the event period dummies in the regression
model above are orthogonal.
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3.4. Cross-sectional regression model
To obtain additional insights into the price effects from takeover
bids, a cross-sectional model is run for individual announcement-
period stock returns. Such a regression model permits me to
control for (1) effects of competition in the market for corporate
control, (2) method of payment and (3) time period while
examining the effects of strategic core and degree of
di versification.
The regression model is
where the dummy variables are defined as follows:
c =1 if the takeover is a strategic core M&A and zero otherwise
R =1 if the takeover is a related, not core M&A and zero
otherwise
M =1 if the offer is made in a multiple-bidder contest and zero
otherwise
T =1 if the offer is made after 1980 and zero otherwise
PI =1 if the method of payment is cash and zero otherwise
P2 =1 if the payment method is mixed and zero otherwise
The first two dummy variables are included to examine the
marginal effect of strategic category effects on abnormal returns
for bidders and targets. The selection of the additional dummy
variables is based on prior studies of takeover activity, and the
effects of those variables are discussed earlier in this study.
Method of payment (P1,P2) seems to influence the abnormal
returns for both targets and bidders in a takeover contest. Target
firms realize on average higher abnormal returns in cash offers
than in security exchange offers (see Huang & Walkling 1987,
Eckbo & Langohr 1989 and Eckbo.Maksimovic & Williams 1990 for
empirical evidence). This result can often be attributed to
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information asymmetries between the bidder and target. Cash is a
costly medium of exchange since the bidder bears the full cost of
overpaying for the target. Using cash therefore signals high
valuation of the target. In a security exchange offer, uncertainty
about the success of the bid is important to the target shareholders.
Stockholders in acquiring firms seem to benefit from using cash in
takeovers. Assume that managers possess information about the
intrinsic value of their firm which is not fully reflected in the
preacquisition stock price, and that they will finance the
acquisition in the most profitable way for existing shareholders.
In the vein of Myers & Majluf (1984), cash will be the preferred
method of payment if the firm is believed to be undervalued, while
common stock exchange offer will be offered in the opposite case.
This provides a signal to the market in the sense that a cash offer is
good news and a common stock offer is bad news about the bidding
firm's true value.18
The M variable indicates whether the takeover bid is a m u I t i P I e
or single bidding contest. Multiple bidding tend to increase target
that target companies through
higher abnormal
Empirical evidence indicates
an auction effect realize
premiums and reduce bidder returns.
significantly returns in multiple bidding
situations .19 For bidding firms the abnormal returns are reduced
when there is strong competition among bidding firms;
Bradley,Desai & Kim (1988) show that returns to acquiring firms
are significantly positive in single-bidder contests and
insignificantly different from zero in multiple- bidder contests.
1 8 Recent empirical work has shown that, in general,
announcements of additional equity issues by public corporations
are accompanied by negative share price effects (Smith 1986
summarizes this evidence). In a takeover bid where equity is the
payment method, positive announcement effects from the takeover
can be offset by information released in the financing decisions
(See Travlos 1987).
19See James & Wier 1987, Bradley,Desai & Kim 1988 and Michel &
Shaked 1988.
161
The dummy variable T is included to take into account t im e
(environment) effects on takeover bids. Jarrell & Bradley (19,80)
and Bradley. Desai & Kim (1988) find that the financial and
regulatory environment. as measured by the decade in which the
bid occurs. is important in determining the wealth gains of
shareholders of target and acquiring firms. The 80s are
distinguished from the 70s in several respects: (1) less
intervention by government. (2) development of sophisticated
defensive tactics (poison pills. targeted share repurchases. lock-up
provisions. supermajority. fair-price amendments etc.) and (3)
junk bonds and other means of financing corporate takeovers.
To account for the possibility of heteroskedastisity in the data, all
variables are standardized with the standard error of the market
model regression (S). This is equivalent to using weighted least
squares to estimate the regression parameters where the
reciprocal of the standard error of the market model is the
relevant weights.
The weighted least square regression model that is run can be
expressed as follows:
v. EMPIRICAL RESbt~s
l.ABNORMAL RETURNS TO STOCKHOLDERS OF
ACQUIRING FIRMS
This section analyzes empirical results based on abnormal returns
to stockholders of acquiring firms. The abnormal returns for
different event periods (1 ...... 6) and combinations of these are
examined. Such a time series analysis provides insight into the
intertemporai behavior of M&A returns. One should take notice of
the fact that when the bid is announced. the eventual outcome of
the bid is uncertain. Furthermore. there is also uncertainty
associated with whether a takeover bid will be submitted or not
before the announcement date (partial anticipation). These types
of uncertainties are resolved over time when new information
about the offer is revealed to the market. The period over which
this uncertainty is resolved varies across the sample and of course
affects the abnormal returns. Of particular importance is that this
period over which the uncertainty is
different strategic groups (unrelated,
strategic core M&As). For example. one
where for unrelated takeovers most of
and announcement effects take place
announcement date) as opposed to the core group where the effect
seems to be more evenly distributed over a longer time span (as we
will see later. the data actually indicates that this is the case).
resolved may vary for
related, not core and
could imagine a scenario
the uncertainty resolution
close to day zero (the
The abnormal returns for acquiring firms are computed for four
different portfolios:(1) all bidders (279 firms), (2) strategic core
M&As (56 firms). (3) related, not core M&As (48 firms) and (4)
unrelated firms (175 firmsj.! Table V.l. below presents average
1As discussed in section IlIA above. the classification is based on
the following rule: (A) strategic core M&As: M&As among firms
within the same three and/or four digit SIC-code. (B) related. not
core M&As: M&As among firms within the same two-digit SIC code
(but different 3 digit SIC code) and (C) unrelated M&As: M&As
TABLE V.1. - PARAMETER VALUES FOR a'S AND b'S
Allfirms Bidder firms Target firms
a
Z-stat.
b
Z-stat.
0.0002
4.40
0.0002
3.72
0.0001
2.46
0.934
152.33
0.982
129.16
0.881
85.18
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alfa (a), beta (b) and Z-values for bidders and targets.
1.1. All bidders
Table V.2. below provides the empirical results for bidder firms and
shows that, on average, bidder firms' stockholders realize negative
or zero abnormal returns. The abnormal returns are
indistinguishable from zero at a 5 % level in all event periods
except for event period 4 (-1,0) where bidders realize a
significantly negative return -1.09 % (Z=-7 .81) and event period (-
20,+ 10) where the negative return amounts to -0.97% (Z=-2.08).
Even though bidders in the sample on average lose from M&As, it is
worthy of note that the portfolio of all bidders contains acquiring
firms undertaking different types of strategic M&As. Negative
returns in one strategic category may outweigh potential positive
returns from another strategic category. To analyze this further,
the "all bidders" -group is subdivided into three portfolios: (l)
strategic core M&As, (2) related, not core M&As and (3) unrelated
M&As.
1.2. Strategic core M&As (hypothesis 1)
As hypothesized, bidders in strategic core M&As realize positive
abnormal returns. Bidders in this group gain positive abnormal
returns in all event periods. For event period (-60,+ 1O) the
abnormal return (5.01 %) is almost significantly positive at a 5 %
level when a two tailed Z-test is applied (Z=is 1.94). In event period
(-40,+ 1O) the abnormal return is 4.21 % (Z= 1.66%). For bidders in
this group, the M&A seems to be a wealth-increasing event. To a
large extent, the sample value creation (abnormal returns) for this
group takes place before the actual announcement date. The
abnormal return in the period (-60,-2) amounts to 4.20 %. This
across two-digit SIC codes.
TABLE V.2. - RESULTS BIDDER ARMS
Average abnormal returns (ARn's) in percent for different strategic
categories and event periods. The Z-value (Zn) and number of firms (N) in
portfolio are given in parentheses.
Event
period
All
bidders
Strategic
core M&As
Related, not
core M&As
Unrelated
M&As
ARl 0.32 0.79 0.60 0.09
-60,-41 (0.93,279) (1.03,56) (0.66,48) (0.25,175)
AR2 0.35 1.36 1.07 -0.49
-40,-21 (0.55,279) (1.11,56) (0.97,48) (-0.43,175)
AR3 0.14 1.50 0.65 -0.43
-20,-2 (0.25,279) (1.16,56) (0.24,48) (-0.46,175)
AR4 -1.09*** 0.38 -0.56 -1.69***
-1,0 (-7.81,267) (-0.44,53) (-1.42,45) (-8.84,169)
AR5 -0.51 0.34 -1.81* -0.43
1,10 (-1.18,279) (0.70,56) (-1.69,48) (-0.95,175)
AR6 0.26 0.10 0.34 0.28
11,20 (0.52,279) (-0.36,56) (0.93,48) (0.37,175)
AR3,AR4 -0.97** 1.70 0.07 -2.08***
-20,0 (-2.08,267) (0.91,53) (-0.14,45) (-3.01,169)
AR2,AR4 -0.70 3.62 0.93 -2.50**
-40,0 (-1.03,267) (1.37,53) (0.63,45) (-2.36,169)
AR2,AR5 -1.05 4.21* -0.74 -2.77**
-40,+10 (-1.21,267) (1.66,53) (-0.19,45) (-2.37,169)
AR1,AR5 -0.68 5.01* -0.09 -2.63*
-60, +10 (-0.54,267) (1.94,53) (0.18,45) (-1.84,169)
* = significantly different from zero at the 10 % level
** = significantly different from zero at the 5 % level
*** = significantly different from zero at the 1 % level
Hypotheses tested using a two-tailed Z-test
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upward drift in the stock price before the announcement date
seems to be strong for this group. One reason for this might be
that strategic core M&As face a larger degree of partial
anticipation (Malatesta & Thompson 1985) and insider trading
(Jarrell & Poulsen 1989b) than the other groups (this aspect will be
discussed more extensively later).
1.3. Related, not core M&As (hypothesis 2)
Related, not core M&As realize zero or negative abnormal returns.
The results show that bidder abnormal returns are not
significantly different from zero at a 5 % level for any event
period. However, in event period five the abnormal return (-1.81
%) is significantly negative at the 10 % level. These results are
consistent with the proposition that relatedness, per se, is not
sufficient to realize gains for bidders in M&As. Put differently, the
premium related bidders have to pay is seemingly higher than the
present value of expected future rent created from the takeover.
One reason for this may be that other core bidders are able to
create large amounts of rent creating (specific) synergies. To win
the contest, related bidders must pay an amount that equals the
next highest offer plus an amount epsilon. According to the
theoretical model in Chapter III above, this amount will often
imply that related bidders have to pay too much of a premium to
realize a positive abnormal return.
The results support the hypothesis that the expected abnormal
return for related bidders is zero. The fact that abnormal returns
have a tendency to be negative for this group (contrary to
hypothesis) should not be too surprising; related bidders should on
average be expected to create less specific synergies than core
bidders. But, still, they have to pay at least as much as what core
bidders are willing to pay. Hence, negative returns for related
bidders should not come as a shock.
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1.4. Unrelated M&As (hypothesis 3)
By examining the results for unrelated M&As, one sees that the
stockholders of these bidding firms generally realize significant
losses. The announcement effect in event period 4 is - 1.69 % and a
Z-statistic as large as -8.84. In event period (-20,0) the
announcement effect is -2.08 % (Z=-3.01). Event periods (-40,0) and
(-40,+ 10) have abnormal returns of -2.50 % (Z=-2.36) and -2.77 %
(Z=-2.48) respectively. For the other event periods, the abnormal
returns are not significantly different from zero at the 5 % level.
However, the strong support for hypothesis 3 indicates that small
expected benefits from unrelated diversification is more than
outweighed by the required takeover premiums that must be paid
to gain control of a firm.
1.5. Test of equality of means among strategic groups
Table V.3. below provides the tests of equality of means among
various bidder strategic groups. These tests analyze whether the
difference in mean abnormal returns between two groups is
statistically different from zero. The panel shows that returns to
strategic core M&As are statistically higher than returns to
unrelated bidders. Moreover, strategic core M&As create higher
returns than related, not core M&As, but this is only significant at
the 10% level. Mean returns in related versus unrelated
acquisitions are not statistically different for any of the event
periods.
2. ABNORMAL RETURNS TO TARGET STOCKHOLDERS
2.1. All targets (hypothesis 4)
In accordance with virtually everyevent study on M&As,
TABLE v.a. -TESTS OF EQUAUTY OF MEANS - BIDDERS
This table provides the tests of equality of means (t-statistics). Degrees of
freedom in parentheses.
SC = strategic core M&As
RC = related, not core M&As
UR = unrelated M&As
SC-RC SC-UR RC-UR
AR4 0.92 2.53* 1.32
-1,0 (96) (220) (212)
AR3,AR4 1.03 2.54** 1.32
-20,0 (96) (220) (212)
AR2,AR4 1.12 3.18*** 1.73*
-40,0 (96) (220) (212)
AR2,AR5 1.65* 3.26*** 0.93
-40, + 10 (95) (220) (212)
AR1,AR5 1.50 3.10*** 1.08
-60, + 10 (96) (220) (212)
* = significantly different from zero at the 10 % level
** = significantly different from zero at the 5 % level
*** = significantly different from zero at the 1 % level
Hypotheses tested using a two-tailed t-test
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stockholders of target firms realize large significantly positive
abnormal returns on and around the announcement date (see table
VA.). There is a large effect in event period 4 (-1,0) for "all
targets" (11.29 %, Z=57.00), strategic core targets (8042 %,Z=I9.05),
related, not core targets (11.85 %, Z=24.82) .and unrelated targets
(12.04 %,Z=47.38). The abnormal returns for event period 3 (-20,-2)
are also large where the group "all targets" realizes 8.39 %
(Z=13.02), strategic core targets 7.32 % (Z=4.83), related,not core
targets 6.16 % (Z=4A2) and unrelated targets 9.36 % (Z=I1.40).
Taken together, most of the
impounded in the stock price
abnormal returns generated
statistically indistinguishable
M&As in event period 1).
abnormal returns for target firms are
in event period 3 and 4 (-20,0). The
for event periods 1 and 6 are
from zero (except for unrelated
The significant abnormal returns in event period 3 (before the
announcement date) is consistent with partial anticipation of the
takeover announcement and insider trading.
2.2. Tests of equality among strategic groups
(hypothesis 5)
Hypothesis 5 states that strategic core targets are expected to
realize higher abnormal returns than related targets which in
turn are expected to realize higher abnormal returns than
unrelated targets. Table V.5. shows the tests of equality of means
among targets in different strategic groups. The results actually
suggest a reverse relationship: unrelated M&As realize higher
returns than related, not core M&As which in turn realize higher
returns than core M&As. Targets in unrelated M&As realize
significantly higher returns than targets in strategic core M&As.
The difference between core and related, not core targets, and
unrelated and related, not core targets are not statistically
different from zero at the 5 % level. Therefore, hypothesis 5 is not
supported.
TABLE V.4. - RESULTS TARGET ARMS
Average abnormal returns (ARn's) in percent for different categories and
event periods. The Z-value (Zn) and number of firms (N) in portfolio are
given in parentheses.
Event
period
All
targets
Strategic
core M&As
Related,not
core M&As
Unrelated
M&As
AR1 0.70 -2.21 1.18 1.51**
-60,-41 (1.48,268) (-1.23,54) (0.94,47) (2.07,167)
AR2 1.65*** 0.76 3.50** 1.41*
-40,-21 (2.69,268) (0.46,54) (2.53,47) (1.71,167)
AR3 8.39*** 7.32*** 6.16*** 9.36***
-20,-2 (13.02,268) (4.83,54) (4.42,47) (11.40,167)
AR4 11.29*** 8.42*** 11.85*** 12.04***
-1,0 (57.00,240) (19.05,47) (24.82,43) (47.38,150)
ARS 1.26*** 1.41* -0.30 1.65***
1,10 (3.35,268) (1.80,54) (0.24,47) (3.10,167)
AR6 0.51 0.45 0.19 0.62
11,20 (1.08,268) (0.32,54) (0.18,47) (1.09,167)
AR3,AR4 20.90*** 17.28*** 19.30*** 22.49***
-20,0 (30.59,240) (11.41,47) (12.25,43) (25.75,150)
AR2,AR4 22.82*** 18.37*** 23.34*** 24.07***
-40,0 (23.82,240) (8.53,47) (10.65,43) (19.64,150)
AR2,ARs 23.01*** 18.96*** 22.54*** 24.41***
-40, + 10 (21.82,240) (8.11,47) (9.46,43) (17.99,150)
AR1,ARs 23.90*** 16.58*** 24.13*** 26.14***
-60+10 (19.31,240) (6.11,47) (8.62,43) (16.39,150)
* = significantly different from zero at the 10 % level
** = significantly different from zero at the 5 % level
*** = significantly different from zero at the 1 % level
Hypotheses tested by using a two-tailed Z-test
TABLE V.5. - TESTS OF EQUAUTY OF MEANS - TARGETS
This table provides the tests of equality of means (t-statistics). Degrees of
freedom in parentheses.
SC = strategic core M&As
RC = related,not core M&As
UR = unrelated M&As
SC-RC SC-UR RC-UR
AR4 -1.25 -1.69* -0.08
-1,0 (88) (195) (191)
AR3,AR4 -0.61 -1.92 -1.11
-20,0 (88) (195) (191)
AR2,AR4 -1.35 -1.88 -0.23
-40,0 (88) (195) (191)
AR2,AR5 -0.90 -1.65* -0.54
-40, + 10 (87) (195) (191)
AR1,AR5 -1.67* -2.62** -0.52
-60,+10 (87) (195) (191)
* = significantly different from zero at the 10 % level
** = significantly different from zero at the 5 % level
*** = significantly different from zero at the 1 % level.
Hypotheses tested using a two tailed t-test.
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3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
3.1. Bidder returns
The most interesting part of the empirical analysis of this study is
the examination of bidder returns. One main reason for this is that
in the majority of studies in financial economics, scholars have
had difficulty finding abnormal returns for bidders that are
significantly different from zero (see discussion in chapter II,
section 7 and 8 above). This problem has led to a discussion of
whether the observed zero abnormal returns are a result of
competitive mechanisms in the market for corporate control (e.g.
Ruback 1983) or of measurement problems like partial anticipation
(Malatesta & Thompson 1985) and size effect problems (Asquith,
Bruner & Mullins 1983). Furthermore, in the strategy area
researchers have tried to group firms into different strategic
categories but have not found any conclusive results (Chatterjee
1986, Lubatkin 1987, and Singh & Montgomery 1987). It is my
belief that important reasons for the inconclusive results in the
strategy field stem from small samples, size-effect problems and,
most importantly, lack of theories that integrate strategy and
finance. In light of existing results in the M&A field, the present
study provides interesting results that are consistent with
important work in the strategy field (Teece 1980,1982, Rumelt 1982,
Williamson 1985, Reve 1990) and finance (Ruback 1983). To
reiterate, the empirical results of this study show that returns are
in the hypothesized direction and support my hypotheses which
are linked to my theoretical model:
JnR
TYPEOF BIDDER: ABNORMALRETURNS:
1. All bidders
2. Strategic core bidders
3. Related, not core bidders
4. Unrelated bidders
Negative
Positive
Zero·
Negative
The results show that strategic core bidders represent the only
group that realize positive abnormal returns in M&As. This group
also has higher abnormal returns (equality of means test) than
unrelated bidders at the 5 % significance level and related, not core
bidders at the 10% level. Unrelated bidders realize significantly
negative returns and related bidders realize negative or zero
abnormal returns. The results in this study are consistent with the
following:
1. Value created and value destroyed - not only redistribution
effects
2.Strategy matters
3.Strategic core - major dimension for choice between integration,
strategic alliances and markets
3.1.Product-market imperfections
3.1.1. Sunk costs, transaction costs,imperfect
information and causal ambiguity
3.1.2. Markets - not fully contestable
3.1.3. Sustainable competitive advantage (vis-a-vis
competitors
3.2. Relatedness, per se, not sufficient for abnormal returns
3.3. In unrelated acquisitions, winner's curse or agency
problems may be dominant effects
3.4. Transactions costs theory (Williamson 1985)
3.5. Positioning, industrial org. economics
Porter (1980,1985)
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4. Market efficiency
5. Competition in the market for corporate control - not perfect.
6. Measurement problems - partial anticipation and size-effects
7. Important link between strategy and finance
l - Value created and value destroyed - not only redistribution
effects
The fact that both strategic core bidders and targets realize positive
abnormal returns is consistent with the proposition that M&A
announcements are wealth-increasing events for both parties in
the transaction. That is. net total benefits (synergy+reduced
transaction costs+market power effects+diversif'ication benefits-
costs of integration) are positive for firms in core transactions.
Furthermore. the bidders are able to capture some of the gains
created by only paying a premium which represent less than 100
% of the total value created. One could argue that some of the gains
might be a redistribution to stockholders from other stakeholders
of the firm. e.g. transfers from holders of senior securities (Dennis
& McConnell 1986) or abrogation of implicit contracts with
employees. suppliers. customers. etc. (Shleifer & Summers 1988).
There has been no attempt in this study to analyze the importance
of these effects. Moreover. some of the bidder gains in the core
group may stem from increased market power. Even though prior
studies tend to reject the market power hypothesis (see Eckbo
1983.1985. Eckbo & Wier 1985. Stillman 1983 and James & Wier 1987).
potential gains from increased collusion can not be ruled out as an
explanatory factor.
In the case of unrelated takeovers. value is destroyed for bidders.
but created (of course) for targets. It is uncertain whether the
total gains (bidders and targets together) are positive. negative or
zero. However bidders in the unrelated group pay. on average. a
premium that more than outweighs a possible gain. The net result
is that bidders lose and targets gain from this large premium.
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For related, not core bidders the argument is analogous to the. one
for unrelated bidders. However, the results for the related bidder
group are indistinguishably different from zero at a 5 % level.
2 - Strategy matters
There has been some discussion in the literature whether intended
strategies (cf., Mintzberg 1988) really matters; that is, if managers
really can create sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 1985)
through strategic choice and action. Even though there is strong
consensus that strategy matters, this study adds to the current
empirical evidence that strategy formulation and implementation
are important.
3 - Strategic core - a major dimension
The results in this study indicate that the concept of strategic core
(Reve 1990) is important in strategy research in general and in
M&A research in particular. The lengthy model developed in this
study, which uses strategic core as one of the main building blocks,
is supported by evidence from a large sample of takeovers from the
1970s and 1980s. This finding has important implications for
corporate strategy and M&As. In my view, the best way to look
upon strategic M&As is to regard these transactions as
ins tru men t s to implement corporate strategy. Put differently,
M&As represent a way of creating competitive advantage through
cost advantage or differentiation. For these advantages to be
sustainable, the newly formed economies of scale and scope must
be sustainable as well. If they are not sustainable, they will not
create rents in the product-market. Furthermore, if they are not
sustainable, it is expected that bidding mechanisms in the market
for corporate control ensures that bidders, at best, realize zero
gains. Creating competitive advantage through imperfections in
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the product- markets is what strategy is all about, and therefore, is
what strategic M&As are all about.
The empirical evidence from this study supports the claim that
only strategic core bidders realize positive abnormal returns and
lends support to the model discussed in Chapter 3. According to the
model, strategic core has two fundamental effects: (1) a product-
market effect and (2) a financial market effect. The strategic core
influences the degree to which the firm can create a competitive
advantage in the product-market via physical asset specificity,
human asset specificity (specific know-how, organizational
routines/structures/systems and organizational structure), site
specificity, image/reputation and strong external alliances. These
core assets strongly affect the drivers that create market failures
and sustainable competitive advantage. As discussed earlier in this
study, the most important underlying drivers for market failure
are sunk costs, transaction costs, imperfect information and causal
ambiguity. Takeover gains based on the strategic core of a firm are
therefore expected to create sustainable rent since they are not
easily duplicated or countered by competitors. The empirical
evidence supporting the strategic core implications does not
support Baumol's (1982) discussion on contestable markets. Core
bidders realize synergies based on imperfections in the product-
markets where sustainability to some extent is ensured.
The strategic core also has an important financial market effect;
even if the market for corporate control is competitive, the bidder
can realize an abnormal return. If a certain bidder has a large
specific synergy potential (S) which is larger than the specific
synergy potential that any other bidder can realize, there is no
strong substitutability among bidders.2 One should expect that this
would hold more often in cases where a firm diversifies narrowly
as opposed to widely. The empirical results lend support to this
financial market effect.
2For a formal treatment, see model in chapter 3.
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In the case of related, not core bidders, the results are again
striking. The results support the assertion that relatedness among
bidders and targets is not a sufficient condition for acquiring firms
to realize positive abnormal returns. If the economies that are
created are not unique enough, one should expect that the
premium outweigh the benefits for the bidder. This is a result of
the competitive bidding mechanism that probably will unfold in
the market for corporate control. In general, when the cost of
resource acquisition equals the value created by implementing a
strategy, this strategy generates only normal returns even if it
successfully creates imperfect competition in product markets.
If there are economies to be realized among firms that are related
(but not closely), other types of firm organization may be a better
solution than a takeover. Examples here might be internal
development, formal contracts, joint ventures and strategic
alliances.
Unrelated bidders lose significantly in takeovers. Even if there
might be small expected net positive synergy effects from an
unrelated takeover, these effects can hardly justify the large
takeover premiums required to gain controlover a company.
Furthermore, most of the synergies seem to be quite general (G).
The negative results for the unrelated bidders are consistent with
the "hubris hypothesis" put forward by Roll (1986) or an agency
problem where the management deliberately acts in a way that
destroys shareholder value.
The finding that core bidders outperform related and unrelated
bidders is consistent with transaction costs theory (Williamson
1985). A firm's strategic core is, per definition, highly specific and
should therefore be organized within the firm's boundaries
(hierarchy). Synergies based on less specific assets (unrelated and
related,not core) should probably be handled through different
governance structures. The empirical findings also lend support to
173
the main argument in industrial organization economics (Porter
1985): a firm should seek to create an advantage in the product-
market that is sustainable. M&As based on narrow diversification
are expected to be the takeover strategy that most likely satisfies
that requirement.
4 - Market efficiency
The results from this study is also consistent with market
efficiency in a semi-strong form (Fama 1970,1976). According to
this hypothesis, the expected price effects will occur on or before
the first public announcement of a takeover. For both bidders and
targets in my sample, there is an upward drift in the stock price
before the actual announcement date. Information leaking, partial
anticipation and insider trading may explain this. In addition, the
reaction on the days -1,0 is strong and significant. After the
announcement date the abnormal returns converge quickly
towards zero again. This pattern of stock price behavior is
consistent with semi-strong market efficiency.
5 - Competition in the market for corporate control - not perfect
Many researchers have concluded that the takeover markets are
competitive. The microeconomic definition of a perfectly
competitive market focuses on firms which face infinitely elastic
demand curves for homogeneous products. Since bidding and
target firms are heterogeneous, this definition does not seem to
apply in the takeover market. The evidence indicates that core
bidders actually capture some of the gains created which is
consistent with the proposition that bidders are heterogeneous and
that the gain a bidder can create in excess of the second highest
bidder is not completely bid away by other bidders and
arbitrageurs. Furthermore, the fact that unrelated bidders realize
significantly negative returns supports the proposition that when
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other potential related bidders (that can presumably create higher
values with a given target than an unrelated bidder) exist, then. the
unrelated bidder must pay a premium that reflects the target's
higher value use. In this sense, the market for corporate control
seems to be competitive.
6 - Measurement problems - partial anticipation and size effects
A major problem in prior research has been measurement
problems. One important problem is partial anticipation of the
takeover announcement (Malatesta & Thompson 1985) and insider
trading (Jarrell & Poulsen 1989b). The data indicates that, for
unrelated takeovers, most of the announcement effects take place
on days (-1,0). For the core group, however, much of the abnormal
returns are realized well ahead of the actual announcement date.
The reason for the strong upward drift in the stock price before
the announcement date for this group may be that these
transactions are easier to anticipate by investors; such takeover
announcements may represent a culmination of a series of related
strategic moves by the acquiring firm and/or new business or
industry specific signals indicate opportunities for value creation
through M&A. Another interpretation is that insider trading is
more significant for the core group than for the unrelated group.
Another problem can be related to differences in size between
bidders and targets (size effect problem). This second problem is to
some extent mitigated in this study because of the sample
construction; only those transactions where the target represents
at least 10 % of the equity value of the bidder are included. This
does not imply that the size effect problem is gone - only reduced.
Furthermore, partial anticipation is still a problem. Therefore, it is
especially encouraging that the results for bidders yield some
abnormal returns that are significantly different from zero.
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7 - Important link between strategy and finance
This study indicates the important link between strategy and
finance in a takeover context. The takeover market seems to be
competitive in the sense that general synergies are bid away from
the bidders. Specific synergies that create market-failure are a
necessary condition for bidders to create value in takeovers. As
formalized in the model in chapter 3, an optimal target would be a
target with whom the specific synergy potential relative to
alternative bidders' synergy potential is maximized (see equation 7
in the model).
3.2. Target returns
According to virtually all event studies in the M&A field, targets
realize substantial and statistically significant increases in their
stock prices. This applies to the targets both in the strategic core,
related and unrelated group. Furthermore, tests of equality of
means among targets in different strategic groups indicates that
the differences in abnormal returns among core, and unrelated
targets are statistically different from zero at the 5 % level. Targets
in unrelated M&As realize higher abnormal returns than targets
in core M&As. This result contradicts hypothesis 5. Earlier
empirical studies provide inconclusive results. Chatterjee (1986)
finds that unrelated targets outperform related targets, whereas
Singh & Montgomery (1987) find that targets in related
acquisitions have higher returns than targets in unrelated
acquisitions. Lubatkin (1987) finds no difference between
"related" (= product concentric and horizontal & market
concentric) and "unrelated" (conglomerate) mergers.
One reason that targets in unrelated takeovers realize higher gains
than in core transactions may stem from bidding mechanisms in
the market for corporate control. According to the model in
Chapter III above, the winning bidder in an unrelated takeover
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has to pay at least as much as any other potential unrelated, related
or core bidder. This implies that the premium in unrelated
mergers is not necessarily lower than the one in related mergers.
Another possible explanation for the different target group results
might be that the more related the target, the greater the partial
anticipation; the takeover announcement could mark the
culmination of a series of related strategic moves by the acquiring
firm before the announcement to buy a more or less specified
related target. Therefore, a significant fraction of the gains may
be anticipated by the capital market well ahead of the acquisition.
4. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
This section provides cross-sectional regression results explaining
the effects of strategic categories, multiple-bidder contests, time
periods and methods of payment on the abnormal returns for
bidders and targets respectively. Table V.6. below shows the matrix
of correlation coefficients between the independent variables. The
coefficients do not indicate high correlation. If the F-statistic is
significant but none of the t-statistics are significant when the
dependent variable is regressed on the independent variables, this
would be symptomatic of a higher degree of multicollinearity.
Examination of results presented later on reveals that this is not
the case.
4.1. Returns to stockholders of acquiring firms
Results of the weighted least squares regression for bidder firms
for windows (-1,0) and (-1,10) are reported in table V.7. below.3
3 Results of the ordinary
presented in the same table.
section 6 below (sensitivity
window (-20,+ 10) are reported
least squares (OLS)
These results will be
analysis). Results
in appendix 1.
regression are
discussed under
for the larger
TABLE V.6. - RRST ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Table V.S.a. - Correlation coefficients bidder firms
Core Related Multiple Time Cash Mix
Xl X2 X3 ~ Xs Xs
Core Xl
Related X2 -0.224
Multiple X3 -0.022 -0.036
Time X4 0.032 -0.052 -0.005
Cash Xs -0.173 -0.002 0.105 0.182
Mix Xs 0.012 -0.007 -0.001 0.030 -0.450
Table V.S.b. - Correlation coefficients target firms
Core Related Multiple Time Cash Mix
Xl X2 X3 ~ Xs Xs
Core Xl 1
Related X2 -0.231 1
Multiple X3 -0.030 -0.002 1
Time x, 0.012 0.018 0.035 1
Cash Xs -0.154 0.013 0.097 0.267 1
Mix Xs -0.034 -0.015 0.029 -0.014 -0.438 1
TABLEV.7.
CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS BIDDER ARMS
Weighted least squares (WLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results explain the
effects of strategic category, multiple-bidder contests, time period and method of payment on
the abnormal returns to the stockholders of bidder firms involved in 267 completed M&As in
the period 1970-1987. The dependent variable is the abnormal returns for period (-1,0). (t-
statistics in parentheses)
WLS model: AR4/S = Xo/S + X1CIS + X2RIS +X3M/S + ~ TIS + XsP1 IS + XsP2/S
OLS model:AR4 = Xo +X1C + X2R + X3M + ~T + XsP1 + XsP2
where C = 1 if the takeover is a strategic core M&A and zero otherwise, R= 1 if the takeover is
a related, not core M&A and zero otherwise, M = 1 if the offer is made in a multiple-bidder
contest and zero otherwise, T = 1 if the offer is made after 1980 and zero otherwise, P1 = 1 if
the method of payment is cash and zero otherwise, and P2= 1 if the payment method is mixed
and zero otherwise. S = standard error of the market model regression.
Dependent
variable Xo
Core Related Mult.
X1 X2 X3
Time
~
Cash
Xs
Mix
Xs F
WLS regression:
AR4 -0.0209 0.0194 0.0143 -0.0083 -0.0212 0.0312 0.00S6 0.149 0.130 7.60
(-1,0) (-3.78) (2.79) (2.12) (-1.4S) (-3.92) (4.99) (0.76)
AR4,ARS -0.03S6 0.0337 0.00S9 -0.0027 0.0223 0.0490 0.0181 0.10S 0.08S S.10
(-1,10) (-3.9S) (2.98) (0.54) (-0.29) (-2.S4) (4.80) (1.S2)
OLS regression:
AR4 -0.0296 0.0293 0.0121 -0.0069 -0.0148 0.0386 0.0078 0.143 0.123 7.21
(-1,0) (-4.4S) (3.73) (1.48) (-1.0S) (-2.40) (S.48) (0.84)
AR4,ARS -O.OS32 0.0403 0.0002 0.0046 -0.0021 0.OS4S 0.01S6 0.101 0.080 4.87
(-1,10) (-4.71) (3.03) (0.01) (0.42) (-0.20) (4.S6) (1.00)
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Results are essentially the same for both event periods (-1,0 and -
1,10). The discussion of the effects of the various explanatory
variables will therefore only focus on parameter estimates for (-
1,0). However, choice of event period seems to have an impact on
the strategic category variables (core and related, not core). For
these two variables, there will be an explicit examination of the
different event periods.
The intercept term implicitly represents cases where the takeover
is unrelated, has one single bidder, is announced in the 1970s and
is paid for by using an exchange of stocks. The estimate of the
constant is significantly negative (XO=-2.09 %, t=-3.78) which
indicates that the average abnormal return to unrelated single
bidders in the 1970s who paid by using stock is significantly
negative.
Consistent with the results from the time series analysis, we see
that the variable strategic core has a significant positive impact
on the returns to bidder firms. The marginal impact of the core
variable is to significantly increase the bidder abnormal returns
by 1.94 % (t=2.79) for the window (-1,0). For window (-1,10) the
effect is 3.37 % (t=2.98) and for (-20,+10) the impact is 4.19 %
(t=2.75) (see appendix 1). Furthermore, the related, not core
variable also increases returns to bidder firms compared to the
base case (unrelated bidders). The marginal impact is statistically
significant (X2=1.43%, t=2.12) for event period (-1,0) and not
statistically significant (X2 =0.59%, t=0.54) for event period (-1,10)
and (X2=0.73%, t=0.49) for event period (- 20,+10). The impact of the
core variable seems to be strong for all event periods. It seems that
much of the announcement effects for this group of transactions
take place in periods outside (-1,0).4 The impact of the core
variable becomes relatively more important than the related, not
core variable as the length of the event period increases.
4This was also apparent in the time series analysis above.
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As hypothesized, the marginal impact of m u I t i p I e - bid der
contests is to reduce returns to acquiring firms, but this estimate is
not significantly different from zero (X3 =-0.83%, t=-1.45). It is
worthy of note that this result corresponds to evidence reported in
Bradley,Desai & Kim's (1988) cross-sectional study analyzing the
marginal impact of having more than one· bidder. One reason for
not finding a significant impact of this variable may be, as
discussed earlier in this study, that on the announcement date of a
takeover it is often uncertain whether later competing will arrive.
If it turns out to be a multiple bidder contest ex post, this may be
only partially anticipated ex ante by the market. What is actually
being measured in the regression is the market's assessment of the
profitability and the expected value of future higher bids at the
day before and on the announcement date. In some cases,
however, the winning bidder comes in as a "white knight", and it is
therefore already known by the market that this is a multiple
bidder contest.
The estimates of the time variable is significantly negative (X4=-
2.12%, t=- 3.92). This is consistent with the proposition that bidding
firms realize significantly lower returns in the 1980s as compared
to the 1970s, and is also consistent with prior empirical evidence.P
In the 1980s sophisticated defensive tactics developed, investment
banks were more aggressively promoting takeovers using junk
bonds and bridge loans as powerful instruments and takeovers
were to a large extent supported from the Administration of that
time.
The last two variables examine the marginal impact of the payment
method used in the transaction. Bidders realize 3.12 % (t=4.99)
higher returns in cash acquisitions as compared to an acquisition
were there is exchange of common stocks. When the payment
method is m i xed, bidders realize insignificantly higher returns
5 See Bradley, Desai & Kim 1988, Jarrell & Poulsen 1989, Morek,
Shleifer & Vishny 1990).
179
than in an stock exchange transaction (X6=0.56%, t=0.76). The
significant effects from the cash variable is consistent with
empirical evidence presented in Travlos (1987) and lends support
to the hypothesis that the method of payment in a takeover
provides important signals. Assume that managers have
information about· the intrinsic value of their firm which is not
fully reflected in the preacquisition stock price and that they seek
to finance the acquisition in the most profitable way for existing
shareholders. In the vein of Myers & Majluf (1984), cash will be
the preferred method of payment if the firm is believed to be
undervalued, while a common stock exchange offer will be offered
in the opposite cases. Cash as a payment method therefore provides
a signal to the market that the firm is undervalued. The positive
marginal impact of the cash variable is also consistent with
Jensen's(1986) free cash flow hypothesis since the use of cash can
increase firm value by reducing agency problems. Finally,
according to Fishman's (1989) theoretical model, cash can serve as
an instrument in making preemptive takeover bids.
4.2. Returns to target stockholders
Results of the weighted least squares regression for target firms
are reported in table V.8. below. The results for target firms are
reported using two different windows (-1,0) and (-20,+10).6 The
second window includes a longer period before the bid because of
evidence indicating especially strong significant run-up in target
stock-prices before formal bid announcements (e.g., Jarrell &
Poulsen 1989b). Moreover, the days after the formal
announcement (1,10) capture some information about type of
contest (single/multiple) and characteristics of bidder
(core/related/unrelated). Except for variable P2 (mixed payment),
the results for window (-1,0) and (- 20,+ 10) are materially the same.
6Results for the period (-1,10) are reported in appendix 2.
TASLEV.8.
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION TARGET ARMS
Weighted least squares (WlS) and ordinary least squares regression (OLS) results explain the
effects of strategic category, multiple-bidder contests, time period and method of payment on
the abnormal returns to the stockholders of target firms involved in 240 completed M&As in
the period 1970-1987. The dependent variable is abnormal returns for period n. (t-statistics
in parentheses).
WlS model: ARn/S = Xo/S + X1C/S + X2R/S + X3M/S + ~T/S + XsP1/S + XsP2/S
OLS model: ARn = Xo + X1C +X2R + X3M + ~T + XSP1 + XsP2
where C = 1 if the takeover is a strategic core M&A and zero otherwise, R= 1 if the takeover
is related, not core M&A and zero otherwise, M= 1 if the offer is made in a multiple-bidder
contest and zero otherwise, T = 1 if the offer is made after 1980 and zero otherwise, P1= 1 if
the method of payment is cash and zero otherwise, and P2= 1 if the payment method is mixed
and zero otherwise. S = standard error of the market model.
Dep. Core Related Mult. Time Cash Mix ~~.var. X1 X2 X3 X4 Xs Xs R2 F
WlS regression:
AR4 0.0747 -0.0138 -0.0131 -0.0012 0.0018 0.0823 0.0305 0.181 0.160 8.59
(-1,0) (4.35) (-0.70) (-0.66) (-0.08) (0.11) (4.39) (1.36)
AR3,ARS 0.1371 -0.0127 -0.0347 -0.0059 -0.0038 0.1232 0.1014 0.142 0.120 6.44
(-20,+10) (5.60) (-0.45) (-1.22) (-0.26) (-0.16) (4.60) (3.17)
OLS regression:
AR4 0.0679 -0.0197 0.0008 -0.0144 0.0163 0.0802 0.0332 0.099 0.076 4.26
(-1,0) (3.85) (-0.91) (0.04) (-0.81) (0.94) (4.11) (1.36)
AR3,ARS 0.1382 -0.0191 -0.0364 0.0061 0.0010 0.1295 0.1082 0.120 0.097 5.28
(-20, + 10) (5.71) (-0.64) (-1.21) (0.25) (0.04) (4.83) (3.24)
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Therefore. in most cases only the parameter values and t-statistics
of the regression using abnormal returns for window (- 1.0). are
discussed.
The intercept term is significantly positive indicating that
unrelated targets in single-bidder contests that took place in the
1970s where the method of payment is exchange of stocks. earn
7.47 % (t=4.35) in the window (-1.0). In the extended window (-
20.+ 1O). targets on average realize a cumulative abnormal return
that equals 13.71 % (t=5.60).
The parameter estimates associated with the strategic category
variable (co re and related,not core) are consistent with the
results obtained in the above time series analysis. On the margin.
target abnormal returns are reduced when the successful bidder is
related to the targets activities. This reduction is. however. not
significantly different form zero.
The estimated coefficient of the multiple bidder variable is not
significantly different form zero (X3=-0.12%. t=-0.08). In view of
the results of Bradley. Desai & Kim (1988). it is maybe somewhat
surprising that evidence in this study lacks a significant
parameter for this variable. Jarrell & Poulsen (1989) report. on the
other hand. insignificant parameter estimates in line with this
study.
The ti m e variable provides information about the marginal impact
of a takeover taking place in the 1980s as opposed to the 1970s. The
results indicate that the parameter estimates for this variable is
indistinguishable from zero. This is consistent with other studies
analyzing this variable for target firms.7
The point estimate of the coefficient on the cash dummy variable
shows a strong positive effect on target abnormal returns. The
7See Bradley.Desai & Kim (1988) and Jarrell & Poulsen (1989).
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marginal impact on returns in the (-1.0) window is to increase
target returns by as much as 8.23 % (t=4.39). Put differently.
continuously compounded abnormal returns are 8.23 % higher for
( - 1. 0).8 The impact of the m ixed dummy variable is also
significantly positive in the (-20.+ lO) window. Evidence found in
this study regarding the payment method corresponds nicely with
results reported elsewhere.V
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS FROM CROSS-SECTIONAL
ANALYSIS
Results from the cross-sectional analysis in this study yield
interesting insight into the marginal effect of certain variables in
the takeover process. The evidence is by and large consistent with
results reported in the time series analysis above (cf.. core and
related. not core variables) and with other empirical studies
examining the marginal impact of time. cash and mixed payment
dummy variables. Maybe a little bit surprising is the lack of
significantly positive effect of the multiple bidder variable on
target abnormal returns. Overall. the parameter estimates lend
strong support to the hypotheses that strategic core plays a major
role in the takeover situations. that the payment method provides
important signalling/agency/ coinsurance/competitive effects
and that takeover regulation/defensive tactics/government
intervention/financing instruments (as summarized in the time
dummy variable) matter.
8 It is worthy of note that in the (-20.+10) window the difference
amounts to as much as 12 %).
9 See Huang & Walkling 1987. Eckbo & Langohr 1989 and
Eckbo.Maksimovic & Williams 1990).
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6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
This section analyzes how sensitive the cross-sectional results are
to the choice between ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and
weighted least squares (WLS).
By and large the results are not very sensitive to whether a WLS or
an OLS regression is applied. It is worth noting, however, that a
few parameter values are significantly influenced by choice of
regression method. For bidder firms, the related variable changes
from a significantly positive marginal impact (compared to
unrelated takeovers) in the WLS (-1,0) regression to an
insignificant impact in the OLS (-1,0) regression (X2=1.2%, y=1.47).
The same happens to the time variable for window (-1,+ 10). For
tar get firms, the results yield the same conclusions in both
methods for all variables in all event periods.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the major findings and contributions of the
study. Major theoretical, methodological and managerial
implications are highlighted and limitations are discussed. The
studyends with suggestions for future research.
2. MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
This study aims at filling in a step or two in recent theoretical and
empirical research in strategic management and financial
economics. A major purpose of the study is to analyze when
mergers and acquisitions are expected to be profitable for
stockholders of buying and selling companies. This purpose
implies that one has to deal with both recent developments in the
theory of the firm (contract theory, transaction costs theory,
industrial organization economics, incentives) and financial
market theory (efficient markets, auctions and competitive
bidding). Mergers & acquisitions can be regarded as one way of
orgamzmg firm activities. Equivalently, by using the vernacular
from important works on the theory of the firm, institutions serve
the purpose of facilitating exchange and can best be understood as
optimal accommodations to contractual constraints rather than
production constraints. M&A-research therefore implicitly deals
with alternative ways of organizing economic activities and
requires an explicit discussion of alternative institutional modes
(direct entry, strategic alliances and market solutions). However,
the theory of the firm does not alone provide the necessary tools to
properly analyze M&A profitability for stockholders. Financial
market effects should be evaluated simultaneously with arguments
proposed in the theory of the firm area.
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Based on the fundamental premises above, the study develops a
model for M&As. The model emphasizes value creation, strategic
core, efficient boundaries and financial market effects. A main
goal of the model is to provide some guidance for how to make
decisions about efficient firm boundaries. Furthermore, the model
forms a bases for the development of hypotheses that are
empirically testable.
The concept of strategic core is an important building block in the
model. A strategic core is based on unique assets that provide a
foundation a for a firm's sustainable competitive advantage.
Physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, site specificity,
dedicated assets, image/goodwill and strong external alliances are
the key elements in the concept of strategic core and enables firms
to create rents because of market failure (sunk costs, transaction
costs, imperfect information and causal ambiguity). The same core
assets can have important financial market effects because non-
replicability in the product-markets influences the outcome of a
bidding situation in financial markets.
M&As represent a way of creating a competitive advantage
through cost advantage and differentiation. These advantages are
sustainable when economies of scale and scope are based on factors
that create rents in the product-market. If the synergies are not
specific, it is hard to create a rent in the product-market, and one
has to expect that bidding mechanisms in the market for corporate
control ensure that bidders, at best, realize zero gains. A major
theme is therefore to rely on synergy potentials that have the
ability to create imperfections in the product markets. In my
model, an optimal target for bidder n (bn) is one for whom the
difference between bn 's highest possible bid (zero abnormal
return bid) and the next highest bid, is the largest. Put
differently, an optimal strategy for the bidder is to look for a target
whose specific synergy potential relative to other bidders's
synergy potential is maximized. Using the variable notation
presented in Chapter 3 above, this argument can be formalized as
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follows:
n
MaxL(snti
i=l
(n-l)
- max I(Sjti + OBjti))
j=1
The choice between M&As, strategic alliances and internal
development is also formalized in the model. Without using formal
notation, the choice of institutional form is shown to depend on
investment outlay, change in transaction costs, change in
bureaucratic costs, types of synergies and overbidding.
The empirical part of the dissertation applies a market model ID the
following form: l
6
Rjt = aj + bjRmt + lYjndnt + ejt
n=l
and examines a large number of transactions that take place in the
U.S in the 1970-1987 period. Based on both time series and cross-
sectional analysis, the hypotheses proposed are generally
supported. Abnormal returns to bidders in strategic core M&As are
significantly higher than gains in unrelated takeovers. Core
bidders also realize higher abnormal gains than related, not core
bidders (significant at the 10 % level). This finding is consistent
with the proposition that strategic core is important in M&As
because scale and scope economies that create imperfections in the
product markets seem to be necessary in order to create positive
abnormal returns for bidders. The results for related, not core
bidders indicate (in accordance with the model) that relatedness
among bidders and targets is not a sufficient condition for the
acquiring firm to realize positive abnormal returns. Unrelated
bidders generally realize significantly negative returns. This
l Notation as defined earlier in this study.
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result is consistent with the fact that unfolding competitive
bidding mechanisms in the financial markets result in takeover
premiums that more than offset potential net benefits from
integration.
One problem with a time series analysis. is that other factors can
disguise the effects of the variables that are used as the basis for
classification (in this study these variables are core, related, not
core and unrelated). To further examine the strategic
classification variables, we ran a weighted least squares cross
sectional regression model in which other variables' effects are
corrected for. Specifically, we analyze marginal effects of
variables for single/multiple bidding contests, time and method of
payment (cash, mix, stock) in addition to the strategic
classification variables. The results for the cross-sectional
regression models provide additional strong evidence that the core
variable is important. The intercept term of the regression model
represents cases where the takeover is unrelated, has one single
bidder, is announced in the 1970s and is paid for by an exchange of
stocks. The estimate of the constant is significantly negative. It
indicates that average abnormal returns for unrelated single
bidders in the 1970s who paid with stock are significantly
. negative. The variable
bidder abnormal returns.
strategic core significantly increases
The related, not core variable also
increases returns to bidder firms but is less significant.
The evidence also indicates that bidding firms realize lower
returns in the 1980s than in the 1970s. This may be due to
sophisticated defensive tactics, junk bonds, bridge loans,
aggressive investment banks, and a supportive Administration.
Bidders realize significantly higher gains when the payment
method is cash. This is consistent with hypotheses developed
elsewhere in the literature (signaling, free-cash flow hypothesis
and preemptive takeover bidding).
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For target firms the tendency of the core and related, not core
variable is to reduce abnormal returns. This seem to be a logical
result based on the model developed earlier in this study: the
winning bidder in an unrelated takeover has to pay at least as
much as any other potential unrelated, related or core bidder. This
implies that the premium in unrelated mergers is not necessarily
lower than the one in core and related, not core mergers.
Furthermore, the method of payment variable has significant
effects on target returns. This is consistent with empirical results
reported in other studies.
3. IMPLICATIONS
3.1. Theoretical implications
Theory development and empirical results in this study lend
support to several propositions:
(1). It has been extensively argued in this study and elsewhere (see
Reve 1990) that a major dimension for choice between integration,
strategic alliances and markets is the strategic core of a firm. In
the comprehensive model for corporate takeovers presented above,
it is argued that core assets influence; the gains created in M&As
directly and indirectly through effects on industry structure. The
study indicates both theoretically and empirically that the concept
of strategic core is important in M&A research and, more
generally, for theories of the firm.
(2). Core M&As are more likely to create positive abnormal returns
for bidding firm shareholders than other strategic M&As. Since
economies of scale and scope based on core assets (physical asset
specificity, human asset specificity, site specificity, dedicated
assets, image/goodwill, strong external alliances) are more often
associated with sunk costs, transaction costs, imperfect
information and causal ambiguity, they will be more specific and
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sustainable. If the synergy effects are positive and specific, it is
easier for bidding firms to realize positive abnormal returns.2
(3). Relatedness, per se, is seemingly not enough to create positive
abnormal returns for bidders in M&As. Bidding mechanisms tend
to imply that bidders in unrelated and related, not core M&As
realize at best zero net present value from their investments.
Other institutional solutions would often be better under these
circumstances.
(4). According to the theoretical model developed in this study,
unrelated bidders must pay at least as much as the bidder with the
highest alternative valuation of the target. Therefore, to win, the
unrelated bidder must overbid. Evidence from this study strongly
indicates that this happens in "real life", This may be due to
winner's curse or an agency problem (deliberate overbidding).
Even in "rational" models one should account for the possibility
that alternative bidders overbid. That is why a variable for
overbidding is included in the model above.
(5). This study indicates that strategic core and specific synergies
are important for bidder abnormal returns. As discussed in the
theoretical model in chapter 3, type of synergies and assets that
are transferred are important for the choice between M&As,
strategic alliances and markets. The core variable is inextricably
linked to transaction costs theory (highly specific) and industrial
organization economics (sustainable competitive advantage). In
that sense, the results are consistent with these perspectives.
(6). Financial market effects should be evaluated simultaneously
with propositions from the theory of the firm area. Bidding
mechanisms may influence predictions based on theories of firm
2 One should also remember that the bidder gains for the core
group may partly stem from increased collusion. However, the
market power hypothesis is not supported in earlier empirical
studies.
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organization that do not account for these effects. Furthermore, as
argued in the market model developed above, the optimal target for
a bidder is the one with which the specific synergy potential
relati ve to alternative bidders' synergy potential is maximized.
(7). Evidence in this study supports the proposition that in the
market for corporate control takeover legislation and other
exogenous factors have important impacts on shareholders
abnormal returns and therefore on firm boundary decisions.
These exogenous factors are represented in this study by the time
variable.
(8). The method of payment in takeover bids also seems to have an
important effect on abnormal returns. Stock price returns to
acquiring firms are significantly lower in offers financed with
new equity issues than in offers financed with cash.
3.2. Methodological implications
In accordance with most empirical studies that examine abnormal
returns in M&As, this studyapplies a market model. The event
study methodology proves more useful than alternative
methodologies and, furthermore, the market model seems to be well
specified (see Brown and Warner 1980,1985 and Malatesta 1986).
In addition, to conduct a traditional time-series analysis, this study
also applies a cross-section analysis which relates the excess
returns associated with M&As to theoretically appropriate factors.
These factors may explain why M&As differ in the value they
create and may help us avoid the hidden effects in the time series
analysis.
The fact that this study finds significant effects (which has been a
problem in much M&A research to obtain), may partially be
attributed to the sample construction process. To circumvent some
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of the size-effect problems, the target had to have a market value
of at least 10 % of the bidder's market value two months prior to the
announcement of the bid.
The time series analysis reveals that partial anticipation and
insider trading indeed have important effects on the abnormal
returns of both buying and selling firms. The upward drift in
stock prices is especially strong for target stockholders, but also
seems on average to be important for the core bidder group.
3.3. Managerial implications
The theoretical model and empirical results in this study have
strong normative implications for management. Some of the most
important implications are:
(1). It is hard to realize positive abnormal returns in M&As.
Competitive markets demand high premiums; many hidden
bureaucratic costs exist, and synergy potentials are hard to realize.
(2). One major task is to explicitly define the firm's strategic core.
What type of assets and skills create sustainable competitive
advantage for the firm? Make sure that the strategic core is
clearly defined, avoid being too vague. Then look for synergy
potentials that may be based on core assets. These synergies may
create imperfections in the product market and enable the firm to
profit from a takeover. Strategic M&As should aim to create
competitive advantage through imperfections in the product-
market.
(3). Analyze alternative potential bidders' synergy gains.
their potential general and specific synergy gains.
Predict
(4). If the specific synergy potential for the focal bidder is large
relative to the bidder with the highest alternative specific synergy
potential, consider submitting a takeover bid.
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(5). Before making a bid, evaluate alternative institutional modes
(internal development, strategic alliances and market solution).
Do they provide a more profitable solution? Factors that influence
this are discussed in length earlier in this study.
(6). Do not expect to realize posinve abnormal returns in related,
not core M&As. Synergy potentials here are in general fewer and
less specific and will therefore often be bid away in the financial
market.
(7). Unrelated takeovers are generally unprofitable. To win a
takeover contest. the firm must pay a premium that, under most
circumstances, outweighs potential net benefits.
(8). Takeover legislation and other
strongly affect takeover profitability.
exogenous factors may
These factors must be
thoroughly examined before a decision is made.
(9). Financing of a bid strongly affects shareholders' abnormal
returns and is therefore an important decision variable.
4. LIMIT ATIONS OF STUDY
This section considers possible limitations of the study.
Specifically, the following aspects are discussed: sample selection,
assumptions about the strategic core, content validity of strategic
. \
classification measure, aggregated data and confounding variables.
One of the requirements for this study's sample selection process is
that both bidder and target are listed on NYSE or AMEX when the
transaction is announced. Furthermore, two months prior to the
announcement date the target must have a market value of at least
10 % of the bidder's market value. It is uncertain whether this
sample requirement introduces a bias compared to samples in
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which all takeovers are included. Large transactions often create
more publicity, larger degrees of information production. and
dissemination, arbitrage activity and very competitive bidding
si tuations.
One important assumption in the study is that the firm owns or
controls rent-yielding factors (strategic core). This assumption is
reflected in the comparison of three and four digit SIC codes for
bidder and target. If bidder and target share the three first SIC
codes, the transaction is classified as a strategic core M&A. The
assumption is that synergy potentials exist in the core business of
the bidder, and that this core business creates an imperfection in
the product-market. Thus, if a firm does not own or control a rent-
yielding factor, then the measure will not apply. However, in
large samples with large firms that choose to merge core activities,
one should expect to find rent-yielding factors.
The content validity of the SIC codes is a general problem in
corporate strategy and industrial organization research. This is
discussed above in Chapter 3, section 4. Alternative measurement
variables for strategic classification will be discussed below in
section 5.2 ..
Since the data is based on a sample of several hundred firms, the
synergy potential in a specific merger is not assessed. Moreover,
according to the model discussed in Chapter 3, the bidder must
realize larger specific synergies with a target than those
potentially created by alternative bidders. This would require
identification of potential bidders and analysis of their value
creating capabilities in all value chain activities with a target.
Such information is not readily available and is not used in this
study.
In an empirical studyone runs the risk of underlying
confounding variables. To investigate this problem future studies
might come up with explanatory variables that systematically vary
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with different strategic categories.
S. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
5.1. Theory development
It is beyond dispute that there is a need for further theory
development associated with issues discussed in this study. One
important aim of this section is to envision possible developments
that would sharpen old theories and develop new theories, examine
new concepts, and link this theory to other theoretical
perspectives.
Future research must elaborate on the concept of strategic core.
How do core assets and resources create competitive advantage for
the way a firm competes and the way it adapts to its industry
structure? An important issue that has not received enough
attention in the literature is: how are core factors developed? Can
core skills be developed intentionally or are they created through
a more random process where luck and historic events determine
who can benefit from such skills? Maybe different types of core
factors are developed differently in the sense that some core
factors can be developed by planning and devotion of resources
while others develop via a process that is maybe poorly understood
and under weak control of management.
The sustainability of core factors is another issue that deserves
more research attention. How do underlying factors (such as sunk
costs, transaction costs, imperfect information and causal
ambiguity) affect the core factors and the industry structure in
which the firm competes? Furthermore, can sustainability be
ensured when core skills are transferred to other related areas?
As indicated earlier in this study, there is a strong relationship
between core variables and industry structure. This connection
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creates interesting static and dynamic effects in light of
competition and creation of sustainable competitive advantage. Of
particular interest is the question: how does the strategic core
affect the determinants of industry structure (rivalry, threat of
substitutes and bargaining power of buyers and suppliers). Core
factors seemingly affect the industry structure through sunk costs
and imperfect information. To choose successful strategies that
exploit market failures, it is important to understand how these
underlying factors affect the determinants of industry structure.
Theories based on a static view of strategic core can be modified by
the timing dimension in competition. More research should be
done on how timing and first mover advantages influence the way
a firm organizes its firm boundaries (mergers & acquisitions,
internal development, strategic alliances and market solution).
Boundary choices should only be made after careful analysis of
both static and dynamic aspects of the factors that influence the
optimal mode of firm organization.
In Chapter 1, the M&As process is divided into five steps: (1)
strategic, organizational and legal analysis, valuation execution of
transaction and strategy implementation. It would be interesting
to consider relationships between M&A type and strategy
implementation. Related M&As with complex synergy transfers
and organizations create more difficulties in the implementation
process than synergies based on less related M&As.
Implementation costs are likely to be dependent on the type of
synergies that are analyzed. For instance, transferring reputation
demands less coordination of activities (links between divisions)
than for example sharing logistics or manufacturing processes.
Implementation costs are also likely to increase with the number
of divisions and reciprocal linkages that exist both before and
after a takeover. Related to this aspect is how congruent are the
portfolio of businesses internally for each bidder and target; that
is, the variation of business activities within each firm. Finally, as
noted by Bartlett (1986), organizational historyand management
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culture (ingrained values, norms and practices of its management)
define some kind of "administrative heritage" and tend to
influence the firm's ability to realize synergies through
coordination of value chain activities.
Another issue to further examine is: do a bidder's abnormal
returns depend on the types of synergies involved. Synergies can
be divided into shared activities, shared knowledge/skills, shared
external relations and shared image/reputation. It seems plausible
that these different types of synergies are associated with
different types of costs and benefits. The marginal cost of
transferring synergies based on shared external relations and
shared image/reputation often seems to be less than the average
cost of creating these relationship/reputation effects. Moreover,
there does not seem to be any clearly defined synergy limits based
on these factors. On the other side, sharing activities implies high
implementation costs and the synergy potential is more limited. As
a result, we may find systematic differences in a bidder's abnormal
returns, depending on the type of synergies realized in different
transactions.
Another examination of this study would be to focus on
international M&As. As discussed in Porter (1986) international
business strategies situations have a unique array of dimensions.
These dimensions are important when a firm chooses between
M&As and strategic alliances.
As argued throughout this study, there is a link between strategy
and finance. It would be interesting to analyze whether this link
represents a happy marriage or more of a one night stand. How do
financial markets and corporate control effects (competitive
bidding, information, proxy fights, tender offers, mergers) affect
firm organization (M&As, strategic alliances and markets) in the
product markets?
There is also a need to better understand: what is the best means
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for gaining control of a firm? Is it a merger or a tender offer?
What are the relative advantages of one mode as compared to. the
other? How do each of these modes influence the distribution of
gains between bidders and targets, and how does arbitrage interact
with this choice? Moreover, how should proxy fights be regarded
as a substitute for merger/tender offers?
Finally, Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory should be examined
in relation to strategic categories. One would expect that firms
with lots of free cash flow and few investments opportunities are
more likely to engage in acquisitions that do not benefit
shareholders.
5.2. Measurement variables
A natural extension of this study would be to apply alternative
methods to measure the concept of strategic core (and implicitly
the degree of diversification) in view of the relationship between
bidder and target firms. A major theme in the study is that bidders
are expected to realize higher abnormal returns when net
synergies are based on factors that create imperfections in the
product-markets. One implication of this theme is that bidders
should gain more from synergies based on the bidders' strategic
cores. To examine this key issue, we must apply measures that have
strong links to the analyzed concept (in this case strategic core).
There are obviously many possible ways of measuring firm
diversification and relationships among bidders and targets - some
of which would be too costly to use in big samples.3 In a study
3For example, one can imagine a measurement method where for
each firm its value chain is analyzed - both with respect to
aCUVIUes being performed (and their interrelationships), cost,
revenue and risk structures and external relationships (products,
markets and the implied industry structure). Actually, this would
imply a full strategic analysis of each firm. Evidently, this is not
possible when large samples are involved. Case studies may,
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based on large firms (as in this current study) any simplified
diversification measure will of course be associated with many
weaknesses. Large firms often have complex structures with many
internal and external relationships that determine the firms'
success. Needless to say, the statics and dynamics of what is
happening internally in a firm and externally in its industry
structure/environments can simply not be measured by one single
variable. However, a good measure captures certain traits that we
are interested in examining and establishes the necessary link to
the concept under scrutiny.
To test the sensitivity of the results to alternative methods of
measuring strategic core and bidder-target relationships, different
classification schemes should be applied. In my view, there are at
least three other measures that have an interesting link to the
strategic core concept and therefore deserve further examination:
(1) comparing several SIC codes, (2) weighted SIC codes and (3)
Rumelt's classification system (see supplement 3).
One suggestion is to compare more than one SIC-code among bidder
and target. One example would be to compare the three most
important SIC codes among bidder and target. The most common
SIC-code among the firms could then determine the classification
of the transaction. Such a categorical measure would be
problematic in a takeover context; assume, for example, that two
firms are core related in the third most important SIC code and that
this business area only accounts for 20%. The bidder then buys all
or a share of all target's assets. He buys assets associated with the
20% of the core related area, but also assets associated with 80% of
the rest of the firm that might be totally unrelated.
Another measure can be based on weighted SIC codes. One rule
could be: compare the major SIC code for bidder and target. For
however, be fruitful in order to highlight certain issues that may
be of interest in such cases.
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each finn. the major SIC code is assigned a weight. for example the
percentage of finn i's total sales that take place in a particular
market. If the SIC codes are value weighted. one can gain
additional insight into the relationship between the firms. If the
major SIC codes account for 60% of the bidder's activities and 40%
of the target 'activities. one can compute an index value as 40% x
60% =24%. This index and the relationship between the bidder and
target can be used simultaneously to construct a new measure. The
advantage of such a measure is that it compares major businesses
and in addition it accounts for the percentages of the merging
firms' activities in these markets.
A third possible way of classifying the M&As is to build upon
Rumelt's classification system. This classification is based on a
two-tier breakdown to assign a firm to diversification categories.
Assignment to a "main" diversification category (single. dominant.
related and unrelated) is based on the percentage of a finn's total
sales that can be attributed to a "discrete business area". Further
differentiation is based on the pattern of linkages among a finn's
business lines. One principle subdivision of the major groups is
based on the "constrained" vs. "linked" criteria. In other words. is
the firm's diversification built on a single or on several strengths
and resources. According to Montgomery (1982) this division is
associated with the degree of diversification. One implication of
this diversification rule is that Rumelt's measure may be applied to
the strategic concepts used in my study of M&As.
In addition to measures of strategic classification. there are other
explanatory variables that may be of interest (confer discussion in
the theory development section 5.1. above). One way to analyze the
relative importance of a firm's strategic core and its industry
effects is to construct a takeover index. This index should capture
information about recent takeover activity in the industry. say two
years before and after the announcement date of the analyzed
transaction. One should expect that the higher frequency of
takeovers in the industry. the lower the abnormal returns for
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bidding firms.
Several examples of other variables that may interact with
strategic classification variables come to mind. Previous
ownership in a firm, ownership concentration and fractions of
shares bought may allow us to analyze bidding mechanisms in
strategic mergers and acquisitions (see Grossman & Hart 1980,
Shleifer & Vishny 1986 and Bradley,Desai & Kim 1988). Industry
concentration ratios on both the bidder and seller side and number
of rival firms can be used to analyze bargaining relationships in a
takeover setting. Free cash flow effects can be examined for
instance by defining free cash flow as operating income before
depreciation minus interest
and common dividends.f
expense, taxes, preferred dividends
In Chapter 1 the M&As process is
illustrated. Strategy implementation is an important side of M&As,
and its influence on abnormal returns may be empirically tested.
For example, a variable measuring the number of
interrelationships (links) among divisions and/ or number of
divisions in a firm may capture important information on
bureaucratic and implementation costs.
5.3. Methodology
This studyapplies a market model (see Brown & Warner 1985) for
the time series analysis of stock price reactions to takeover bids.
The cross-sectional analysis in the studyapplies both weighted
least squares (WLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
models. The WLS model accounts for the possibility of
heteroskedastisity in the data by standardizing all variables with
the standard error of the market model regression (S). By and
large, results are not sensitive to the choice between WLS and OLS
regression.
4Lang,Stulz & Walkling (1990) apply this definition of free cash
flow.
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Eckbo, Maksimovic & Williams (1990) argue that if an event is
voluntary and investors are rational, then standard OLS estimators
are inconsistent. The intuition behind the argument goes like this:
assume that it is common knowledge among investors that
managers initiate an event only after receiving a private signal
indicating that the event has a positive value. This implies that
abnormal returns from announcements only occur if management
has valuable private information that is not reflected in the
market prices prior to the event. Rational outside investors would
then use the event announcement and their knowledge of insiders'
incentives to infer private information. Consequently, the market
uses its knowledge of managers' incentives to evaluate the
expected abnormal returns. This inference truncates the residual
term that measures the value of manager's private information. In
OLS cross-sectional regressions this truncation is ignored
implying that the estimators of the cross-sectional coefficients are
inconsistent. To avoid this problem, consistent maximum
likelihood (ML) estimators can be constructed.
A natural methodological extension of this study would therefore
be to construct a consistent estimator using a nonlinear cross-
sectional maximum likelihood model.
APPENDIX1
CROSS-SECTIONALRESULTSBIDDERARMS
Weighted least squares (WLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results explain the
effects of strategic category, multiple-bidder contests, time period and method of payment on
the abnormal returns to the stockholders of bidder firms involved in 267 completed M&As in
the period 1970-1987. The dependent variable is the abnormal returns for period (-1,0). (t-
statistics in parentheses)
WLSmodel: AR4jS = XojS + X1CjS + X2RjS +X3MjS + ~TjS + X5PljS + XsP2jS
OLS model:AR4 = Xo +X1C + X2R + X3M + ~T + X5Pl + XsP2
where C= 1 if the takeover is a strategic core M&A and zero otherwise, R= 1 if the takeover is
a related, not core M&A and zero otherwise, M= 1 if the offer is made in a multiple-bidder
contest and zero otherwise, T= 1 if the offer is made after 1980 and zero otherwise, Pl = 1 if
the method of payment is cash and zero otherwise, and P2= 1 if the payment method is mixed
and zero otherwise. S = standard error of the market model regression.
Dependent
variable Xo
Core Related Mult.
Xl X2 X3
Cash
X5
Mix
Xs F
WLS regression:
AR3,AR5 -0.0392 0.0419 0.0073 0.0073 -0.0181 0.0454 0.0219 0.061 0.039 2.79
(-20,+ 10) (-3.24) (2.75) (0.49) (0.58) (-1.53) (3.32) (1.37)
OLS regression:
AR4 -0.0574 0.0575 0.0104 0.0134 -0.0083 0.0536 0.0248 0.071 0.050 3.30
(-20,+10) (-3.80) (3.23) (0.56) (-0.90) (-0.59) (3.35) (1.18)
APPENDIX2
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION TARGET ARMS
Weighted least squares (WLS) and ordinary least squares regression (OLS) results explaining
the effects of strategic category, multiple-bidder contests, time period and method of payment
on the abnormal returns to the stockholders of target firms involved in 240 completed M&As
in the period 1970-1987. The dependent variable is abnormal returns for period n. (t-
statistics in parentheses).
WLS model: ARn/S = Xo/S + X1C/S + X2R/S + X3M/S + ~T/S + XSP1/S + XsP2/S
OLS model: ARn = Xo + X1C +X2R + X3M + X4T + XSP1 + XsP2
where C = 1 if the takeover is a strategic core M&A and zero otherwise, R= 1 if the takeover
is related, not core M&A and zero otherwise, M = 1 if the offer is made in a multiple-bidder
contest and zero otherwise, T = 1 if the offer is made after 1980 and zero otherwise, P1= 1 if
the method of payment is cash and zero otherwise, and P2=1 if the payment method is mixed
and zero otherwise. S = standard error of the market model.
Dep. Core Related Mult. Time Cash Mix ~~.var. X1 X2 X3 ~ Xs Xs R2 F
WLS regression:
AR4,ARS 0.OSS2 0.0024 -O.016S 0.012S 0.0067 0.1038 O.OSOO 0.182 0.162 8.68
(-1,+10) (2.74) (0.10) (-0.71) (0.67) (0.34) (4.72) (1.90)
OLS regression:
AR4,ARS 0.0499 -0.\>102 -0.0088 -0.0037 0.0122 0.1063 O.OS68 0.106 0.083 4.61
(-1,+10) (2.39) (-0.34) (-0.34) (0.17) (0.S9) (4.S9) (1.97)
SUPPLEMENT 1
DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF THE CONCEPTOFSYNERGY
Kitching (1967) - production (economies of scale,
quantity discounts, increased
purchasing power)
- technology (sharing R&D, transferring
technical processes)
- organization (eliminating duplicated
functions, motivation)
- finance (access to capital, lower
borrowing costs)
Lubatkin (1983) - technical economies (scale economies)
- pecuniary economies (market power)
- diversification economies (risk red.)
Bradley, Desai &
Kim (1983)
- more efficient management
- scale economies
- improved production technologies
- combination of complementary resources
- market power
Wells (1984) - shared activities
- shared knowledge and skills
- shared image, values
Porter (1985) - tangible interrelationships (economies
of scale, economies of scope, power)
- intangible interrelationships
(transference of generic skills and
knowhow)
- competitor interrelationships (rival
firms compete in more than one industry)
Chatterjee (1986) - financial synergy
- operating synergy
- collusive synergy
Hill & Hoskisson (1987) - economies of scale
- economies of scope
- financial economies
Singh & Montgomery
(1987)
Lubatkin & O'Neill
(1987)
Ansoff (1988)
Jones & Hill (1988)
- economies of scale
- economies of scope
- market power
- tangible Interrelationships
- intangible interrelationships
- competitor interrelationships
- sales synergy
- operating synergy
- investment synergy
- management synergy
- economies of scope
- economies of integration
- internal capital markets
SUPPLEMENT 2: SUMMARY OF SYNERGIES SPECIRED BY ACTIVITY
1. TANGIBLE INTERRELATIONSHIPS
INFRASTRUCTURE
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Shared financing
Shared cash utilization
Shared accounting
Shared legal department
Shared government relations
Shared hiring and training
TECHNOLOGICAL
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Joint technology development
Joint interface design
PROCUREMENT
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Joint procurement
PRODUCTION
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Shared inbound logistical system
Shared components
Shared component fabrication facilities
Shared assembly facilities
Shared testing/quality control
Shared indirect activities
MARKET
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Shared brandname
Shared advertising
Shared promotion
Cross selling of products to each
others' buyers
Interrelated pricing of complementary
products
Bundled selling
Shared marketing department
Shared channels/sales offices
Shared service network
Shared order processing
2. INTANGIBLE
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Transfer of know how/skills
3. COMPETITOR
INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Multipoint competitors
Source: Based on Porter (1985:chap. 9)
SUPPLEMENT 3 - SOME MAJOR CLASSIFICATIONS OF
MERGER/DIVERSIACATION STRATEGIES
Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) classification in "Statistical Report on
Mergers and Acquisitions:
1. Horizontal - An acquisition is horizontal when the companies involved
produce one or more of the same, or closely related, products in the same
geographic market.
2. Vertical - An acquisition is vertical when two companies involved had a
potential buyer-seller relationship prior to the merger.
3. Product extension - An acquisition is considered to be product extension in
type when the acquiring and acquired companies are functionally related in
production and/or distribution but sell products that do not compete directly
with one another.
4. Market extension - An acquisition is considered to be market extension in
type when the acquiring and acquired companies manufacture the same
products, but sell them in different geographic markets.
5. Unrelated - This category involves the consolidation of two essentially
unrelated firms.
Singh & Montgomery (1987): Related and Unrelated
1.Related - At least one of the following characteristics (1) similar production
technologies, (2) similar science-based research, (3) similar products and/or
markets.
2. Unrelated - Consolidation of two essentially unrelated firms.
Shelton (1988) builds on Salter & Weinhold (1979):
1. Identical - Similar products, similar customers
2. Related complementary - New products, similar customers
3. Related supplementary - Similar products, new customers
4. Unrelated - new products, new customers
Hopkins (1987):
1. Technology related - Involves firms which supplement an already
established distinctive competence in some product technology or
manufacturing process by acquiring firms with the same, or similar, production
techniques or product technology.
2. Marketing related - Involves firms with an established competence in
marketing, often specializing in branded consumer products, which these firms
exploit by acquiring companies whose products are sold in the same or similar
manner, distributed through the same or similar channels, and use the same
or similar forms of advertising and promotion.
3. Conglomerate strategy - these firms acquire companies in areas unrelated
to their main business.
Williams,Paez & Sanders (1988):
1. Horizontal restructuring - Involving a business comprising the same skill in
the same market.
2. Vertical restructuring - Involving a business forward or backward in the
value chain of one of the firm's major lines of business
3. Complementary (market) restructuring - Involving a business which
enhances one of the firm's major lines of business with a different skill or
technology.
4. Supplementary (market) restructuring - Involving a business which serves a
different market than one of the firm's major lines of business, but which is
based on a similar skill or technology used in one of the major lines of
business.
5. Unrelated restructuring - Involving a business comprising a different skill
a different market.
Rumelt's (1974,1982) classification has been used in several studies:
1. Single business - Any firm which derives 95 % or more of its revenues
from one business
2. Dominant business - Any firm which derives 70-94 % of its revenues from
its largest single business. Divided into four sub-classifications:
a) Dominant vertical - Any dominant firm with a high vertical ratio
b) Dominant constrained - Any dominant firm which diversified by building on
a single strength or resource associated with the original business
c) Dominant linked - Any dominant firm which diversified on the bases of one
ore several strengths or resources. The particular strength or resource varied
across the different businesses in the firm.
d) Dominant unrelated - Any dominant firm whose diversification activities
are not related to the dominant business.
3. Related business - Any firm deriving less than 70 % of its sales from a
single business and possessing a high relatedness ratio. Divided into two sub-
classifications:
a) Related constrained - Any related firm which diversified by building on a
single strength or resource associated with the original business.
b) Related linked - Any related firm which diversified on the basis of one of
several strengths or resources. The particular strength or resource varies
across different businesses in the firm.
4. Unrelated business - Any firm deriving less than 70 % of its sales from a
single business and possessing lower relatedness ratios. Two sub-
classifications:
a) Multi-business - Any unrelated firm containing a few large unrelated
businesses .
b) Unrelated portfolio - Any unrelated firm containing many unrelated
businesses.
SUPPLEMENT 4 - TAKEOVER PREMIlMS FOR 681 SUCCESSFUL OFFERS IN THE PERIOO 1963 - 1985a
Cash tender premil.l"s Cash merser premiums Stock merser premiums
Mean Mean Mean
Row Year Nl.JIIber premilIll(%) Nl.JIIber premilIll(%) Nl.JIIberpremi lill (%)
1963 2 35.6 4 - 7.0 12 29.4
2 1964 3 45.7 6 34.3 11 32.8
3 1965 7 41.0 2 44.5 13 35.8
4 1966 7 40.3 2 49.7 17 39.9
5 1967 7 59.6 3 24.1 35 25.5
6 1968b 5 39.8 2 34.9 45 27.3
7 1968c 4 44.6 0.7 6 25.7
8 1969d O O 2 20.5
9 1969 2 19.7 O 24 27.2
10 1970 2 41.9 O 12 42.5
11 1971 3 20.2 O 12 41.6
12 1972 51.7 O 14 31.3
13 1973 3 26.0 2 31.6 16 49.3
14 1974 7 108.4 5 106.1 12 62.1
15 1975 8 99.6 2 123.9 12 77.2
16 1976 14 66.3 5 30.7 17 68.1
17 1977 9 72.9 14 54.3 29 73.8
18 1978 13 76.3 17 76.8 20 66.0
19 1979 20 97.8 15 77.1 13 62.2
20 1980 8 80.9 8 80.2 12 81.2
21 1981 9 72.5 8 89.2 7 43.8
22 1982 9 80.3 6 89.9 9 71.5
23 1983 7 93.2 6 33.2 8 66.3
24 1984 21 52.8 6 36.2 10 46.8
25 1985 19 45.2 5 58.9 4 61.9
a: Takeover premillllSare calculated by dividing the market value of consideration (cash, common stock,
or preferred stock) offered per target share minus the target's previous share price (measured 60 calendar
days before the offer announcement) by the target's previous share price. If consideration is stock, the
value of the acquirer'S offer is measured 60 days before the offer announcement.
b: Before passage of the Williams Act (January through July 29, 1968)
C: After passage of Williams Act (July 29,1968 through December 1985)
d: 1969 takeovers in which the offer was made before the Willams Act was passed
Conclusions: Cash tender, cash merger and stock merger takeover premiums for 1974-1985 are approximately
double those for 1963-1973
Source:Nathan & O'Keefe (1989)
SUPPLEMENT 5 - BREAK-EVEN TAKEOVER GAINS FOR ACQUISITION OF
CORPORATION "B" WITH A PRE-OFFER VALUE OF 100 AND DISCOUNT
RATE OF 10 %
Takeover
premium (%) 10 20 40 60 80 100
Implementation
horizon (year)
O 10 20 40 60 80 100
1 11 22 44 66 88 110
2 12.1 24.2 48.4 72.6 96.8 121
3 13.3 26.6 53.2 79.8 106.4 133
4 14.6 29.2 58.4 87.6 116.8 146
5 16.1 32.2 64.4 96.6 128.8 161
6 17.7 35.5 70.8 106.2 141.6 177
7 19.5 39 78.0 117.0 156.0 195
SUPPLEMENT 6: BRIEF OVERVIEW OVER THE STANDARD CLASSIFICATION
GROUPINGS AS OF 1987
Major
Group
01-09
10-19
20-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-89
91-94
99
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION GROUPINGS
Description
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
Mining and Construction
Manufacturing
Transport, Communications, and Utilities
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Other Service Industries
Government Services
Nonclassifiable Industries
aass Description
Example of Oassification Hierarchy
35 Machinery, except electrical
351 Engines and turbines
3511 Steam engines
3519 Internal combustion engines
Oass Description
Example of Four-Digl Expansion
36 Electrical equipment
363 Household appliances ~
36:) 1 Household cooking equipment
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